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Professor Shivram Dattatray Joshi was born in Konkan in
the town of Ratnagiri on August 15, 1926. He was born into
a family of Sanskrit Pandits. His father and his uncle were
both Sanskrit Pandits dedicated to the tradition of
Vyakarana. His father died when Shivram was still a child,
and he was sent to Pune to stay with his uncle, Maheshwar
Shastri Joshi, who taught Sanskrit at the Poona Sanskrit
College in Datewadi near the Bhikardas Maruti temple in
Sadashiv Peth. Under the guidance of his uncle, Shivram
became a master of Sanskrit Vyakarana at a very early age.
He passed the Vyakarana-Tirtha examination of the Bengal
Sanskrit Association in 1941 at the age of fifteen. He
passed the Vyakaranottarna examination from Baroda in 1942;
the Vyakaraim-Cudamani examination of the Vedasastrottejaka
Sabha, Pune, in 1944; and the Vyakaranacarya examination of
the Poona Sanskrit College in 1945. Having become a
recognized teacher of Sanskrit in Pune before reaching the
age of twenty, he began teaching at the Poona Sanskrit
College. While he thus pursued the path of traditional
Sanskrit scholarship, other boys of his age went to English
schools and colleges. The financial rewards for teaching
Sanskrit were meager at best, and the young scholar and his
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students followed the honorable Pune tradition of
Mddhukart. During this period, S. D. Joshi became a
well-known teacher of Sanskrit in Pune, and many college
students and even college teachers began studying with him.
He was the principal of the Poona Sanskrit College from
1947-1955.
This was the situation when Professor D. H. H. Ingalls
of Harvard University came to Pune in the early fifties. He
wished to read Sanskrit grammatical texts with a Pandit, and
the young S. D. Joshi was recommended to him by Dr. V. G.
Paranjpe and Mahamahopadhyaya Kashinath Shastri Abhyankar.
S. D. Joshi, who had never studied English, read these texts
with Ingalls using Sanskrit as the medium of conversation.
Ingalls soon recognized a brilliant mind and could see that,
if his traditional learning were augmented by western
training in critical methods, Joshi would become a scholar
of unequaled abilities. With this realization, Ingalls
encouraged Joshi to get his B.A. in Sanskrit and then to
apply for a scholarship to go to Harvard for a Ph.D.
At this stage Joshi decided to finish the high school
matriculation examination. In 1955 he received his B.A. in
Sanskrit from the University of Poona. Although he was
officially a student in their classes, his professors of
Sanskrit were well aware of Joshi's exceptional abilities
and often modified their views in accordance with his
suggestions. It was during his college days, that my
father, Murlidhar Vasudeo Deshpande, became his classmate.
Initially my father was unaware of the fact that S. D. Joshi
was already an accomplished scholar and teacher. To him he
was just a close friend. One day, Joshi took him to Poona
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Sanskrit College. My father mentioned that there was said
to be a very learned teacher, called Panditji, in that
college and that he would very much like to meet him. After
some time, Joshi revealed the fact that he was that
Panditji. I was just a child at the time, yet I distinctly
remember my father's excitement. Panditji has remained a
close friend to my father and a dear uncle (kaka) to me. He
took me to my first restaurant in Pune. This was before he
went to America to do his Ph.D.
After getting his B.A. in Sanskrit, S. D. Joshi was
awarded a fellowship to study at Harvard. He went that same
year. I still remember the long conversations he and my
father had before he left. After some time at Harvard, he
returned to Pune and married one of his college classmates,
Kalavati Bhagwat, on June 22, 1958. After the birth of his
son, Anandavardhan, he returned to Harvard and in 1960
finished his doctoral dissertation on Kaundabhatta's
Dhatvarthanirnaya under the guidance of Professor Ingalls.
After returning to Pune in 1960, S. D. Joshi joined the
Department of Sanskrit Dictionary at the Deccan College. In
1964, he joined the Centre of Advanced Study in Sanskrit at
the University of Poona as a Reader in Sanskrit. In 1970,
he became Professor and Head of the Department of Sanskrit
and Prakrit Languages. From 1974 to 1987, he served as
Director of the Centre of Advanced Study in Sanskrit. Since
1987, he has been the General Editor of the Sanskrit
Dictionary Project at the Deccan College. In 1971-72, he
was a visiting professor at Harvard, and in 1976-77, a
visiting professor at Nagoya University, Japan. He has
visited and lectured at numerous universities in and out of
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India. He is currently the General Secretary of the All
India Oriental Conference. Among the numerous honors he has
received, we would like to mention the most recent one.
Professor Joshi received an award from the President of
India on August 15, 1991, as a Rastriya Pandita (National
Scholar).
It was S. D. Joshi who inspired and encouraged me to
join the field of Sanskrit studies. He did this by both his
advice and his example. But, beyond our personal
relationship, I honor and respect him as a teacher. During
the two years (1966-1968) when I was studying for my
master's degree in Sanskrit at Pune, Professor Joshi taught
me more than I could have learned in twelve years with
another teacher. Besides the two scheduled hours per week,
he invited his class to his home every evening. During
these long sessions, he explained to us in meticulous detail
the intricate arguments in the Mahahhasya and the Paribha-
sendusekhara. It was an unparalleled saturation and trans-
mission of knowledge, a gift from a teacher to his students,
one that cannot be matched. Many generations of students
have experienced this same generosity, which was comple-
mented almost daily by the hospitality of Mrs. Joshi.
Saroja Bhate and I decided to jointly edit this
felicitation volume because we feel great love, affection,
and gratitude toward Professor Joshi. In the past, he has
shunned most public displays of honor and tried his best to
discourage us from going ahead with this work. We strongly
believe, however, that the world of Sanskrit scholarship
must have an opportunity to express its respect, gratitude,
and admiration for his contributions as a teacher and a
scholar. By serving as the coeditors of this volume, we
x
2have merely provided an opportunity for that expression.
Let me conclude this preface by quoting a verse from the
Satasloki of Sankaracarya.
There is no comparison known in the world to
describe a great teacher, the transmitter of know-
ledge. Perhaps one may think of a touchstone,
which turns iron into gold. However, it does not
turn iron into another touchstone. A great
teacher transmits his own identity to the disciple
who studies at his feet. This is what makes him
incomparable and extraordinary indeed!
Notes
1. This refers to the practice of Brahman families support-
ing students by offering them meals. Sometimes a student
would go to one or more families to get his food, and eat
it at his own residence, or he might have meals with
different families according to a schedule. Many genera-
tions of students residing in Pune were supported in this
way.
2. We would like to thank all the contributors to this
volume for their assistance, and especially for their
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patience. Due to circumstances beyond our control, it
has taken an unusually long time for this volume to be
published. We would like to apologize for this delay.
We also note with sorrow the deaths of Professor Gopika-
mohan Bhattacharya, who passed away in 1986 during a
visit to Vienna, Austria, and Professor Bimal K Matilal,
who passed away at Oxford, U.K, on July 8, 1991.
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INTERPRETING VAKYAPADIYA 2.486 HISTORICALLY
(PART 3)*
Ashok Aklujkar
1.1 The first two parts of this study were published
in the Adyar Library Bulletin (1981:581-601, Dr. K Kunjunni
Raja Felicitation Volume) and in Indological and Buddhist
Studies: Volume in Honour of Professor J. W. de Jong on his
Sixtieth Birthday (Canberra: Australian National University,
Faculty of Asian Studies, 1982, pp. 1-10). I am happy that
this third part is also appearing in a volume dedicated to a
scholar who has contributed substantially to our under-
standing of Sanskrit sastras.
1.2 Vakyapadiya (VP in abbreviation) 2.486, the first
word of which I intend to discuss here, runs thus: parvatad
agamam lahdhva bhasya-bijanusaribhih I sa nlto bahu-
sakhatvdm candracaryadibhih punah II The question of the
precise import of this verse has given rise to a substantial
body of literature extending over 125 years (Aklujkar
1978:9). As I have already examined this literature direct-
ly and indirectly in the publications mentioned above, I
shall merely state here that I prefer to translate the verse
along the following lines: 'Having acquired the traditional
knowledge from parvata, Candracarya and others, who followed
the indications in the Bhasya, again made it (i.e., the
traditional knowledge) many-branched'. I should also
clarify that in my view, as argued in the 1978 article, the
verse was probably authored by a student of Bhartr-hari (B
in abbreviation) and not by B as has been commonly supposed.
1.3 Although parvata is a common Sanskrit word with
'mountain, mountain range' as its definite meaning and it
would not be incompatible in that meaning with the other
words of VP 2.486, it has caused much reflection on the part
of scholars. Goldstucker (1861:258), Weber (1862:161),
Kielhorn (1874b:285-86; 1876c:244-45), and Bhandarkar (1883-
85a/1933:184) refrain from translating it as 'mountain',
although they must have known its most frequently attested
meaning. Instead, they leave it untranslated as "Parvata"
(note the capitalized initial) in their translations or
paraphrases of the verse, giving the impression that they
take it as a proper name, most probably that of a person.
Nearer to our time, Joshi and Roodbergen (1976:xxxiii) and
Joshi (1976:138) do the same,1 while Varma (1971a:206) and
Laddu (1981:193-94) explicitly take parvata as a reference
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to a particular person. Then there are scholars who, while
not giving up the common meaning of the word, pay special
attention to it in order to identify the mountain intended
by the author of the verse. These are: Tara-natha Tarka-
vacaspati (1864: [introduction], p. 2; 1902: [introduction],
p. 2), Peterson (1883-85:183), Ramakrishna Kavi (1930:239),
Thieme (1956:20), Scharfe (1976:276), Cardona (1978:97, n.
36), and Bronkhorst (1983:393-97).
2.1 On the basis of Raja-tarangini (RT in abbrevia-
tion) verse 1.176, which is related in content to the VP
verse we are discussing, Varma identifies parvata with King
Abhimanyu of Kashmir (and also with the land of Kashmir; see
note 2). This is patently absurd. According to the context
of 486, vyakaranagamah . . . daksirmtyesu vyavasthitah,
parvata must be in the South (3,3). A king of Kashmir (or
the Kashmir country) is hardly likely to have been viewed as
Q
Southern. Secondly, regardless of the reading one accepts
of the RT verse, Abhimanyu cannot rightly be viewed as the
giver or source of the agama in the case of Candracarya and
others (Aklujkar 1987:228).
2.2 Laddu, too, takes parvata as a reference to an
individual, but this individual is the Vedic, and to some
extent Epic and Puranic, seer whose only distinction seems
to be that he is always found in the company of Narada;
otherwise, he is singularly characterized by a lack of indi-
viduality. The Classical authors, as far as I know, do not
refer to him. He is not even remotely connected with gram-
matical studies.
3.1 Among those who prefer to take parvata as standing
for a mountain, we find (a) the author of the Tika, Punya-
raja or Hela-raja (Aklujkar 1974); (b) modern scholars like
Raghunatha Sharma (1968:574), Raghavan Pillai (1971:146),
and Subramania Iyer (1969:3; 1977:204) who reproduce the
Tika explanation; and (c) other modern scholars such as
Ramakrishna Kavi, Peterson, Thieme, Tara-natha Tarka-
vacaspati, Scharfe, Cardona, and Bronkhorst (precise
references in 1.3) who either add to the Tika explanation or
differ from it in the identification of the mountain.
3.2 Peterson, apparently following Miiller, accepts
the view that the parvata involved is "the hill of Chittore"
in modern Rajasthan. The reason he gives in support of this
identification is that the hill of Chittore "was a centre of
learning for the southern country." However, the reason is
hardly adequate. Peterson did not prove, and in fact could
not have proved, that there were no other centers of learn-
ing for the southern country, irrespective of what he means
by "centre of learning" and "southern country" (see note 3).
Nor did he prove that there was something so special about
the center of learning at Chittore that only it could have
preserved the agama in question. He did not even attempt to
answer preliminary questions such as: Is it known that
Chittore specialized in the study of grammar or of
Pataiijalf s Maha-hhasya (MB in abbreviation) in the early
centuries of the Christian era? Was it considered or likely
to be considered 'southern' by B or his students (1,2)? Was
it, or was it at least believed to be, a repository of manu-
scripts of rare works? Is Candracarya said to have visited
it? To propose an identification without raising even a few
of these questions is to show disregard for the context of
parvatat (see also the point I make in note 13).
3,3 The more elaborate statement made by Scharfe is
open to the same charge. In suggesting that parvata should
be identified with Citra-kuta, he asks none of the above
questions. In addition, he makes a series of unproved
assumptions. Why identify parvata with Citra-kuta?
Because, he tells us, the oral tradition of the MB was
alive there. How do we know that the oral tradition was
alive there when verse 485 says vyakaranagamah daksinatyesu
grantha-matre vyavasthitah The traditional knowledge (which
would include the oral tradition) of grammar remained among
the Southerners only in book form'? Because, according to
Scharfe, "the verse speaks only about the South Indian
Mahabhasya tradition which had withered to the point that
oral instruction had ceased." Now, how can one assert this
when there is no indication in the preceding verses 481-84
that their author intends to speak of Southern Vaiyakaranas
and Northern Vaiyakaranas separately? Are we going to say
that samksepa-rud, alpa-vidya-parigraha, and akrta-bttddhi
grammarians existed only in the South or that the confusion
Baiji and others caused in MB studies was confined to the
South? In the latter case, how do we account for the fact
that the n^mes Baiji, Saubhava, and Haryaksa, although
unusual, have nothing south Indian about them? In any case,
why would the author of verses 481-86 be concerned with
making a statement that applied only to south India? If he
spoke of disintegration of MB studies only in the South,
would it not follow that the state of these studies was
satisfactory in the North (cf. Bronkhorst 1983:395)? Why,
in that case, would he mention a single location in the
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North as the place where the agama was recovered? How
would his assertion accord with the commonly noticed state
of affairs that South India in general managed to preserve
transmission lines for a longer period (Aklujkar 1981:599-
600)? If the Northern tradition had not been disrupted,
would Candracarya's acquisition of the agama be an achieve-
ment so remarkable as to deserve special mention? Why would
Candracarya try to improve the state of MB studies in the
South? Was he a Southerner? If he was, how would one
account for the traditions that connect him with either
8Kashmir or Bengal?
3.4 Even if Scharfe's contextually improbable inter-
pretation of vyakaranagarnah daksinatyesu grantha-matre
vyavasthitah is accepted, how would it imply that Citra-kuta
was the place where the dgama was preserved? At most, the
implication would be that the study of the MB did not suffer
as much in the North as in the South. Furthermore, how does
Scharfe establish Candracarya's association with Citra-kuta?
He does so on the basis of examples in the Candra Vrtti
9
pertaining to sutras 1.3.106-7. Therefore, the further
assumptions are that: (a) Candracarya of VP 2.486 is identi-
cal with Candra-gomin; (b) the Candra Vrtti was in fact
written by Candra-gomin; (c) the sentence "we shall eat
rice," given as an example in the above-mentioned part of
the Candra Vrtti, means 'we shall eat rice only once'; (d)
if rice was eaten only once before reaching Kausambi, the
journey to Kausambi could not have taken more than a day;
(e) if Candra-gomin thought the journey to Kausambi required
only a day's travel in the direction of the eastern city of
Pataliputra, his place of residence could have been anywhere
_ 12
up to fifty miles west of Kausambi; and (f) since Citra-
kuta is about fifty miles west of Kausambi, it must be the
place where Candra-gomin resided.
3.5 Of the six assumptions outlined above, (a) and (b)
are open to doubt, and those remaining, the ones that are
crucial to establishing Candra-gomin's/Candracarya's
presence at Citra-kuta, do not form a logically tight series
of propositions. They constitute a novel, and for that
reason commendable, attempt to determine a location, but one
that is far from definitive. Assumption (c) forms their
basis, and once its validity is called into question, the
others no longer remain tenable. Now, from my notes 11 and
12 here and from Bronkhorst 1983:397, it is evident that
there are serious problems in relying on assumption (c).
3.6 To sum up, the impression I get from Scharfe's
discussion of VP 2.486 and Candra Vrtti 1.3.106-7 is that
o
the possibility of connecting the two occurred to him and
the force of that new idea made him overlook many indica-
tions to the contrary. He has proved nothing more than the
likelihood that the author of the Candra Vrtti was, at the
time of writing his Vrtti, in an area which lay to the west
of Kausambi and from which a journey to Kausambi and
_ 13
Pataliputra could be foreseen.
4.1 The Tika provides a specification of parvatat with
the expression tri-kutaika-desa-varti-tilingaika-desat.
This expression is printed as °vartti-tri-lingai° in
Manavallfs (1887:285) and Raghunatha Sharma's (1968:574)
editions and as °vartino lingai0 in Kielhorn's (1874:286)
article. An examination of the manuscripts of the Tika
reveals that the second variant reading is found only in a
15few inferior manuscripts and the first variant reading is
1 fi
not found in any manuscript accessible at present. Since
this is the situation, an attempt like Thieme's (1956:20),
which follows Kielhorn's reading and gives a siva-linga in
the Tri-kuta region as the location of Candracarya's acqui-
- 17
sition of the agama, must be set aside.
4.2 Besides, the word eka-desa does not really com-
pound well with linga (=siva-linga) in the present context.
A statement to the effect that 'the agama was acquired from
a part of the siva-linga which stands on a part of the
(mountain) Tri-kuta' is not likely to be intended, for there
is no propriety in relating the acquisition to a part of the
siva-linga. Thieme realizes this and remarks: "lingaika-
desat is perhaps a mistake for simply: lingat, or, else, for
lingavisesat 'from a particular linga,' the ekadesa-part
having been nonsensically repeated, or put in place of
-visesat, from the preceding compound by a copyist."
However, since the reading lingai0 is objectively weaker
than tilingai0, there is no need to indulge in the kind of
speculation that Thieme's statement contains. Besides, a
corruption of linga-visesad into lingaika-desad is tran-
scriptionally improbable. The available manuscripts do not
even indirectly indicate that °gaika-desad could have
resulted from anything like °ga-visesad (see note 15).
4.3 Explaining the Tlka identification is partly easy
and partly difficult. The easy part comes later, viz.,
tilihgaika-desat. Undoubtedly, tilinga is an earlier form
of the modern name Telangana and refers to a part of Andhra
Pradesh having approximately the same boundaries as modern
18Telangana. An element of convenience in this fact is that
the identification of parvata as a mountain in Telangana
will stand even if no agreement is reached on the identifi-
cation of Tri-kuta (4,7) and on the connection of the
expression tri-kutaika-desa-varti with the expression
tilingaika-desat (see note 24). I shall, therefore, post-
pone the consideration of tri-kutaika-desa-varti and turn
first to determining the specific area of Telangana that the
Tlka author and, if the Tlka author has accurately preserved
the tradition, the author of 486 are likely to have had in
mind.
4.4 It is indeed strange that the author of 486 should
give the location of a major achievement by using a general
term like parvata. There are two possibilities under which
such use seems sensible. Either the author does not know
the precise location or parvata does not carry for him in
this instance the general meaning it usually conveys.
The first possibility can be entertained in two ways:
(a) The author is uncertain about the location beyond the
fact that it was a mountain; or (b) the author cannot make
up his mind as to which of the two or more mountains identi-
fied as the site of Candracarya's achievement was the true
location.
If (a) were the case, a form like kasmad api, indicating
indefiniteness, would probably have accompanied the expres-
sion parvatat. Besides, a tradition identifying the parvata
rather precisely would not, in all probability, have arisen.
It seems proper, therefore, to entertain the first possibi-
lity only in the form of alternative (b). This I shall do
in a later section (5.1). It is more convenient at the
present stage of our discussion to explore the second possi-
bility.
4.5 Let us assume for a moment that the ordinarily
general term parvata could have been used in 486 as a
19singular term referring to a mountain. In other words,
the question to be asked is: Is there a specific mountain in
the South that could be referred to simply as parvata? I
think Sri-parvata is the only mountain that meets the
conditions contained in this question because (a) the stem
parvata is more closely associated with it than with any
other mountain frequently mentioned in the ancient and
medieval literature of India. The other prominent mountains
are quite freely referred to with compound names that
contain one of the synonyms of parvata such as adri, girt,
saila, or acala. Sri-parvata, on the other hand, does not
commonly attract designations like srt-giri (see note 20c).
In addition, (b) if a mountain is to be referred to by drop-
ping a part of its name for the sake of brevity or for the
sake of preserving the meter, the part to be dropped should
be dispensable from some point of view. The stem sri,
figuring in the name Sri-parvata, is so commonly employed as
an honorific before names (including the names of other
prominent mountains) that we should not be surprised if it
was occasionally looked upon as an honorific even in the
name Sri-parvata and thus thought to be dispensable.
The thoughts expressed in the preceding paragraph are
not mere speculation. There is in fact a tradition of
referring to Sri-parvata simply as parvata (Dhere 1977:106,
121-23, 135). It may not have arisen for the reasons
alluded to above and may be due to the importance of
Sri-parvata as perceived by the people of India, particu-
larly of south India CSri-parvata is the mountain; when
someone uses the word parvata, it is Sri-parvata that first
comes to mind')- However, what matters for us is that it is
clearly there and that even the interpretation 'mountain of
Sri' of the name Sri-parvata did not preclude occasional
dropping of the component srt,
4.6 It will thus be seen that the second possibility
(general term used particularistically) need not be viewed
as a possibility in theory only. Besides explaining what
looks like a lack of precision (it is not that an ancient
10
author's usage is imprecise; it is our understanding of his
usage that is deficient), it leads us to an identification
that ties in well with tilingaika-desat of the Tika, for
Sri-parvata is a part of Tilinga or Telangana (see notes 18
and 20). Furthermore, the identification agrees with indi-
cations in the Tibetan tradition and can be said to receive
21confirmation in the accounts of Chinese travellers.
22According to the Tibetan tradition, Candra-gomin
encountered the MB exposition when he returned from Simhala
(Ceylon) to southern Jambu-dvEpa (India). For the travel-
lers from Ceylon to northern India, Sri-parvata was not only
a natural, well-trodden, and time-honored region to pass
through (Moticandra 1953, map preceding index), but it was
also a holy and fascinating place on account of its associa-
tion with siddhas and siddhis (Aklujkar 1982:6-7). In fact,
there was a regular provision at Sri-parvata in the early
centuries of the Christian era for receiving travellers
(particularly Buddhist travellers from Ceylon) as we learn
from an inscription of Vira-purusa-datta dated in the third
century A.D. (Sircar 1965:235).
4,7 Now, to turn to the first half, tri-kutaika-desa~
varti, of the identification in the Tika, Tri-kuta is said
to be the name of at least four mountains in Sanskrit liter-
ature and Indian inscriptions:
(a) A mythical mountain in the North that forms the
southern ridge of the Meru, bears the Tri-pathaga Ganga, is
surrounded by the Milky Ocean, and has peaks made of iron,
silver, and gold; cf. Maha-bharata 2.39.11, 2.82.11;
Markandeya-purana 55.6; Bhagavata-purana 8.2.Iff; Sabda-
11
kalpa-druma pt. Ill, p. 74; Wilson 1894:141, n. 2; Kirfel
1954:10.
(b) A mythical or semimythical mountain beyond the
ocean in which Havana's Lanka is situated; cf. Mahd-hhdrata
3.261.53, 3.266.54-55; Rdmdyana 5.2.1, 6.30.18 (and passage
18 on p. 950 of Appendix 1), 7.5.21-22, 7.11.20; Vdyu-purdna
1.48.26-29; Panca-tantra, book 5, story 11 (Biihler's fourth
ed., p. 63); Rudrata's Kdvydlamkdra 7.20; Bhoja's Srngdra-
prakasa, p. 419.
(c) A range of hills near the west coast of India
which extends from northern Konkan to the west of the
present district of Nasik; cf. Mirashi 1955:xl-xli, 1963:
106-7; Gupta 1973:45, 246. Probably the same as the
Tri-kuta mentioned by Saida Mahammada in his Kalpa-samuha
(Dhere 1977:201).
(d) A mountain in the eastern part of the Deccan
(Mirashi 1975:186), probably the same as the one which B. V.
Krishna Rao (Journal of the Andhra Historical Research
Society 10:191; reference according to Gupta 1973:246)
specifies as Kotappakonda near Kavur in the Narasaraopeta
25
taluq of the Guntur district.
4,8 Of these four mountains bearing the name Tri-kuta,
the one described in (a) is clearly alien to the spirit of
this inquiry and can safely be ignored for that reason as
well as for its uniform association with the North (3.3).
Mountain (b), too, ceases to be historical if Havana's
Lanka is identified, as is generally the case, with the
island of Ceylon (Sri Lanka) or some part thereof. As far
as I can ascertain, no mountain in Ceylon was or is called
Tri-kuta. Secondly, not only is there no corroboration of
12
discovery in Ceylon in the other accounts of Candra's
achievement, but the Tibetan accounts specifically state
that Candra found the equivalent of the VP agama after he
left Simhala or Ceylon (4.6).
However, while we can dismiss the idea of a Tri-kuta
understood to be associated with Ceylon, we cannot easily
dismiss the Tri-kuta associated with Havana's Lanka. The
Tika author mentions Ravana and raksas immediately after the
statement of identification we are discussing. It is
probable, therefore, that the Tri-ktita he had in mind was
the one that figured in the descriptions of Havana's king-
dom. This observation leaves only two alternatives open to
us: (a) that the Tika author is correct in his statement of
identification about parvata, but wrong in connecting the
identified (Tri-kuta) parvata with Ravana; and (b) the Tika
author does not understand Ravana's Lanka to be Ceylon but a
region near an historical Tri-kuta. Both these alterna-
tives dictate that we determine independently which mountain
or mountains can historically claim the name Tri-kuta.
4,9 Our attempt to determine this will of course be
confined to mountains (c) and (d) of the list given in 4.7,
for the available evidence does not lead us in any other
direction. Of them, (d) is a suspect candidate for its
claim to the name Tri-kuta has not generally been accepted
by specialists of ancient and medieval Indian geography.
Gupta (1973:246-47), agreeing with V. S. Ramachandra Murt/s
article in volume II (p. 45) of the Journal of the Andhra
Historical Research Society, concludes that there is little
evidence to support the identification of Kotappakonda with
90
the Tri-kuta mentioned in historical records.
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4.10 Mountain (c) was known as Tri-kuta from at least
the third century A.D., as the evidence collected by Mirashi
and others establishes (4.7c). Our acceptance of it as the
mountain intended, or originally intended, in the tradition
preserved by the Tlka will not, therefore, be incompatible
with the date of the Tlka (Aklujkar 1982:3, 6, n. 4). It is
also a mountain of the Daksina-patha, so its acceptance will
not go against the expression daksinatyesu of verse 485 (see
note 3). We know that Northern scholars, litterateurs, and
their works reached the southern part of India through the
29territory adjacent to this mountain. Also, if we assume
that in the Tlka author's perception Lanka was situated near
this mountain (4.8, note 27), we will have accounted not
only for the presence of Ravana by the side of Tri-kuta in
his statement but we will also have arrived at a hypothesis
that scholars such as Shah and Sankalia, interested in
determining the location of Valmiki's Lanka, have indepen-
dently developed (cf. Cardona 1978:97).
5.1 Taking parvata in its usual sense of 'mountain',
we thus arrive at two likely locations for the retrieval of
vyakaranagama: Sri-parvata and Tri-kuta. Both of these
agree with contextual indications such as daksinatyesu; were
well known in the period (the early centuries of the
Christian era) to which the concluding verses of the Vdkya-
kanda belong; are likely to have been visited by Candra
whether he started from Kashmir (as in the RT account) or
returned from Simhala (as in the Tibetan accounts); had
excellent potential for preserving the vyakarawagama manu-
scripts as areas of pilgrimage (Katre 1954:25-26); and were
frequented by followers of both Brahmanism and Buddhism,
14
30which jointly preserve Candra's memory. Besides, both are
supported by a piece of information recorded as early as the
Tika (see note 13 for the value of this piece as evidence).
5.2 We have now reached a point in our discussion at
which we can choose between the following positions: (a) The
uncertainty regarding which of the two locations was actual-
ly the place of Candracarya's discovery belongs to the
period of the Tika; and (b) The uncertainty goes back to the
period of the author of 486 (4.4). If we accept (b), it
would be pointless to press this discussion further in the
hope of being able to determine one location exclusively,
for the author of 486 is our earliest source on what
Candracarya achieved. If he is deemed to be undecided,
there is practically no hope of our being able to decide
what the location of the recovery of vyakaranagama was in
the original account. However, before we accept alternative
(b), let us remind ourselves that we have thus far proceeded
on the basis of two assumptions: that tri-kutaika-desa and
tilingaika-desa are separable parts of the Tika phrase, and
that the word tri-kuta can stand only for a mountain (see
note 24). Both of these assumptions deserve further
examination.
5.3 As is well known, readings in manuscripts should,
as far as possible, be interpreted as they are. Assumption
of loss or change of text matter should be resorted to only
if the available reading cannot make contextually acceptable
sense without such an assumption. Such is not the case with
the Tika phrase. It can be understood to mean 'from a part
31of Tilinga which (in turn) exists in a part of Tri-kuta'.
There is nothing contextually incompatible in this meaning.
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Mere repetition of eka-desa would not be adequate justifica-
tion for imagining a gap in the Tika phrase or for emending
it. If Tri-kuta refers to a mountain, it is not at all
improbable that it would refer also to the region around
32that mountain. In fact, as Mirashi (1955:xli-xliv) notes,
a name like Purva-tri-kuta-visaya 'East Tri-kuta district'
is found in the Anjaneri plates of Bhoga-sakti, and Tri-kuta
is mentioned in a list of countries in the Ajanta inscrip-
tion concerning Harisena (475-510 A.D.). A dynasty of Trai-
kutakas, who most probably derived their name from associa-
33tion with the Tri-kuta region, is also clearly attested in
historical records (Mirashi 1955:xli-xliv; Mulay 1972:16,
29; Gupta 1973:246). True, Mirashi observes that "The Trai-
kutaka kingdom at its largest extent seems to have extended
from the Kim in the north to the Krishna in the south, and
to have comprised South Gujarat, North Konkan, and the
Nasik, Poona and Satara Districts of Maharashtra," and thus
it is not certain that the Traikutaka country included
Tilinga. However, as the word "seems" in Mirashi's state-
ment indicates, one cannot rule out the possibility that the
borders of the Traikutaka country could have at times been
different. Evidence available for determining boundaries
of political units in as early a period as the second to the
sixth centuries A.D. rarely allows one to draw precise and
final conclusions. As the Traikutakas emerged after the
decline of the Satavahana empire, which included Tilinga, it
is not unlikely that Tri-kuta, as the region of the
Traikutakas, included or was thought to include Tilinga.
Such a situation is especially likely to have prevailed in
16
the early period of the Traikutaka dynasty, for which, as
Mirashi observes, we have no records.
5.4 Thus, whether we accept a tradition of two loca-
tions for Candracarya's achievement or a tradition of one
location would depend on whether we are willing to concede
the possibility of the inclusion of Tilinga in Tri-kuta and
on how natural we find the repetition of eka-desa in the
Tlka statement of identification. Acceptance of a tradition
of one location does not involve assumption of textual
corruption in the Tlka but it does involve the assumption
that Tri-kuta, as a region, at one time included Tilinga.
As such an acceptance leads us to Sri-parvata, it would
better explain why the author of 486 used a general expres-
sion like parvata (4.5) in the singular number. But it
would also enhance the possibility that even the author of
35
486 viewed Candracarya's achievement as a miracle and that
the story of the recovery of vyakaranagama is simply one of
the myths associated with Srt-parvata (Aklujkar 1982:6-7),
thus having no specific historical value. Acceptance of a
tradition of two locations, on the other hand, allows us to
take Tri-kuta, in conformity with the indisputable part of
the available evidence, as a region contiguous to the moun-
tain range Tri-kuta. Such an acceptance leaves room for one
further interesting connection. If B was a Maitrayamya and
if the Maitrayanlyas enjoyed a prominent presence in the
Nasik area (see references collected in Bronkhorst
1983:396), the author of 486 probably belonged to the Nasik
(i.e., the Tri-kuta) area. He could have then recorded in
his composition a piece of local history and intended to
Or*
refer to Tri-kuta by the word parvatdt
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6.1 At this point, I would like to return to the
possibility entertained at the beginning (1.3) of this
exploration of parvata, the one in which parvata could be
taken to refer to a person. Although the specific identifi-
cations proposed by Varma and Laddu are unacceptable
(2.1-2), I do not consider the possibility itself a weak
alternative. According to the Brhacchankara-vijaya of
Vidyaranya-svamin, quoted by Rama-tosana Bhattacarya in his
Prana-tosini (p. 956), parvata is employed in the sense of a
37certain type of ascetic. Furthermore, Bhattoji Diksita,
in his Siddhanta-kaumudi on the Paninian (2.2.34) rule
alpactaram and the varttika abhyarhitam ca, gives as an
example the expression tapasa-parvatau. This example is
sensible only if parvata is comparable in some way to tdpasa
oo
'ascetic5. Thus, it is not improbable at all that parvata
carried a meaning of the form 'an ascetic who is found in a
mountain area, a wild ascetic, an ascetic given to extreme
39modes of ascetic conduct'. If this meaning is assigned to
parvata in 486, one can explain at least two things: the
occurrence of the brahma-raksas 'brahmin ogre' element in
the Tika and Patanjali-carita accounts of Candra's achieve-
ment (see note 21a), and the use of a very general term like
parvata by the author of 486 when we expect him to tell us
how or where the vydkarandgama was recovered. If parvata is
taken to be expressive of location, then the author has been
unexpectedly imprecise; he has not specified anything beyond
a mountain in the South. On the other hand, if parvata is
viewed as a word used in the rather specific ascetic-
directed sense, the author cannot be faulted for having used
too general or too wide a term. It is not his expression
18
that lacks precision; rather, it is our knowledge of the
expression he uses that needs to be widened. Similarly, if
parvata stands for an ascetic haunting mountains or caves
and having a wild, frightening, or repulsive appearance, we
can see how a brahma-raksas came to be associated with the
verse as a benefactor of Candra. I should also point out
that the use of the ablative parvatdt in 486 somehow seems
more natural in the case of a sentient source of acquisition
than in the case of a location. If the author of 486
intended to give us the location of the acquisition made by
Candracarya, would he not have used the locative form
parvate? These observations should explain why we cannot
absolutely exclude the possibility of parvata being a
reference to a person.
6.2 The word parvata in the sense elucidated just now
could be a variant or a corrupt form of a secondary
(taddhita) derivative parvata. Indications available in the
Kdsikd, Nydsa, and Pada-manjart on Panini 2.4.23, 3.2.53,
and 4.2.144 suggest that there was an older commentarial
tradition according to which the word amanttsya occurring in
Panini did not convey a literal or etymological (yaugika)
meaning of the form 'anything or anyone other than a human
being' but a specific conventional (rudha) meaning like 'a
raksas, pisaca, etc.', that is, 'a member of a species
thought to be similar to humans, but having strange
capacities'. If this is so, one early, if not exclusive,
understanding of parvata (and parvatiya) derived by Panini
4.2.144, vihhasamantcsye, must have been something like 'a
person of extraordinary or miraculous capacities associated
with a mountain'. The probability that the pre-Kasika
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Paninlyas such as B and his disciples were aware of this
meaning of parvata/parvata and used the word in that sense
in their writings is thus strong.
6.3 One consequence of attaching the meaning 'mountain
ascetic' to the word parvata, as in the case of identifying
parvata with iSri-parvata (5.4), will be that the probability
of tracing back the miraculous element in the accounts of
Candra to B's time will be strengthened. This element is
indeed widespread, as will incidentally become clear in part
4 (under preparation) of the present study. Moreover, since
B or his students (1.2) were not totally against the possi-
bility of knowledge through extraordinary means (Aklujkar
1970b:42-50), it is not incongruent to associate them with
the miraculous. While this realization will deprive the
Vakya-kanda verses of some of their value as a historical
statement, it cannot be avoided by any historian who,
rightly, evaluates his evidence before allowing it to lead
him to definite conclusions.
7,1 There is a way in which both lines of interpreta-
tion, taking parvata as a reference to an individual and
taking parvata as a reference to a mountain, come together.
If Candracarya and others recovered, in the eyes of the
author of 486, the agama from a siddha-like ascetic on a
Southern mountain (most probably Sri-parvata, which was
famous for such ascetics), then, while the first-level or
initial interpretation of parvata would differ as 'a moun-
tain ascetic' and 'a mountain', the ultimate import will be
the same. We will have satisfied both expectations to which
the context of 486 gives rise: (a) Who among the ddksindtyas
had the vyakarariagama? (b) Where in the South was the
20
vyakaranagama found? The Tika explanation, in effect,
accomplishes this, although it speaks of a brahma-raksas in
the place of a parvata ascetic.
7*2 Parvatat is the only "down-to-earth" detail in VP
2.486. It is unfortunate that we are required to keep two
lines of interpretation (mountain and person) open and to
entertain two possible identifications (Sri-parvata and
Tri-kuta) in the first line of interpretation. However, I
believe such a course will serve the interests of future
research better than a rushed, precise identification. Our
ignorance of what actually happened may be disturbing but
now it will at least have well-defined boundaries.
If a preference must be indicated, I would rank as
follows the identifications defended above. In the present
state of our knowledge, the strongest identification appears
to be 'parvata = an ascetic or hrahma-raksas belonging to
Sri-parvata'. Next in strength seems to be 'parvata =
Sri-parvata', with the attendant assumption that some
scholar, or scholarly community, on Sri-parvata had in his,
or its, possession the manuscripts in which the agama of the
MB was preserved. Last in terms of acceptability is the
equation 'parvata = Tri-kuta (as mountain or region)'.
This rank-ordering is based (a) on a consideration of
how many independent lines of evidence point in the same
direction, and (b) on whether an identification forces us to
assume something which is not in the evidence and thus to
sacrifice economy of explanation.
The elements of what I consider to be the strongest




who is associated with
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<-- grammatical considerations
<-- Kasika (Nyasa, Pada-manjaii),
Siddhanta-kaumudi









<-- Tika, (possibly also the)
Chinese travelogues
<-- Chinese travelogues, Tibetan
legends
<-- Tika, Chinese travelogues,
Dhere
<-- Tika, Tibetan legends,
Chinese travelogues
who is seen as tran-
scending the ordinary
human condition, and




who serves as a source
well inside South India




It can be seen from this table how almost all the
relevant evidence converges in the case of, or can be accom-
modated in the frame of, the first identification. For what
I consider to be the next best identification, only the
boxed part of the convergence holds good. On the other
hand, the 'parvata = Tri-kuta' identification rests only on
the statement in the Tlka and this, too, when the original
form of that statement is assumed to be different from what
it is now.
Notes
Conclusions reached in this part were reported in the
form of a short paper on 21 March 1983 at the 193rd
meeting of the American Oriental Society held at Balti-
more. The author was able to study many of the sources
used in the article because of financial assistance
provided at various times since 1969 by the University
of B.C. Humanities and Social Sciences Research Commit-
tee, the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council
of Canada, the Shastri Indo-Canadian Institute, the
American Council of Learned Societies, and the Alexander
von Humboldt Stiftung of the Federal Republic of
Germany. I also wish to acknowledge the dispassionate
response to my criticism of his position that Professor
Hartmut Scharfe gave in his letter of 6 November 1987.
The response based on the 26 October 1987 version of the
paper helped me in clarifying some points and correcting
a few errors.
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1. The implicit refusal to take parvata as 'mountain' is
especially remarkable in the case of Weber and later
researchers mentioned here. Weber (1862:161n) and
Kielhorn (1974b) knew at the time of their relevant
writings that Tara-natha Tarka-vacaspati had given a
specification of parvata as Citra-kuta or Tri-kuta. An
earlier edition of Tara-natha's Sahdartha-ratna (the
reference according to the third edition available to me
is 1902:2) is mentioned by Weber, and Tara-natha's
edition of the Siddhdnta-kaumvdi (1864:2) and Weber's
article are mentioned by Kielhorn. Kielhorn also knew
that Punya-raja, an ancient commentator of VP 2.486, had
understood parvatdt to be a reference to a region.
Finally, it is beyond doubt that Bhandarkar and most of
the later scholars mentioned here exhibit an awareness
of Kielhorn's writings.
2. Varma (1971a:350) contradicts himself when he also takes
parvata in its sense of 'mountain' and identifies it
with Kashmir (as mountainous country) of King
Abhimanyu's time.
3. (a) Any directional adjective like daksindtya 'southern'
is relative in its application, for what is southern to
one user can very well be northern to another. However,
it is reasonable to assume that in most Classical Indian
uses of daksindtya the reference would be to persons or
objects of the Daksina-patha unless a further specifi-
cation is available in the context (Sircar 1960:172, n.
2). Another consideration one should keep in mind in
the case of VP 2.486 is that, as its author belonged to
the Paninian tradition of Sanskrit grammar, his under-
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standing of daksinatya is not likely to be very
different from that of Pataiijali (Kielhorn's ed., vol.
1, p. 8), who indicates that the author of the varttika
yatha laukika-vaidikesu was a daksinatya (Cardona 1976:
268-69). The third helpful consideration in ascertain-
ing the common meaning of daksinatya in the Classical
period is the remark by several authors to the effect
that the word cora/caura in the language of the
daksinatyas means odana 'cooked rice' not 'thief; cf.
Prabha-candra, Nyaya-kumuda-candra, p. 547; Jayanta-
bhatta, Nyaya-manjari, p. 242; and Abhinava-gupta,
Tattva-viveka on Para-trimsika 5-9ab, p. 125, who
distinguishes between saindhavas and daksinatyas. With
reference to the meaning of the same cora, Vadi-deva-
suri (Syad-vada-ratnakara, p. 703) distinguishes between
gurjaras and dravidas; the latter must obviously be
daksinatyas in his view. Probably iSridhara (Nyaya-
kandali, p. 215) also has a relevant observation to
offer in this case, although I cannot verify the
reference at present.
(b) For a determination of the reference of
Daksina-patha, see Law 1932/1979:xv, xix, 3-4, 44, 48,
60, 66; Raychaudhuri in Yazdani 1960:3-4; Sircar 1960:
14-15, 52, 57, 73, 172-73, 178, 242; Gupta 1973:8-9; and
Simha 1974:85.
4. (a) parvatat tri-kutaika-desa-varti-tilingaika-desad
iti.
(b) Variant readings available for the Tika phrase
in (a) are given in note 15. The possibility of its
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having suffered some damage in manuscript transmission
will be discussed in 4.2, note 24, and 5.3.
5. Peterson does not specify how, when, or where Miiller's
suggestion about parvata was made.
6. (a) Tara-natha Tarka-vacaspati offers the same identifi-
cation as Scharfe's without giving any reasons to sup-
port it, as if he was simply explaining or replacing the
reading tri-kuta of the Tlka with citra-kuta.
(b) Scharfe does not indicate awareness of the
information given in (a), which, one expects, would have
been known to him through Weber 1862.
(c) Scharfe's presentation differs also in that he
further identifies Citra-kuta with Rama-giri, presumably
the same Rama-giri as the one mentioned by Kalidasa in
his Megha-duta. It should, therefore, be noted that the
identification of Citra-kuta with Rama-giri is not
universally accepted (cf. Gupta 1973:101-3) as Scharfe
seems to have thought.
(d) Bronkhorst (1983), who also does not indicate
awareness of the information in (a), follows Scharfe in
a strange way. On pages 393 and 395, he has Candra
going to the Himalaya to acquire "[correct] traditional
knowledge" or "The Pataiijalian oral tradition." On the
other hand, on page 397, he has Candra at least con-
templating a journey through Kausambi, as in Scharfe's
view, but not necessarily residing at Citra-kuta, as is
Scharfe's view. In other words, Bronkhorst uses
Scharfe's discussion to assign Candra to Gujarat or
north Maharashtra but not to explain Candra's retrieval
of the agama. In so doing, he severs the direct connec-
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tion between VP 2.486 and Candra Vrtti 1.3.106-7 that
Scharfe seeks to establish. Thus, his view is similar
to Varma's (2.1) and is partly based on what Scharfe
thought to be justified. As my discussion shows, both
Varma and Scharfe have put forward views that violate
contextual considerations and go against the available
evidence about Candra's achievement. Bronkhorst's com-
posite view, therefore, stands doubly refuted and need
not be discussed separately.
7. (a) Note that the option of considering Citra-kuta as
relatively southern is not open to Scharfe because in
his view the verses deal with the withering of the MB
tradition in the South and hence the location of agama
retrieval must be in the North; cf. Bronkhorst 1983:395.
(b) In his letter of 6 November 1987, Scharfe makes
the following remarks, which serve to clarify his 1976
interpretation of verse 485: ". . . the VP stanza says
that the southern tradition existed only in manuscripts;
that implies that it existed in the north also orally,
and that would be the place to get this tradition. If B
had wanted to say that these manuscripts were all that
existed of the Mbh [= Maha-bhasya] tradition, it would
be odd to refer to South India at all. He would rather
have said: "The tradition existed only in manuscripts."
My preceding remarks should suffice to establish that
this interpretation is contextually improbable. It is
also flawed by lack of logical implication. There is no
incompatibility between (i) saying that the MB tradition
existed only in the form of manuscripts, and (ii) saying
that the MB tradition existed only in the South. Third,
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there is no justification for taking agamah daksinatyesu
grantha-Triatre vyavasthitah as synonymous with
daksinatyah agamah grantha-matre vyavasthitah, as
Scharfe does.
8. (a) See S. K De 1938:258-59, and Simha 1969:242-43, for
a discussion of Candra's/Candra-gomin's province of
birth.
(b) The presence of Gaudas in early Kashmir is
proved by RT 4.323-35 and Ksemendra, Desopadesa, adhyaya
6. The latter refers to students from Bengal who had
come to Kashmir to study Sanskrit and Sanskritic
branches of knowledge. The grandfather of the remark-
able author Jayanta-bhatta was also a Gauda who migrated
to Kashmir.
(c) Bronkhorst (1983:396-97) actually accepts
Candra's residence in the South, i.e., in Gujarat or
north Maharashtra. His discussion of Candra?s locality
shows no awareness of the literature referred to in (a).
He obviously assumes that Candracarya is definitely the
same as Candra-gomin, that a Buddhist like Candra-gomin
must have lived in an area inhabited by followers of the
Maitrayamya recension of the Veda, and that the possi-
bility of the localities of Candracarya and Candra-gomin
being different need not be entertained!
9. There are some minor but complex problems, in addition
to the major problems indicated here, associated with
Scharfe's use of the examples in the Candra Vrtti and
other related texts. It would be better to take them up
for discussion in a separate publication.
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10. The problems connected with the acceptance of Candra-
gomin's authorship of the available Cdndra Vrtti are
discussed in Birwe 1968.
11. It is not clear to me exactly how Scharfe deduces from
"We shall eat (bhoksydmake) rice" that Candra-gomin's
was a one-day journey to Kausambi. Since Scharfe con-
trasts this example with others meaning "We shall eat
twice/' I have assumed that in his view "We shall eat
rice" implies 'We shall eat rice once' and one rice meal
implies one day's journey. However, who is likely to
eat only one rice meal or only one meal per day? Does
the example presuppose a Buddhist monk as the speaker of
the sentence? In that case, why is there nothing in the
context of the example that would suggest restriction of
the example to a monk's situation? If, on the other
hand, the inference that the distance was to be covered
in one day is to be drawn only from the grammatical form
hhoksydmahe, why do other grammarians specify the number
of times they would carry out a particular act in a
similar situation? Why does the Kdsikd (3.3.136, 138)
see nothing wrong in changing odanam bhoksydmahel
bhoktdsmahe to dvir odanam bhoksydmahe/bhoktdsmahe,
although it, too, speaks of a journey through Kausambi to
Pataliputra? Scharfe (1976:275) glosses over the problem
the Kdsikd examples pose by stating that they "appear to
be compounded renderings of the sentences found in the
Candra-vrtti and Abhaya-nandin's Mahdvrtti . . . the
example must be regarded as one of those standard
examples handed down through the times and used without
respect for its actual [factual?] accuracy." Before
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blaming the evidence that inconveniences his specula-
tion, however, Scharfe should have asked himself: Why
would the Kasika opt for compounded renderings? Is it
certain that the Kasika was written later than the
Candra Vrtti and the Maha-vrtti? I am aware that, since
Kielhorn's 1886 article, it has generally been held that
the Kasika is influenced by the Candra vydkarana. How-
ever, as I pointed out at the time of the 192d meeting
of the American Oriental Society in 1982, this view may
not be valid. Recently, Bronkhorst (1983:368) has
argued that there is no Candra influence on at least the
sutra text in the Kasika. As for Abhaya-nandin, he has
been placed in the post-Kasika period by the historians
of Sanskrit grammar on very good grounds (Yudhisthira
Mlmamsaka, 1973/samvat 2030, vol. 1, 3d ed., pp. 458-71,
584-86; also pp. 9, 24, and 51-52 of the introductions
contributed by Vasudeva-sarana Agravala, Nathu-ramaji
Premi, and Yudhisthira Mlmamsaka to iSambhu-natha
Tripathfs edition of Abhaya-nandin's Maha-vrtti, Kashi:
Bharatiya Jfiana-pitha, 1956). Moreover, two of the
Kasika phrases that could be said to have been inspired
by the Maha-vrtti are not as precise as their counter-
parts (compare tatra saktun pasyamah and yukta
adhyaimahi with tatra . . • dvih saktun pasyamah and
yukta dvir adhyaimahi). If the Kasika were at the
borrowing end, why would it sacrifice the existing
precision? That the Kasika elsewhere copies examples
from such works as the MB hardly constitutes sufficient
proof for the present purpose.
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12. The questions I have about this particular assumption
are: Was travel in the range of fifty miles generally
viewed by Candra's contemporaries as possible in one
day? Would an ordinary man eat only once during a
fifty-mile journey when the journey is to be completed
with ancient means? Would it be correct to hold that
the Candra Vrtti example is from the perspective of a
monk who eats only one meal per day?
13. The attitude that may be implicit in Peterson's and
Scharfe's attempts at identification also needs comment.
Both these scholars write as if the Tika identification
does not exist or need not be taken seriously. This is
hardly a justifiable view to take of a piece of informa-
tion that is about one thousand years old; that is
unlikely to have been given unless it was known to
earlier students and commentators of the VP (cf.
anusruyate in the Tika); and that is in itself very
plausible (especially because it contains the names
Tri-kuta and Tilinga attested in a number of inscrip-
tions, etc.). If Peterson or Scharfe had pointed out
that the Tika detail offends common sense (has a mythic
character like some other details in the Tika) or is
contradicted by another equally old source, they would
have been justified in setting it aside. By not follow-
ing any such procedure they give the impression that
information preserved by scholars directly in the line
of transmission deserves little or no credence. This is
an unwarranted and unprofitable position to take. More-
over, since their own views are based on the use of some
indirectly related tradition, they are open to a charge
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of self-serving eclecticism. The same comment can be
extended to Bronkhorst's discussion.
14. Mirashi (1955:xl) follows a reading ovarti-tri-
kalingaika0 not found in Manavallfs edition (1887),
which Mirashi apparently used. As note 15 establishes,
there is some trace of this reading in the generally
inferior manuscript E7 and its transcript E14 but there
is no clear support for it in any of the available manu-
scripts. Even in E7, the presence of ka is due to the
copyist's inability to decide whether his exemplar reads
ta/ti or ka. It would appear that Mirashi read the name
Tri-kalinga in his source through an oversight caused by
the memory of that name, which occurs in other histori-
cal records handled by him.
15. Following the designations given in Rau 1971, the devia-
tions noticed in manuscripts from the Tika text accepted
here can be specified as follows:
(a) trikutekadesa0 El, trikutaidesa0 E25,
trikutaiddesa0 E5, trikutadesa0 E7, trikute desa° E14.
(b) °varttinetilimgai E8, °varttinotilimgaika° El,
°vartinolimgaika° E3, E9, E9a, E22, °varttinolimgaika°
with no changed to ti in the margin E10, °vartita-
kalimgaika0 E7, E14, °varttitaligauka0 E5, °vartiti
limgaika0 E20, °varttine [or te] UgaikoP E23,
°varttitelimgaika° E4, E21, E25, °vavartitilimgaika° E6.
The difference of one t between varti and vartti is
of no consequence, as anyone conversant with common
features of Sanskrit orthography knows.
The generally reliable manuscripts of the Tika are
E4, E6, E l l , E13, E15, E16, E21, E24, and E25, as my
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planned critical edition of the Tika will establish.
They agree in reading the Tika phrase as I have accepted
it in this study, except for the redundant writing of va
in E6 and the presence of te in the place of ti in E4,
E21, and E25. The last variation does not make any
significant difference. Tilinga and Telinga are well-
attested names of the same Telangana region.
The manuscripts designated E2, E17, E18, E19, and
E26 by Rau do not contain the required portion. Rau's
E12 is a modern transcript of E2. E9a did not somehow
come to Rau's notice but was made available to me at the
library of the Sanskrit College in Calcutta.
16. (a) I have not yet had time to determine which, if any,
of the manuscripts accessible to me Manavalll followed
in his editio princeps of the Vakya-kanda-ttka. It is
possible that, as a nineteenth-century pandit, he showed
preference for the Sanskrit-sounding form trilinga over
the Prakrit or desy a-sounding forms tilinga and telinga.
(b) trilinga is noticed elsewhere as a variant of
tilinga (see note 18cd). Its acceptance would not
affect the subsequent discussion in this study.
17. For a critical examination of the other aspects of
Thieme's view, see Aklujkar (1986).
18. (a) This spelling is according to the National Atlas of
India. The spellings "Telingana," "Telengana," etc.,
are also noticed.
(b) For information on Tilinga or Telangana, see
Raychaudhuri in Yazdani 1960:27-29; Sircar 1960:16, 71,
75-76, 88, 89; Gupta 1973:37; and Schwartzberg 1978:137,
maps a and b; 38, map b; 39, map c; and 100, map a.
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(c) tri-linga, tirilinga, etc., are attested as
variants of tilinga. A secondary derivative tailanga is
also found.
(d) "The name Tirilinga (Skt Tri-linga) is tradi-
tionally derived from three shrines (lingas), namely,
those at Kalesvaram, SrTsailam and Draksarama . . .".
(Gupta 1973:37). Bhimesvara in the place of Draksarama
is given as the third linga leading to the formation of
Tri-linga by Liiders in Epigraphia Indica 6, no. 10
(1900-1): 93.
19. Parvata is also taken as a proper name of a region in
northwestern India. According to Schwartzberg (1978:
184a), it refers to Jammu. It does not seem likely,
however, that this reference was current in the days of
B and his disciples. Besides, this Parvata was not
likely to be thought of as southern in the period with
which we are concerned (see note 3).
20. (a) For references to Sri-parvata in Sanskrit litera-
ture, inscriptions, etc., see Aklujkar 1982:8. For the
importance of Sii-parvata in Indian religious history,
see Dhere 1977:105-9, 179-80, 194-95.
(b) The geographical location of Sri-parvata is
shown in Schwartzberg 1978:22, map a; 27, map b; and 32,
map a.
(c) Sri-parvata and Srt-saila have been treated as
practically identical in the publication mentioned in
(b), as well as in some Sanskrit works and modern
research publications. Sri-parvata would seem to be the
older of the two names and has a general as well as a
specific reference. In its former role, it seems to
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stand for the mountain range toward the southwestern
extremity of which the Brahmanical site of Sri-saila
took shape (cf. Sircar 1965:235, n. 3; Schwartzberg
1978:27, map b). In the latter role, Sri-parvata
appears to be a predominantly Buddhist site near
Nagarjunakonda in the northeastern part of the same
Nallamala (alternative spellings "Nallamalur" and
"Nalamalai") mountain range.
(d) The location of Sri-saila is shown in plate 35
of the National Atlas of India and in Schwartzberg
1978:21, map a; 25, map a; 26, map a; 27, map b; 31, map
a; 34, maps a and b; 38, maps a and b; 41, map a; 47,
map a; 99, map a; and 140, map a.
21. (a) Accounts of Candra's discovery, including those in
Tibetan, will be compared in part 4 of this study.
(b) Fa-hsien's report of his travels in India
between 399 and 414 A.D. contains a hearsay description
of a five-tiered, or five-storied, mountain monastery
(Po-lo-yu or Po-lo-yue) called approximately parava in
the local language. At least some specialists of the
travelogues of Chinese visitors to India have come to
the conclusion that this monastery is identical with the
one {po-lo-mo-lo-ki-li) which Yuan Chwang (=Hiuen
Tsiang) visited about two hundred years later and which
was on Sri-parvata, associated with Nagarjuna. Accord-
ingly, Watters (1905:200-1; cf. Yazdani 1960:146-47)
sees in Fa-hsien's parava the Sanskrit word parvata (not
paravata 'pigeon' or 'columbarium' as Fa-hsien thought)
standing for i§ri-parvata.
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22. The tentative assumption here is that Candra-gomin is
the same individual as Candracarya or was confused with
Candracarya by this time.
23. Thus, Ramakrishna Kavi was on the right track when he
included the guess "somewhere near Sri Parvata, probably
in the Andhra country" in his 1930 article (p. 239).
However, he did not give any evidence or reasoning in
support of his remark or provide a geographical specifi-
cation of Sri-parvata.
24. (a) Another possible identification of Tri-ktita, not as
a mountain but as a region or country, will be taken up
in 5.2.
The assumption in my discussion at this point is
that the Tika phrase tri-kutaika-desa-varti-tilingaika~
desad could originally have been different (a suspicion
based on the repetition of eka-desa, as on Thieme's
part, but not resolved in the same way as Thieme
proposes). The original form of the phrase was perhaps
as follows: tri-kutaika-desa-fvarti . . . ity eke. anye
tv ahuh . . .-Jvarti-tilingaika-desad iti, i.e., the
text available at present could be a result of haplog-
raphy caused by the recurrence of varti.
Resting on this assumption is the point of view that
two possible lines of identification, one based on the
name Tri-ktita and the other based on the name Tilinga,
should be kept apart at this stage of the discussion.
(b) As the Sabda-kalpa-drurna (p. 655) notes,
Sanskrit lexicons give the names Tri-kakud, Suvela,
Tri-mukuta, Tri-srnga, and Citra-kuta in the same group
as Tri-ktita. Except for Suvela, which may be helpful in
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determining the location of the Tri-kuta mentioned in
Rama narratives, the other mountains seem to have been
grouped with Tri-kuta only on account of the structural
similarity of the names.
25. This mountain would be very close to Sri-parvata (see
note 20) if not identical with a part of Sri-parvata
understood as a mountain range.
26. Mirashi (1975:205-19) establishes that, in the percep-
tion of many Classical authors, Lanka was located in
Simhala.
27. (a) It would be simplistic to hold that only one tradi-
tion regarding the location of Lanka was current in as
diverse and large a country as India and throughout as
long a period as that of Classical Sanskrit literature.
(b) The view that, in Valmlki's perception, Ravana's
Lanka was situated in a place other than Ceylon,
probably near the Vindhyas, has been expressed for many
years. Shah (1976) and Sankalia (1982) are the most
recent exponents of that view known to me.
28. If, however, the identification is correct with refer-
ence to a part of the historical evidence available (see
note 34) and we have in fact two Tri-kutas (approxi-
mately on the western and eastern borders of the
Satavahana empire), then we will have open to us the
alternative 'parvata = Tri-kuta = Kotappakonda', but it
will not materially be very different from the alterna-
tive 'parvata = Sri-parvata' (see note 25).
29. For understandable reasons, the ancient traveller in
India had to move along those areas where the height of
mountains like the Vindhyas was either not to be met
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with or was negotiable. A sort of western corridor for
the movement of men and goods, therefore, seems to have
developed near the Nasik area.
30. (a) Tri-kuta is near such ancient Buddhist sites as
Kanheri and Ajanta, and near Brahmin holy places like
Tryambakesvara. The appeal that Sri-parvata had for
Buddhists and Brahmins can be judged from the informa-
tion and sources given in note 20.
(b) I intend to discuss the problem of the religious
affiliation of (B and) Candracarya in a separate publi-
cation. One's conclusions in this regard will naturally
depend on whether Candracarya is held to be identical
with Candra-gomin and, to some extent, on what view one
takes of the religious affiliation of B and his
disciples.
31. Subramania Iyer's (1977:li, 204) renderings of the Tlka
phrase, "Trilinga country, near the Trikuta mountain" <
and "Trikuta," are not as precise as they should have
been.
32. The Tlka author could also be said to have a region
rather than a mountain in mind. In the latter part of
his identifying phrase, eka-desa is compounded with
tilinga, the name of a region. The same is, therefore,
likely to be true of eka-desa in tri-kutaika-desa.
33. Thus, Schwartzberg (1978:137, map a) is right in showing
Tri-kuta as a region.
34. As possible evidence to the effect that Tri-kuta could
have at times denoted a larger area than the one
determined by Mirashi, note the following:
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(a) The word tri-kuta, probably referring to an
area, occurs in a third-century A.D. plate discovered in
the Vizagapatnam district; cf. Hultzch, Epigraphia
Indica 3, no. 3 (1894-95):19-20.
(b) A temple of Tri-kutesvara is said to be near the
village Kondakavuru, which is eight miles south of
Narasaravupeta; cf. Liiders, Epigraphia Indica 6, no. 12
(1900-l):116, 127.
(c) In a Visnukundin inscription, Prince Madhava-
varman II, whose headquarters were at Amara-pura (=
Amaravatl near Sri-parvata?) has been called tri-
kuta-malayadhipati; cf. Sircar 1960:189.
(d) If there were in fact two historical Tri-kutas,
(c) and (d) of our list in 4.7, it is possible that the
area between them governed by rulers such as the Satava-
hanas was known as the country of the Tri-kutesvaras or
as Tri-kuta.
(f) There is a temple of Tri-kutesvara existing from
at least 1191 A.D. at Gadag in Dharwar district; cf.
Kielhorn, Epigraphia Indica 3, no. 30 (1894):217-20.
(g) Mishra (1973:139), on the basis of Sumpa Mkhan-
Po's Pag-Sam-Jon-Zang (p. Ixvi) edited by S. C. Das,
points out the probability that there once was a
Traikutaka vihara in West Bengal.
35. There are no expressions indicating a miracle in 486
(Aklujkar 1981:600), although a miracle is at least
suggested in all the other known accounts except the one
in the RT.
36. Under this possibility, what the author of 486 would, in
effect, be saying would be this: 'Candracarya and others
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came from the North and acquired from the mountain the
agama that had survived only in a written form among the
daksinatyas, that is, among us'. B, as the author's
teacher, would then be the person who built on the foun-
dation prepared by Candracarya (verse 487) and revived
the tradition, at least in the Nasik area.
37. (a) 'vaset parvata-mulesu pravdho yo dhyana-dharandt I
sarat saram vijariati parvatah pariklrtitah II 'He who
lives in the foot-areas of mountains, is advanced/
mature on account of practice of meditation, and knows
the quintessence, is said to be parvata'.
(b) According to the Hindi Sabda-sagara (vol. 6, p.
2883), parvata is a samnyasin who belongs to the Dasa-
nami sect and lives at the foot of a mountain, devoting
himself to meditation. This information is corroborated
by the Brhacchankara-vijaya passage quoted in the
Prana-tosinl. The names of the ten samnyasins are given
in that passage in this order: tirtha, asrama, vana,
aranya, giri, parvata, sagara, sarasvati, bharati, and
purl.
(c) Prior to quoting the verse in (a) as a defini-
tion found in the Avadhuta chapter of the Prana-tosini,
the Sahda-kalpa-druma (III, pp. 77-78) informs us that
parvata in this sense is "a specific kind of disciple/
follower of Mandana-misra, who was the disciple of
Samkaracarya." I do not know the basis for the specific
association with Mandana-misra.
38. The author of the Bala-manoramd commentary is puzzled by
Bhattoji's example, as can be seen from his comment:
parvatasya sthavara-janmataya tapasasya tad-apeksaya-
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bhyarhitatvam bodhyam. bhasye tu rnata-pitarav ity
vdahrtam. 'Since a parvata is born of a stationary
entity (or is stationary by birth), a tapasa should be
understood as worthy of respect in comparison to him.
The example in the Bhasya is, however, mata-pitarau\
The Tattva-bodhini commentary does not even indicate
awareness of the example tapasa-parvatau.
39. (a) See note 37.
(b) It might be asked if this sense of parvata could
be as old as the author of 486. I am not aware of any
evidence that would conclusively prove this sense to be
so old. However, since Vidyaranya's list of the ten
classes of monks is not very logical (in the first seven
location is the criterion, whereas in the last three it
is not; there is also overlapping between asrama, vana,
and aranya, and between giri and parvata), it may be
inferred that it has old as well as new terms simply put
together. See also 6.2.
40. (a) Or has he used parvatat for parvate simply because,
in the phrase parvate agamam labdhva, the word parvate,
reduced to parvata by samdhi, would have disturbed the
meter?
(b) Scharfe (1976:276, n. 21) simply dismisses the
view of "an eminent Indian Sanskritist" that parvate
would have been proper if a mountain was intended and
that the use of parvatat indicates that a person was
probably intended. Scharfe does not point out, as he
should have, any instances in which an 'ablative + labK
construction is used to give the location (as distinct
from a conscious source) of an acquisition.
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Note that, for the resolution of the grammatical
point involved here, it is not necessary that the acqui-
sition be that of an agama. I am not making the
unreasonable expectation that another occurrence strict-
ly of the type 'ablative of location + agamam + labdhvW
be pointed out, for I do realize that there would be
very few occasions requiring one to speak of the acqui-
sition of an agama. Similarly, any form of labh or a
synonymous root would do. The point is that Scharfe
should have cited at least one parallel instance favor-
ing the 'location' interpretation before setting aside
so casually the observation he attributes to an eminent
Indian Sanskritist.
In his letter of 6 November 1987, Scharfe informs me
that the observation was made by V. Raghavan at the time
of the American Oriental Society meeting held at Santa
Barbara.
(c) As the correct reading of RT 1.176 is candra-
caryadibhir labdhvadesam tasmat (Aklujkar 1986), the
source in that 'ablative + labK construction is King
Abhimanyu, i.e., the source is sentient.
41. (a) Since the etymological or wider meaning of amanusya
is something anyone knowing Sanskrit would think of
right at the outset, it does not need a tradition to
come into existence, but the narrow meaning is so speci-
fic and unexpected that it is not likely to be found in
commentaries like the Kasika unless a tradition to the
effect that it was intended by Panini existed.
(b) From Patafijalfs comments on 3.2.52-3, it seems
that commentators of Panini had begun by Patafijalf s
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time to entertain the possibility of taking amanusya in
a literal sense. The Kasika does not appear to be the
first commentary to do so.
42. As the secondary derivatives tend to acquire a general
meaning (such as 'belonging to, pertaining to,
associated with') in the history of Sanskrit, parvata
(and parvatiya) probably expanded beyond the sense 'a
parvata-dwelling ogre/ghost/ascetic' to include items
associated with mountains in general; i.e., parvata (and
parvatiya) could also be used as adjectives of things
such as water and fruit found on a mountain. It is
likely that because of this semantic development the
Kasika decided not to follow consistently the narrow
meaning of amanusya it advocated in the case of Panini
2.4.23.
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VYANJANA AS REFLECTED IN THE
FORMAL STRUCTURE OF LANGUAGE
Saroja Bhate
The close relationship between poetics and grammar has
often been articulated in Indian tradition. Anandavardhana,
the author of the Dhvanyaloka, the well-known treatise on
poetics, remarks prathame hi vidvamso vaiyakaranah 'The
grammarians are the foremost scholars'. The doctrine of
dhvani owes its existence to the grammarians' doctrine of
sphota according to Abhinavagupta, the author of the commen-
_ 2tary Locana on the Dhvanyaloka, Since sabda 'word' is the
nucleus in both these systems, they share some topics in
common. For instance, the diverse types of meanings under-
stood from a word are treated in both the grammar and the
poetics. In addition to the two well-known functions of a
word, namely, ahhidha 'expressive function' and laksand
'secondary function', a third is added by rhetoricians like
Anandavardhana. This is known as vyanjand 'suggestive
function'. It is of the utmost significance and plays a
vital role in poetics. It is introduced and established by
Anandavardhana and his followers who have further elaborated
it by classifying it into several kinds. He says, "The
language of the great poets is possessed of an extraordinary
power of suggestion which pervades the whole poetry like the
55
charm of a beautiful woman which is over and above her limbs
g
and features." The suggested meaning, which is understood
through the function of vyanjana, is known as dhvani.
Dhvani, the soul of poetry, is, on the one hand, the
manifestation of pratibha Intuition' of the poet. On the
other, it is subject to the understanding of those listeners
or readers who possess pratibha.
It is generally believed that among the grammarians of
Sanskrit it is Nagesa who first recommends acceptance of
vyanjana as a separate function of words. He not only
describes the nature of vyanjana following the rhetoricians
but also refutes the claim of the Naiyayikas, the logicians,
that vyanjana can be subsumed under laksana.
According to the exponents of the dhvani theory, the
hidden beauty of poetry is understood only through the
function of vyanjana. Various kinds of dhvani as well as
vyanjana are described in different works on poetics. It
has been recognized by the dhvanivadins that the dhvani is
communicated by both linguistic and extralinguistic factors.
Among the extralinguistic factors are listed the specific
character of the speaker as well as that of the listener,
the presence of another person, the context, the situation,
time, place, and gesture. The linguistic factors that
convey dhvani are sentence, compounds, words, word-parts,
n
suffix, syntax, and the poetry as a whole. Rhetoricians
from Anandavardhana to Jagannatha have supplied a number of
illustrations to show how dhvani is understood from various
linguistic elements. A few illustrations cited by the
rhetoricians are given below to make the point clear.
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In the Sahityadarpana a verse from the second act of the
well-known drama of Kalidasa, the Abhijnana-Sakuntalam, is
cited. The verse runs as follows: Muhurangulisamvrta-
dharostham pratisedhdksaraviklavabhirdamam I Mukham
amsavivarti paksmalaksyah katham apy unnamitam na. . .
cumbitam tu II 'Gently she covered her lower lip with her
finger, [but] charmingly she could not say "no." [I] some-
how lifted her face, [which she] turned [away from me]
toward her shoulder, but I did not kiss it'. Visvanatha
remarks "atra 6tuy iti nipatasya anutapavyanjakatvam"
Q
'Here the particle tu suggests repentance'.
A verse from the Meghadutam of Kalidasa is cited in the
Dhvanyaloka as follows: talaih sinjadvalayasubhagaih kantaya
nartito me I yam adhyaste divasavigame nllakanthah suhrd
vah II TO cloud! It is the golden perch] on which sits
the peacock, your friend who is made to dance every evening
by my wife on the rhythm of the clappings of her hands
making sweet sound of her tinkling bangles'.
Here the plural ending added after the word tola implies
the versatile character of the heroine and thereby suggests
the intensity of the pangs of separation experienced by the
hero.10
Many other citations may be found in different treatises
on poetics. The two illustrations given above are enough to
show how, according to the poeticians, various linguistic
elements such as the indeclinable tu and the case-endings
suggest certain feelings. The point to be noted in this
connection is that it is implied by all the rhetoricians
that the dhvani is purely subjective or intuitive. It
flashes in the heart of the reader as soon as he reads a
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particular sentence, word, or word-element The question
that arises is, therefore, do all the readers comprehend the
same dhvani from a certain linguistic expression? Or does
it change from reader to reader? Even if it is admitted
that only the sahrdayas, the connoisseurs, have the ability
to grasp the dhvani, do all the aesthetes agree in their
understanding of the same dhvani from an expression?
Generally, they do not. The suggested meaning is thus a
purely subjective matter. Two readers may not read the same
meaning between the lines of poetry. And the more subjec-
tive is the appreciation of poetry, the less theoretical it
turns out to be. This leads to the lack of uniformity,
precision, and accuracy that are essential to make a system
a formal science. It is precisely for this inconsistent and
obscure character of the dhvani that the Naiyayikas,
Jayanta-bhatta in particular, vehemently attacked the dhvani
theory and rejected vyanjanal as a separate function. This
aspect of the doctrine of dhvani and vyanjana seems to lead
poetics away from a formal science. It tends to be more
intuitive rather than theoretical. One therefore wonders if
some kind of uniformity can be brought about in the literary
evaluation, based on dhvani, of a piece of poetry. Appar-
ently diverse emotive and attitudinal meanings cannot be
tied down to any linguistic factors, although some of them
have been found to be associated with accent and intonation.
It has already been pointed out that the concepts of
vyanjana and suggested meaning make their appearance in the
domain of grammar in the seventeenth century. However,
Panini, the foremost grammarian of Sanskrit, had already
assumed this kind of meaning as one of the meanings under-
58
stood from a linguistic expression. Although Panini never
uses the term vyanjand or any other similar terms, he has,
while analyzing the Sanskrit language, successfully handled
the suggested meaning at the level of the structure of lan-
guage. In his Astadhyayi, he showed in at least two hundred
rules that a number of emotive and attitudinal meanings were
relevant to the form of language. The attitudinal meaning
is associated not only with intonation and accent but also
with different linguistic elements such as suffixes, pre-
fixes, and sometimes even augments.
Students of Panini's grammar are quite familiar with the
fact that some of the sets of verbal endings are directly
connected with the feelings and attitudes of the speaker.
The sets of verbal endings related to moods such as optative
(UfJ) and imperative HOT) are, for instance, described as
conveying various feelings like vidhi 'prompting*, niman-
~ 12
trana 'invitation', amantrana 'permission', etc. For
example, in the sentence hhavdn hhunjita 'You may please
take food', the verbal ending ta conveys request or wish in
the mind of the speaker. More interesting cases treated by
Panini will be discussed in the following pages.
Panini states that the preposition api is a karma-
pravacaniya when it conveys disgust in the mind of the
13speaker. In the sentence api stuyad vrsalam 'One may
praise even an outcaste', api conveys disgust. Elsewhere it
is an upasarga. Therefore, in the sentence apistuydd
vrsalam 'One may praise even an outcaste', wherein no dis-
gust is conveyed, api causes cerebralization of the initial
dental of the following root (P.8.3.65). The phonology of
the construction and the semantic function of api are thus
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directly connected. It is the emotive meaning that distin-
guishes between the two usages of api and the corresponding
formal structure of the two expressions.
Impatience or urgency is conveyed by the krt suffix
NamUL according to P.3.4.52. The illustration given in
the Kasika on the above rule is iayyotthayam dhavati '[He]
runs hurriedly from his bed*. The emotional overtone
implied here is that he is so impatient that he does not
care even to dress after getting out of bed. When, however,
no hurry or impatience is to be conveyed, the expression
would be sayydyd utthdya dhavati '[He] runs after having got
up from the bed'.
The feeling of appreciation is transmitted through some
15secondary suffixes. The suffix rupa in the derivative
vaiydkaranarupah 'a praiseworthy grammarian', for instance,
conveys the speaker's appreciation of a grammarian. In the
absence of appreciation the speaker uses merely the form
vaiydkaranah 'grammarian'.
The primary suffixes also convey various emotions. For
instance, blessing or benediction is conveyed by the primary
suffix vuN according to P.3.1.150. The word jivakah 'one
who lives' suggests the blessing in the mind of the speaker,
17"Let him live long." Similarly, the krt suffix Da in the
form satruhah 'killer of enemies' conveys the blessing that
he should always be victorious in his fights with enemies.
A is eating and B does not like it. B finds fault with
A's manner of eating. A does not like B's undue criticism.
He retorts, yathdkdram aham bhoksye tathdkdram aham, kim
tavdnena 'I will eat as I will. What have you got to do
with it?'. The intention of the speaker to retaliate is
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conveyed by the primary suffix NamUL added after the root kr
- - 18 " °
in the form yathakaram. The ordinary statement of fact
would be yatha krtvaham bhoksye tatha tvam draksyasi 'You
will see how I eat'.
Many more illustrations can be added. All show how
minutely Panini has observed the nuances and their corres-
pondence with the formal structure of linguistic expres-
sions. He has linked feelings such as anger, jealousy,
love, hatred, and insult with diverse linguistic elements.
His treatment of a large number of word formations that are
linked with the dhvani indicates that the emotive and
attitudinal meanings can be formalized at least to a certain
extent. Thus vyanjana, which often expresses the speaker's
intention or presupposition towards an object or a situa-
tion, plays a crucial role in the derivational system of
Panini. It is incorporated in the formal analysis of the
language.
In this structural approach the suggested meaning of a
linguistic expression is fixed and does not vary from
listener to listener. The vyanjand theory developed by the
poeticians fails to explain this correlation between the
linguistic forms and the emotive meanings, which is clearly
pointed out by Panini's grammar.
The questions that emerge from the foregoing observa-
tions are: Can the dhvani language of the poets, which is
deliberately rendered ambiguous to create a charming effect,
be put to a uniform objective analysis, at least to a
certain extent, as Panini did? Is it possible to bring
about uniformity in the comprehension of dhvani by all
readers by establishing a correlation between emotive mean-
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ings and the formal structure of the language? Can such
formalization render poetics more theoretical than intui-
tive? And is it really expected to be so?
One has to admit that the structural approach to
vyanjana has its limitations. The meaning of poetry is not
a fixed thing and is open to interpretation. The true
sahrdayas, people of taste, always consider the best poetry
to be like a veiled beauty, concealing its grace and charm
and allowing the aesthetes to discover it in their own way.
Intuitive communication cannot be fastened to the rules of
grammar. Nevertheless, a preliminary claim can be made on
the basis of the observations made above that linguistic
analysis carried out in the Paninian way may provide some
insights for the exploration of dhvani and bring about
uniformity, at least on the initial level, in applied criti-
cism related to Sanskrit poetry.
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ON PASYA MRGO DHAVATI
Gopikamohan Bhattacharya
In language-generated awareness (sabdabodha), syntactic
expectancy plays a decisive role. Syntactic expectancy
(dkdnksd), competency (yogyata), congruency (dsatti) and the
speaker's intention (tdtparya) are the determining factors
in verbal awareness. Nagesa defines dkdnksd as "The
speaker's intention to know the meaning of a word, which is
appropriate to be syntactically related with the meaning of
another word of which the meaning is already known."
Suppose that, if I know the meaning of a word, say cow, I
desire to know: what shall I do with the cow? I need to
know the meaning of another word, bring. I search for a
meaning for bring that is syntactically related to the mean-
ing of cow. As long as this search continues I do not have
sdbdabodha. But, on hearing the second word and understand-
ing its meaning, my desire is fulfilled and I become aware
of the syntactic connection between the two word-meanings.
Nyaya says: "Awareness of this connectedness [samsarga] is
language-awareness [sdbdabodha]"
Here it may be pointed out that this property of genera-
ting (uthdpakatd) a desire to know the meaning of the other
word may be reciprocal or one-way. Consider the sentence
pacati taTidulam Devadattah 'Devadatta cooks rice'. When I
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say the word cooks, a sympathetic hearer will ask: what is
being cooked? Likewise, if I say taiydulam ('rice' + accusa-
tive case-suffix), the hearer will ask: what is being done
with this rice? Here the awareness of one prompts the
hearer to ask for the other and vice versa. But when I hear
somebody saying "Look," I wish to know "Look at what." When
I hear the sentence "The deer runs," my desire to know is
fulfilled. If I hear the expression mrgo dhavati The deer
runs', I do not ask "What should I do about it?" because the
awareness of the sentence-meaning is complete. In this case
it is not a reciprocal but a one-way determination.
I may point out here that, if I say "Look" and simply
point out with my finger that the deer is running, this will
not generate verbal awareness because the second half is not
verbally expressed. These elliptical sentences, says the
Grammarian, do not generate verbal awareness unless the
other part is uttered verbally.
Now let us consider the sentence pasya mrgo dhavati
'Look, the deer runs' and the nature of the awareness that
follows upon hearing it. The Nyaya and the Grammarian have
suggested two different models of semantic analysis of a
sentence. In the Nyaya view, the connected sentence-meaning
structure is dominated by the meaning of the nominative but,
according to the Grammarian, the verbal phrase is the prin-
cipal element, "the center of interest," and all other word-
meanings are subsidiary to it. These meaning-elements,
being interrelated, finally qualify the principal meaning-
element. An example will make the point clear. In the
awareness generated upon hearing the expression caitro {nnam
pacati 'Caitra cooks rice', the Nyaya says that the meaning
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of the word Caitra is the center of interest and the chief
qualificand (mukhya visesya). One may ask: how does the
meaning of Caitra get predominance over other meaning-
instances? Perhaps the Nyaya has in mind the Vaisesika
notion of substance (dravya), which is the central element
to which all other qualifiers, e.g., quality (#wm), action
(kriyd), etc., relate. Thus, the Nyaya says, the word
pacati ('cooks') has two parts: the root pac and the verbal
suffix tip. The root pac denotes the action of cooking and
the meaning of the tip suffix is 'effort'. In our verbal
knowledge of this sentence, the meaning of effort is
connected with the meaning of Caitra as a prakdra 'quali-
2
fier', and the meaning of the root pac ('to cook') is
connected with effort through the relation of conduciveness
(anukulatd) because effort generates the activity of cook-
ing. Navya-Nyaya says that the meanings of the word Caitra,
the root pac, and the suffix tip figure (lit. bhdsate
'floats') in our verbal awareness in the following manner:
the meaning of Caitra as the chief qualificand (mukhya
visesya) is qualified by the meaning of the tip suffix,
i.e., 'effort', and the effort is qualified by the meaning
of the act of cooking. So the verbal awareness of the
sentence "Caitra cooks rice" would be semantically inter-
preted as uCaitra is the location of effort conducive to
action, which generates the act of cooking, which has rice
as the object" (anna-karTrmka-pdkdnukula-vydpdrdnukula-krty-
asrayas caitrah). To cut a long story short, for Nyaya the
meaning of the chief qualificand enjoys primacy over other
meanings. It is the word inflected with a nominative case
ending (prathamanta).
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More observations on this issue may be in order. If an
object, say X, figures in my verbal awareness, it is always
presented as being qualified by a property. X is the quali-
ficand (visesya), which possesses the relational abstract
visesyatd 'qualificandness'. Likewise, that which figures
in our verbal awareness as the prakara 'property* also has
prakdratd 'propertyhood'. An example will make the point
clear. In our verbalized awareness of the sentence parvato
vahnimdn 'The mountain is possessed of fire', both the moun-
tain and the fire are qualificands (visesya). But the moun-
tain is said to be the chief qualificand, whereas the fire
is not. The principle may be formulated as follows: "Some-
thing is the chief qualificand if and only if it figures in
our verbal awareness only as a qualificand (i.e., if it has
only qualificandness) and not also as a qualifier."
Gadadhara defines it thus: "The primacy of the qualificand
consists in its not being delimited by qualifierness or
being different from qualifierness" (mukhyatvam ca
visesyatayam prakaratanavacchinnatvam prakaratabhinnatvam
- 3va). Now, in the above example the meaning of the mountain
is limited by qualificandness only but the meaning of the
fire is not only a qualificand but the qualifier of the
mountain as well. So in fire (precisely, the meaning of the
word fire), qualifierness and qualificandness co-locate.
The meaning of fire stands in a double capacity, as qualifi-
cand (visesya) and as qualifier (prakara). The qualificand-
ness (visesyatd) is determined by "fireness" and the quali-
fierness is determined by the mountain (parvata-nirupita-
prakdratd). So fire cannot be the chief qualificand.
Mountain is the chief qualificand (mukhya visesya).
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One more point before I proceed further. In the
sentence-generated awareness there would be only one chief
qualificand. This means that in the meaning of a sentence
there can be only one "center of interest." The chief
characteristic of a sentence is that it should have the
identity of meaning, i.e., a sentence denotes a connected
(lit. visista 'qualified') meaning. All the words in a
sentence conjointly denote a single meaning, which is the
meaning of the sentence. This is called ekavakyata.
Jaimini describes it as follows: "[A sequence of words is
considered to be] a single sentence because of identity of
its meaning, [such that] on being separated [its words]
stand in expectancy [i.e., seem incomplete]" (arthaikatvdd
ekam vdkyam, sakamksam ced vihhdge sydt). Raghunatha
says: "The usage of one-sentence-ness is only for denoting
the cognition of a qualified meaning" (ekavdkyatd-
vyavahdras tu visistaikdrtha-pratipatti-paratd-
mdtrena). Gadadhara agrees with Raghunatha.
Now I shall discuss how the nature of language-generated
awareness, as emphasized in Nyaya, leads to several unwanted
situations. Consider the sentence pasya mrgo dhdvati 'Look,
the deer runs'. According to Nyaya, the awareness generated
from the word look would be "You are the location of the act
of seeing." From the words the deer runs the awareness
would be "The deer is possessed of effort conducive to the
act of running" (dhdvandnukula-krtimdn mrgah). If so, we
have here two chief qualificands, tvdm 'you' and mrgah
'deer'. This runs counter to the principle of ekavakyata
(lit. 'being a single sentence') because ekavakyata implies
that it should have only one meaning as the chief qualifi-
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cand, whereas here we have two chief qualificands, you and
the deer. Two chief qualificands imply two sentences,
whereas the sentence "Look, the deer runs" is considered to
be a single sentence having a qualified meaning
_ n
(visistartha).
In the Nyaya view, the sentence under consideration has
a unified meaning. A Naiyayika would not agree that there
are two completely independent meanings, as the Grammarian
interprets the Nyaya theory. In Nyaya, the semantic
analysis of the sentence would be as follows: "You are the
location of effort conducive to the act of seeing of which
deer is the object, which is the location of effort condu-
cive to the act of running" (dhavananukilla-krty-asraya-mrga-
karmaka-darsananukula-krty-asrayas tvam). It is clear that,
in this analysis, tvam 'you' i s the only chief qualificand.
In this way the charge of vakya-bheda 'a split sentence' due
to the absence of ekavakyata is answered.
The Grammarian's usual counterargument is this. It may
be true that the principle of ekavakyata will not be
violated, but the meaning of mrga 'deer', being the object
of the act of seeing, would then have an accusative case-
suffix. That is to say, instead of saying pasya mrgo
dhavati, the Naiyayika would be forced to use an absurd
expression such as pasya mrgam dhavati. To resolve the
impasse, Nyaya could invite a new word tarn ('it') and divide
the whole sentence-generated awareness into two awareness-
instances: (i) the deer is possessed of effort, which causes
the act of running (dhavana-janaka-krtinian mrgah); and (ii)
you are the location of the act of seeing, which has that
(tat), i.e., deer, as the object (tat-karrnaka-darsanasrayas
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tvam). But in that case the principle of unity of a
sentence (ekavakyata) is violated.
The Naiyayika may still argue that: when I say "Look,
the deer runs," what I wish to be seen is not simply "the
deer" but that "the deer runs." Actually, the verbalized
expression of the object of seeing is "the deer runs" (i.e.,
in Nyaya analysis, "the deer possessed of effort generating
the act of running"). It is a qualified meaning, which as a
whole is the object of seeing. A part of that meaning-
complex cannot be taken out and said to be the object
(karma). So we cannot isolate the meaning-element "deer"
and say that it is the object of seeing. Hence the possi-
bility of the word mrga taking an accusative case-suffix can
be ruled out.
The Grammarian counters this as follows: there is no
question that the meanings of both dhavati and mrgah consti-
tute the object-complex of the act of seeing (i.e., both the
"act of running" and the "deer" are objects of the act of
seeing). But dhavati cannot obviously take an accusative
case-ending because it is a verbal form. Obviously, then,
the accusative case-suffix should go to the word mrga.
The Grammarian himself, however, would not face such a
situation. He says that in sentence-generated awareness
(sahdabodha), the chief qualificand is action (vyapara). As
"Look, the deer runs" is an imperative sentence, the act of
seeing (darsana-kriya) is the chief qualificand, "the center
of interest," and its object is "the act of running of the
deer" (mrga-kartrkam dhavanam). Thus, the awareness may be
analyzed as: the act of seeing, of which "you" is the agent
and "the act of running by the deer" is the object. The
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"act of running," although it is a qualificand, is expressed
through a verbal form, e.g., dhavati. Hence, it cannot take
an accusative case-suffix.
One may ask: how, then, without an accusative case-
suffix, could "the act of running" be identified as the
object (karma)! Nagesa replies that the "act of running"
will figure in our verbal awareness as the object through
syntactic expectancy {akamksa) or, to be precise, through
8relational seam (samsargamaryada).
Moreover, the way in which Nyaya analyzes the verbal
awareness from a sentence leads also to problems other than
vdkyabheda. Let us explain the point further. The Grammar-
ian works here with the following principle: if something,
say X, is related with something else, say Y, as a quali-
fier, then X cannot be related with another something, say
Z, as a qualifier (ekatra visesanatvenanvitasyaparatra
— _ 9visesanatvayogat). Now, in the above sentence the act of
running is related with the agent (kartr), i.e., "deer/'
because the Naiyayika says "The deer is possessed of effort
conducive to the act of running." Hence, the same "act of
running" cannot be related to the "act of seeing" as the
object (to be precise, as the qualifier). The reason behind
this assumption is that when X is related with Y, the
syntactic expectancy {akamksa) is fulfilled. Hence, due to
the absence of expectancy, X cannot be further related with
Z. So the Naiyayika cannot show ekavakyata by relating the
act of running with the act of seeing. He cannot get around
the difficulty of the absence of ekavakyata.
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PANINI AND THE VEDA RECONSIDERED*
Johannes Bronkhorst
The relationship between Panini and the Veda has been
much debated. The presupposition underlying a major part
of this debate has been that much or even most of Vedic
literature existed in its present form prior to Panini. In
this article an attempt will be made to establish, as far as
possible, the relationship between Panini and the Veda with-
out taking the correctness of this presupposition for
granted.
1.1 A fundamental question is whether Panini knew the
Vedic texts, i.e., the ones with which he was familiar, in
the same form as we do. Were the Vedic texts that Panini
knew identical in all details with the editions we have now?
It appears that the answer to this question must be nega-
tive.
It is not always possible to decide that a text has not
reached us in its original form. In the case of metrical
texts this may be possible, however, and to some extent we
may be in a position to determine what the original text was
like. This is the case regarding the Rgveda. In another
study (Bronkhorst 1981) it has been shown that certain rules
of sandhi of the Astadhyayl fit an earlier stage of the text
of the Rgveda than the one we now have. The conclusion was
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drawn that "the lack of agreement between the Astadhyayi and
our Rgveda may henceforth have to be looked at through dif-
ferent eyes. Certainly, where phonetic questions are con-
cerned, Panini may describe an earlier form of the Rgveda,
and may not deserve to be blamed for being lacunary . . ."
(pp. 91-92).
This conclusion has far-reaching implications. The
Rgveda has been handed down with great care, with greater
care perhaps than any other Vedic text. Yet even here
Panini's rules of sandhi do not fully agree with the present
text, although we know that at least some of them once
fitted. How much less can we expect full agreement between
Panini's rules of sandhi and all other Vedic texts. This
means that a comparison of Panini's rules of sandhi and the
Vedic evidence, if it is to be made at all, must be made
with the greatest care. A straight confrontation of
Panini's rules with the Vedic facts cannot be expected to
yield more than partial agreement, and says little about the
state of affairs in Panini's day. In the present context it
is important to recall that "Panini's rules on Vedic sandhi
do not necessarily describe the sandhi which was actually
used in the Vedic texts which Panini had before him.
Rather, they describe the sandhi as it ought to be according
to Panini. This is confirmed by the circumstance that
Panini sometimes gives the opinions of others besides his
own, for example, in P.8.3.17-19" (Bronkhorst 1982, 21b)2
A development in tone patterns, too, must have taken
place after Panini. Eiparsky (1982, 73) sums up the results
of an investigation into this matter: "[T]he tone pattern
described by Panini represents an older stage than that
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described for the Vedic samhitas by the Pratisakhyas. While
the samhitas themselves are of course older than Panini's
grammar [?; see below], we may assume that they were
accented in Panini's time with the tone pattern described in
the Astadhyayt, and that their present tone pattern, as well
as the Pratisakhyas that codify it, are post-Paninian revi-
sions." It is true that Kiparsky derives the different tone
patterns from accent properties belonging to morphemes that
are stable in time. Yet it is at least conceivable, also,
that these accent properties changed in the time before the
3tone patterns reached their final form. This means that
little can be concluded from such deviations from Panini in
the accentuation of Vedic words as occur in arya (Thieme
1938, 9 If.; Balasubrahmanyam 1964; 1969), hay ana (Balasu-
brahmanyam 1966), jyestha and kanistha (Devasthali 1967,
5 6
7-8), arpita and justa (Balasubrahmanyam 1974), sriyase
(Balasubrahmanyam 1969; 1972), vodhave (Balasubrahmanyam
1983), and vrsti, bhuti, and vitti (Keith 1936, 736).7
This is further supported by the fact that accents were
not noted down until very late (Thieme 1935, 120f., 129f.).
A passage in the Satapatha Brahmana (1.6.3.10) gives further
proof for this. There Tvastr pronounces a mantra wrongly,
and as a result Vrtra is killed by Indra instead of the
reverse. The mantra concerned is indrasatrur vardhasva.
The later tradition-Patanjali's Mahabhasya (1:2, 1. 12),
Paninlya Siksa (verse 52), Bhattabhaskara and Sayana (on TS
2.5.2), etc.-agrees that the mistake concerned the accent:
an intended Tatpurusa compound 'killer of Indra' becomes a
Bahuvrihi 'whose killer is Indra'. The formulation of TS
2.5.2.1-2-yad abravtt svahendrasatrur vardhasveti tasmdd
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asyendrah satrur ahhavat-fxxlly agrees with this, MS 2.4.3
is even clearer: svdhendrasatrur vardhasva itlndrasydhainam
satrum acikirsad indram asya satrum akarot. Yet the
Satapatha Brdhmana formulates the story in a way that can
only be explained on the assumption that there was no way to
make the difference in accentuation visible. Rather than
writing (or reciting!) the Tatpurusa compound with the
appropriate accent, it analyzes the compound into indrasya
satruh. The passage then reads: atha yad ahravtd indra-
satrur vardhasveti tasnidd u hainam indra eva jaghdna I atha
yaddha sasvad avaksyad indrasya satrur vardhasveti sasvad u
ha sa indram evdhanisyat I.
These considerations show that any comparison between
the linguistic data in Panini and those in the Veda must be
extremely careful in the fields of sandhi and accentuation.
They also suggest that in other respects the Vedic texts
known to Panini may have undergone modification since
Paninf s time.
As an example of a feature that may have changed since
Panini, consider the word rdtri/rdtrt in the mantras of the
Taittirtya Samhita. According to P.4.1.31 (rdtres cdjasau),
rdtrt occurs in ritual literature (chandasi, see below)
before all endings except the nominative plural (cf. Bhat
1968; Wackernagel 1896-1930, 3:185f.).8 Five times the
mantras of the Taittirtya Samhita contain the word in a form
that allows us to determine whether rdtri or rdtrt is used.
Twice (TS 4.3.11.3 and 5.7.2.1) it is rdtrt, thrice rdtri.
However, it is not impossible that originally all five
occurrences had a form of rdtri. TS 4.1.10.1 (rdtrim rdtrim
apraydvam bharantah) recurs as rdtrim rdtrim (at MS 2.7.7
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and 3.1.9; KS 16.7 and 19.10; and SB 6.6.4.1). TS 4.4.1.1
(ratrim jinvosigasi) occurs as ratrim jinvo at KS 17.7. In
these two cases the shortening of I to i was a minor change.
More problematic seems to be TS 7.4.18.1 (ratrir dslt
pisangila), to which no parallels with long f correspond
(Bloomfield 1906, 823). Here a substitution of ratrl would
lead to rdtry aslt, which differs rather strongly from the
mantra as we know it. However, no such objection can be
raised against an earlier *ratri dslt; this in its turn
might be looked upon as the result of sandhi applied to
ratrl aslt, by P.6.1.127 (iko* savarne sakalyasya hrasvas
ca), a rule of sandhi that also held in the Rgveda, at least
according to Sakalya (see Bronkhorst 1982a, 181).
1.2 The second introductory question we have to ask is
whether or not Panini's Vedic rules were meant to be univer-
sally valid in the Vedic texts. Our observations on sandhi
have made it clear that here, at least, there is nothing to
contradict the supposition that Panini's rules were meant to
be adhered to throughout. (This does not necessarily mean,
however, that the texts known to Panini always had Panini's
kind of sandhi.) It is at least conceivable that all the
Vedic rules of the Astadhyayl were meant to be strictly
followed unless the opposite is explicitly stated.
This takes us to the main point of this subsection. If
Panini's Vedic rules were not meant to be followed strictly,
this should have been indicated in the Astadhyayl, Kiparsky
(1980) has shown that Panini distinguished three kinds of
optionality: vd 'preferably*, vihhdsd 'preferably not', and
anyatarasydm 'either way. This means that Panini used
various means to indicate optionality. As a matter of fact,
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option is indicated in a number of Vedic rules, P. 1.2.36,
6.2.164, and 7.4.44 read vibhdsa chandasi, P. 1.4.9 (sasthl-
yuktas chandasi vd), P.8.3.49 (chandasi vd'prdmreditayoh),
P.5.3.13 (vd ha ca chandasi), P.3.4.88 and 6.1.106 (va chan-
dasi), P.6.4.5 and 6.4.86 (chandasy uhhayathd), P£.4.162
(vibhdsarjos chandasi), P.8.2.70 (amnarildharavar ity ubhaya-
thd chandasi), P.8.3.104 (yajtcsy ekesdm), P.8.3.119 (nivya-
bhibhyo'd vyavdye va chandasi), P.8.3.8 (ubhayatharksu), and
P.6.4.9 (vd sapurvasya nigame). The words bahulam chandasi
Variously in ritual literature' occur no less than seven-
9
teen times together, not counting the rules wherein they
may have to be continued. In P. 1.2.61 (chandasi punarvasvor
ekavacanam) and 62 (visakhayos ca [chandasi]), the word
anyatarasydm is in force from P. 1.2.58, and is not cancelled
until nityam in 1.2.63. In P.6.1.52 (khides chandasi) there
is continuation of vibhdsa from sutra 51, cancelled by
nityam in 6.1.57. P.3.1.85 (vyatyayo bahulam) continues
chandasi from 3.1.84 (chandasi sdyaj api), which itself
indicates optionality by means of the word api. Similar
devices are used in P. 1.4.81 (chandasi pare'pi), and 82
(vyavahitds ca); P.3.3.130 (anyebhyo'pi drsyate [chandasi
129]); P.5.3.14 (itardbhyo'pi drsyante [chandasi 13]);
P.6.3.137 (anyesam api drsyate [rd 133][?]); P.6.4.73 and
7.1.76 (chandasy api drsyate)', P.7.1.38 (ktvdpi chandasi)',
P.5.2.50 (that ca chandasi)', P.5.3.20 (tayor ddrhilau ca
chandasi); P.5.3.33 (pasca pascd ca chandasi); P.5.4.12 (amu
ca chandasi); and P.5.4.41 (vrkajyesthdbhydm tiltdtilau ca
chandasi). P.3.2.106 (Utah kdnaj vd) is confined to ritual
literature because only there lit occurs (P.3.2.105 [chan-
dasi lit]). P.8.1.64 (vaivdveti ca chandasi) continues
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vibhasa (63), cancelled by nityam in 8.1.66. P.6.1.209
(jtcstdrpite ca chandasi) continues vibhasa from 208, discon-
tinued by 6.1.210 (nityam mantre). In P.6.3.108 (pathi ca
chandasi) the word ca continues vibhasa from 6.3.106 (cf.
Kiparsky 1980, 62). P.8.3.105 (stutastomayos chandasi)
appears to continue ekesdm from 8.3.104. P.4.4.113 (srotaso
vibhasa dyaddyau) continues chandasi from 4.4.110.
Nityam in P.4.1.29 (nityam samjndchandasoh), in 4.1.46
and 7.4.8 (nityam chandasi), and in 6.1.210 (nityam mantre),
does not indicate that here, exceptionally, some Vedic rules
are universally valid. Rather, it is meant to block the
option that is valid in the preceding rules, as so often
occurs in the Astadhyayi. We have no alternative but to
assume that, just as in his other rules, Panini's Vedic
rules not indicated as being optional were meant to be
generally valid.
From this we must conclude that deviations from Panini
in the Vedic texts known to Panini either did not exist in
his time or were not considered correct by him.
1.3 We now come to the question of what range of liter-
ature Panini considered "Vedic" in one way or another. This
is best approached by studying Panini's use of the word
chandas by which he most often refers to Vedic literature.
It is clear that Panini employs this word in a special way.
The most common meaning of chandas is 'meter', and then
'metrical text'. But this is not the only sense in which
Panini uses it. Thieme (1935, passim, esp. 67-69) showed
that rules given under chandasi 'in chandas9 are also valid
for prose passages (brahmana and yajus). He therefore ren-
dered chandasi as 'in Sacred Literature'. Thieme criticizes
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Liebich's (1891, 26) translation 'pre-classical language',
saying: "I do not think it an appropriate translation, since
it appears to endow Panini with a historical perspective he
hardly could have possessed" (p. 67).
This makes sense, but a major difficulty remains. Many
of the forms taught under the heading chandasi occur in
Sutra texts. Instances are numerous and only a few will be
given here. The name Punarvasu, used optionally in the
singular in chandas according to P. 1.2.61 (chandasi punar-
vasvor ekavacanam [anyatarasyam 58]), is so found at Visnu-
smrti (78.12) and VaSS (1.5.1.5), besides several places in
the Black Yajurveda. The singular of visakha, only allowed
chandasi by P. 1.2.62 (visakhayos ca), occurs similarly at
VaSS 2.2.2.14. The grammatical object of the root hu can
have an instrumental ending in chandas, according to P.2.3.3
(trtiya ca hos chandasi). One instance is Mi§S 1.6.1.23
(payasa juhoti dadhnd yavagvajyena va [cf. Thieme 1935,
10]). Some forms are only attested in Sutras. Khanya-
(P.3.1.123) only occurs in L&S 8.2.4 and 5; (pra-)stavya-
(id.) in L&S 6.1.20; unnlya (id.) in SaGS 4.14.4; and
yasohhagina (P.4.4.132) in HiSS 2.5.43, 6.4.3.
It seems safe to conclude that Panini's term chandas
covered more than just 'Sacred Literature'. We may have to
assume that certain works, primarily the ritual Sutras, and
among those first of all the Srauta Sutras, belonged to a
fringe area wherein Vedic usage was sometimes considered
appropriate. The effect of this assumption for our investi-
gation is that, where a chandas word prescribed by Panini is
attested in one Vedic text and in one or more Sutras, we are
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not entitled to conclude that Panini certainly knew that
Vedic text.
1.4 The final introductory question we have to consider
is the following. Are Panini's Vedic rules descriptive or
prescriptive? To be sure, to some extent they describe the
language that Panini found in Vedic texts, and are therefore
descriptive. But are they exclusively so? It may well be
that Vedic texts were still being composed in Panini's day,
and that he gives in his grammar guidelines regarding cor-
rect Vedic usage. This possibility has been discussed else-
where (Bronkhorst 1982, 275f.) and is further strengthened
by the evidence to be provided in the following sections of
this article. Here attention may be drawn to another reason
to conclude that at least some of Panini's rules may have
been meant to be prescriptive, besides, or rather than,
being descriptive. They may have been composed with some-
thing like uha in mind.
Uha is the term used to describe the adjustments Vedic
mantras undergo to make them fit for other ritual contexts.
An original mantra such as agnaye tva justam nirvapami,
directed to Agni, can become modified into suryaya tva
- 12 - -
justam nirvapami, directed to Surya. Devtr apah suddha
yuyam (MS 1.1.11, 1.2.16, 3.10.1; KS 3.6), directed to the
waters, becomes deva ajya suddham tvam when directed to
clarified butter (ajya). Sometimes only the number needs
adjustment, as when ayur asaste (MS 4.13.9; TS 2.6.9.7; TB
3.5.10.4) becomes ayur asasate or ayur asasate. Only the
gender is modified when jur asi dhrta manasa justa visnave
tasyas te satyasavasah (MS 1.2.4, 3.7.5; KS 2.5, 24.3; TS
1.2.4.1, 6.1.7.2; VS 4.17; SB 3.2.4.11; SBK 4.2.4.9) becomes
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jur asi dhrto manasa justo visnave tasya te satyasavasah
because a bull is under discussion.
Another interesting question is whether modified mantras
are in fact mantras themselves. The later Mimamsa tradition
appears to be unanimous in its opinion that they are not.
PMS 2.1.34 and Sahara's Bhasya thereon state explicitly that
the result of uha is not a mantra, and all later authorities
in this field seem to have followed their example. This
opinion is found, perhaps for the first time, in ApSS
24.1.35, which reads anamnatas tv amantra yatha pravaroha-
numadheyagrahananiti "Die nicht (im Mantra- oder Brahmana-
teile) iiberlieferten Teile sind indessen nicht als Mantra zu
betrachten, z.B. der Pravara, die 'Verschiebung* (uha), die
Nennung eines Namens" (tr. Caland 1928a, 387).
It is not surprising that modified mantras were not
considered mantras in their own right from an early date
onward. After all, the opposite opinion would leave almost
unlimited scope for creating new mantras. At a time when
efforts had been made to gather all mantras into Vedic
collections this must have been undesirable.
Yet there are clear traces of evidence that modified
mantras were not always considered nonmantras. As late an
13author as Bhartrhari (fifth century A.D.), who includes a
long discussion on uha in his commentary on the Mahabhasya
(Ms 2b9 f.; AL 5.18 f.; Sw 6.17 f.; CE Ahn. 1, 5.1 f.)
mentions "others" who think that modified mantras are them-
selves mantras. And several Srauta Sutras make no mention
of the nonmantric nature of modified mantras in contexts in
which that would have been appropriate, for example, BhaSS
(6.15), MSS (5.2.9), and &§S (6.1). Moreover, HigS (1.1.13-
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14) specifies that which is not a mantra without mentioning
uhal Apparently, at one time, modified mantras were
mantras.
This view is supported by the fact that modified mantras
have actually been included in the Vedic collections as
mantras. A particularly clear example is the long adhrigu
passage that occurs, or is discussed, in MS 4.13.4, KS
16.21, TB 3.6.6, AB 2.6-7 (6.6-7), KB 10.4, AsvSS 3.3, and
SSS 5.17, with this difference: TB, AB, KB, and SSS have
medhapatibhydm where MS and KS have medhapataye.
Interestingly, the difference is explained in AB 2.6.6
(6.6.6) in the following words:
sa yady ekadevatyah pasuh sydn medhapataya iti bruydt
yadi dvidevatyo medhapatihhyam iti yadi bahudevatyo
medhapatibhya ity etad eva sthitam
If the victim be for one deity, Tor the lord of the
sacrifice' [medhapataye] he should say; if for two
deities, Tor the two lords of the sacrifice' [medha-
patibhydm]; if for many deities, Tor the lords of the
sacrifice' [medhapatibhyah]. That is the rule. (Tr.
Keith 1920, 138)
15This is as clear a case of uha as is possible.
TS 2.3.10.1-2 repeats the same sacrificial formula four
times, with differences in number, in a single passage in
order to adjust it to different numbers of gods:
asvinoh prano'si tasya te dattdm yayoh prano'si svdha
indrasya prano'si tasya te daddtu yasya prano'si svdha
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mitravarunayoh prano'si tasya te dattam yayoh prano'si
svahd visvesdm devdndm prano'si tasya te dadatu yesdm
prano'si svahd
The question we must now consider is to what extent the
Vedic rules of the Astadhyayi can be looked upon as having
been composed with this kind of uha in mind. Obviously, it
cannot be maintained that this was the only purpose of these
Vedic rules, for some were undoubtedly intended to describe
isolated Vedic facts. But this does not exclude the possi-
bility that uha was one of the purposes for which some of
the Vedic rules of the Astadhyayi were formulated.
There is some reason to accept this last view. Some
Srauta Sutras lay down rules pertaining to the modification
of certain verbal forms. M§S 5.2.9.6, for example, lists
the following acceptable modified forms: adat, adatdm, adan,
ghasat, ghastdm, ghasan, aghasat, aghastdm, aghasan, karat,
karatdm, karan, agrabhlt, agrabhlstdm, agrabhlsuh, and
aksan, AsvSS 3.4.15, similarly, lists ddat, ghasat, karat,
jtcsatdm, aghat, agrabhlt and avlvrdhata. SSS 6.1.5, final-
ly, lists ddat, ddan, ghastu, ghasantu, aghasat, aghasan, or
aghat, aksan, agrabhlt, agrabhlsuh, avlvrdhata, avlvrdhanta,
and others. This shows that there was concern in ritual
circles regarding the correct use of certain verbal forms in
modified mantras. Among the recurring forms are the aorists
1 fi
of the roots ghas, ad, and kr.
The shared concern of AsvSS 3.4.15, SSS 6.1.5, and M&3
5.2.9.6 is explained by the fact that most of the modifica-
tions are meant for virtually identical texts, the so-called
Praisa suktas, in particular RV Khila 5.7.2 (f and 1), which
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correspond to MS 4.13.7 (p. 208, 1.3-7) and 4.13.9 (p. 211,
1.5-12).
It is very probable that Panini knew the Praisa suktas
in which these modifications were to take place, for
Scheftelowitz (1919, 47f.) has adduced reasons to believe
that the Praisas are among the oldest Vedic texts in prose.
This allows us to surmise that a Paninian sutra may have
been composed partly to solve this same problem. This sutra
would then be P.2.4.80 {mantre ghasahvaranasavrdahadvrckr-
gamijanihhyo leh), which deals with the aorists of a number
of roots, among them ghas and ifcr, in a mantra. It favors
here such forms as (a)ghat, (a)ghastam, aksan and akah, and
akran (not in all cases the same forms as the above Srauta
Sutras).
If it can be accepted that P.2.4.80 was composed to
serve the purpose of uha (besides other purposes), the same
may be true of other rules of the Astadhyayl. This, in
turn, would mean that these rules not only describe Vedic
data but also prescribe the means for modifying Vedic
mantras when necessary. This implies that we cannot always
be sure that Panini's Vedic rules describe forms that occur-
red in Vedic texts known to Panini. Unattested forms
accounted for by rules in the Astadhyayl do not, then, in
all cases have to have been part of texts that are now lost.
2. We can now turn to the main part of the present
investigation: an attempt to determine which Vedic texts
Panini knew and which he did not. The above considerations
make it clear that in this context Panini's rules on sandhi
and accent will be of little help. Moreover, none of the
rules that concern details of the phonetic shape of words,
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i.e., the orthoepic diaskeuasis of texts, can be relied upon
to determine which texts Panini knew, for the simple reason
that these features may have changed, and in some cases
certainly changed, after him. Our enquiry must in the main
rely on word-forms prescribed in the Astadhyayi.
Here another consideration arises. We have decided to
take Panini seriously, but this does not mean that we demand
his grammar to be complete. Nor does it exclude the possi-
bility that he made occasional mistakes. It does, however,
imply that, where Panini clearly and explicitly excludes
certain features from the Vedic language, we must regard
with suspicion the Vedic texts containing those features.
We proceed in a twofold manner. On one hand, we collect
forms prescribed by Panini for Vedic and attested in but one
Vedic text and nowhere else. If a sufficient number of such
forms are found for a particular Vedic text and nothing else
pleads against it, we may then assume that this Vedic text
was known to Panini. On the other hand, we shall look for
Vedic texts that contain features excluded by Panini. If
the number of such features is sufficiently large, we may
consider the possibility that Panini did not know these
texts. This double approach will provide us with the
material to be evaluated in subsequent sections.
2.1 Many words prescribed by Panini are found only in
the Rgveda. Some examples are vrkati (P.5.4.41) at RV
4.41.4; dcyuse (P.6.1.36) at RV 4.30.22; yajadhvainam
(P.7.1.43) at RV 8.2.37; jagrhhma (P.7.2.64) at RV 1.139.10
and 10.47.1;17 vrsanyati (P.7.4.36) at RV 9.5.6; tetikte
(P.7.4.65) at RV 4.23.7; and svatavamh payuh (P.8.3.11) at
RV 4.2.6.
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2.2 Three words prescribed by Panini for Vedic are only
found in the Taittirtya Samhita: khanya- (P.3.1.123) at TS
7.4.13.1; the denominative kavya- (P.7.4.39) at TS 7.1.20.1;
and anrhuh (P.6.1.36) at TS 3.2.8.3. Note that all three
words occur in mantras. Thieme (1935, 64) was of the
opinion that a fourth word, brahmavadya (P.3.1.123), is
found only in the Taittirtya Samhita. This word occurs in a
brahmana portion (at TS 2.5.8.3) but not only there; it is
also found at JUB 3.2.3.2; ApSS 21.10.12; and VadhgS (Caland
1928, 176). Thus, no direct evidence remains that Panini
knew the brahmana portion of the Taittirtya Samhita.
2.3 Not all the evidence produced by Leopold von
Schroeder (1879, 194f.; 1881-86, l:xi f., 2:viii f.) to show
that Panini knew the Maitrayani Samhita can stand scrutiny.
Some cases are derived not from Panini but from his commen-
tators. Others correspond to rules of Panini that are not
confined to Vedic usage; these cases do not prove that
Panini knew the Maitrayani Samhita, or a part thereof, for
the simple reason that the words concerned were apparently
also in use in other than ritual contexts. Finally, there
are cases wherein* Schroeder was mistaken in thinking that
certain Vedic words prescribed by Panini occurred only in
the Maitrayani Samhita and not in other texts.
However, the following cases can be used to establish
Panini's acquaintance with at least certain parts of the
Maitrayani Samhita. P.3.1.42 teaches the Vedic (chandasi,
but amantre) verbal forms abhyutsadayam akah, prajanaydm
akah, and pavayam kriyat They occur at MS 1.6.5, 1.6.10
and 1.8.5, and 2.1.3, respectively, and nowhere else. The
Vedic (nigame) forms sadhyai and sadhva (P.6.3.113) are
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nowhere found except in MS 1.6.3 and 3.8.5, respectively.
Agrtya- (P.4.4.117) is only attested at MS 2.7.13, 2.9.5,
and in the colophon to 3.1.10. Noncoiiipounded bhavisnu
(P.3.2.138) is found only at MS 1.8.1. Pranlya- (P.3.1.123)
is found at MS 3.9.1 and nowhere else; ucchisya- occurs only
at MS 3.9.2. Purtsyavahana (P.3.2.65) is found only at MS
2.7.4.
2.4 Vedic forms attested only in the Kathaka Samhita
are the following (cf. Schroeder 1880; 1895): ramayam akah
(P.3.1.42) at KS 7.7; upacayyaprda (P.3.1.123) at KS 11.1;
and ksariti (P.7.2.34) at KS 12.11. One word occurs only in
the Kathaka Samhita and in the Kapisthala Samhita. Since
the latter "is practically a variant of the Kathaka" (Gonda
1975, 327), it is here included: jagatya- (P.4.4.122) at KS
1.8 « KapS 1.8, and at KS 31.7. Adhvarya in P.3.1.123 may
indicate acquaintance with KS 35.7 = KapS 48.9 (Thieme 1935,
23-24; Goto 1987, 191, n. 355).
2.5 A Vedic form found exclusively in the Atharvaveda
is ailayit formed by P.3.1.51 (cf. Thieme 1935, 64); it
occurs at AVS 6.16.3.18 Sivatati (P.4.4.143) is only found
at AVP 5.36.1-9. The word mamaki, formed by P.4.1.30,
occurs only AVP 6.6.8.19
2.6 Two Vedic forms occur in the Latyayana Srauta Sutra
of the Samaveda and nowhere else (except, of course, in the
later Drahyayana Srauta Sutra, which is often no more than a
recast of the former): khanya- (P.3.1.123) at LSS 8.2.4 and
5 (DrSS 22.2.5 and 6); and (pra-)stavya- (id.) at LSS 6.1.20
(DrgS 16.1.22 and 18). Hvarita (P.7.2.33) occurs only in a
mantra in MSS 2.5.4.24d and 4.4.39. Sanim sasanivamsam
(P.7.2.69) occurs in mantras in MSS 1.3.4.2 and VaSS
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1.3.5.16 (cf. Hoffmann 1974). Dadharti is only attested in
JB 2.37.20 Yasobhaglna (P.4.4.132) is only attested HiSS
2.5.43 and 6.4.3.
3.1 We now turn to forms excluded by Panini.
P.3.1.35 {kdspratyaydd am amantre liti) forbids a peri-
phrastic perfect to occur in a mantra, yet AVB 18.2.27 has
gamayam cakdra (cf. Whitney 1893, 249). AVP 18.65.10 has
gamayam cakartha.
P.5.1.91 (vatsardntdc chas chandasi) prescribes -lya
after words ending in -vatsara, resulting in forms like
samvatsartya. The next rule, 5.1.92 {samparipurvdt kha ca),
adds -Ina in the same position, provided that -vatsara- is
preceded by sam- or pari-. This means that Panini did not
know, or approve of, forms wherein -vatsartna- is not pre-
ceded by sam- or pari-. Yet such forms occur: iddvatsarina
at TB 1.4.10.2 and anuvatsartna at TB 1.4.10.3.
P.5.4.158 {Has chandasi) forbids the addition of kaP
after a Bahuvrihi compound ending in -r. An exception is
brdhmanabhartrka (AA 5.3.2).
P.6.3.84 {samanasya chandasy amurdhaprabhrtyvdarkesu)
forbids substitution of sa- for samana before murdhan,
prabhrti, and udarka. Yet this substitution has taken place
in saprabhrti (PB 15.1.6 and KB 20.4, 21.4, etc.); sodarka
(PB 13.7.9, 13.8.1, 13.8.4, and 13.8.5; and KB 20.4, 21.4,
etc.).
P.7.1.26 {netarac chandasi) prohibits the use of neuter
itarad in ritual literature. Yet it occurs at AB 6.15; KB
12.8; SB 4.5.8.14 and 13.8.2.9; TB 3.10.11.4; JB 1.213,
2.75, and 2.249; and at SadB 4.3.7, 4.4.10, and 4.5.8.
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P.7.2.88 (prathamayas ca dvivacane bhasayam) prescribes
the nominatives avam and yuvam with long penultimate a for
secular language, thus excluding these nominatives from the
Vedic language. Yet they occcur in avam (AB 4.8; SanA 5.7;
SB 4.1.5.16 and 14.1.1.23; BAU[K] 3.2.13; ChU 8.8.1) and
yuvam (PB 21.1.1).
3.2 We obtain further results by applying more strictly
our rule that Panini's grammar is to be taken seriously.
Grammatical sutras that are not indicated as being optional
must be accepted as intended to be of general validity. In
21incidental cases this may give rise to doubts, but no such
doubt seems to attach to the following cases.
P.2.3.61 (presyabruvor haviso devatasampradane) is a
rule valid for Brahmana literature (anuvrtti of brahmane
from rule 60; see Joshi and Roodbergen 1981, 101, n. 331),
prescribing a genitive for the object of presya and bru9 if
it is an oblation in an offering to a deity. It thus
excludes the use of the accusative in such cases. Yet the
accusative is often used in the Satapatha Brahmaim, most
clearly in agnisomabhyam chagasya vapam medah presya (SB
3.8.2.27; §BK 4.8.2.21), agnisomabhyam chagasya havih presya
(SB 3.8.3.29; SBK 4.8.3.18), indraya somdn prasthitan presya
(SB 4.2.1.23; SBK 5.2.1.20), and chagandm havih prasthitam
presya (SB 5.1.3.14).22
P.3.1.59 (krmrdrruhibhyas chandasi) is a nonoptional
rule (cf. Kiparsky 1980, 62) prescribing an as an aorist
marker after the roots kr, mr, dr, and ruh in ritual litera-
ture. It excludes in this way the forms akarsit, akarsih,
akarsam, and aruksat from Vedic literature. Yet these forms
occur, as follows: (a)karsit (GB 1.3.4; ChU 6.16.1); akarsih
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(SB 10.5.5.3; GB 1.3.11); akarsam (AVP 20.1.6; TB 3.7.5.5;
TA 10.24.1, 10.25.1; GB 1.3.12); and aruksat (AVS 12.3.42;
AVP 17.40.2).
P.4.4.105 (sabhayah yah) prescribes the suffix ya after
sabha in the sense tatra sadhuh (4.4.98). The next rule,
P.4.4.106 (dhas chandasi), makes an exception for ritual
literature. The form sabhya derived by P.4.4.105 should
apparently not occur in Vedic literature. It does, though,
at the following places: AV§ 8.10.9, 19.55.5; AVP 16.133.5;
MS 1.6.11; TB 1.2.1.26, 3.7.4.6; and §B 12.9.2.3.
P.5.4.103 {anasantan napumsakac chandasi) prescribes for
ritual literature the addition of tac to neuter Tatpurusa
compounds the last member of which end in -an or -as.
Patanjali in his Mahabhasya (2:441) makes this rule
optional, in order to account for words like brahmasaman and
devacchandas, but this merely emphasizes the fact that
Paninf s rule is not optional. Yet there are numerous
23exceptions, some of which occur in the following texts:
AVS 5.10.1-7 (asmavarman), 19.7.2 (mrgasiras), 19.30.3
(devavarman).
AVP 5.29.1 (suryavarcas), 6.12.9-11 and 6.13.1-3 (asma-
varman), 13.11.21 (devavarman), 19.48.14 (hiranyandman).
MS 3.6.7 (diksitavasas), 3.11.9 (vyaghraloman).
VSM 19.92 (vyaghraloman = MS 3.11.9).
VSK 21.6.13 (vyaghraloman = MS 3.11.9 and VSM 19.92).
AB 1.26 (devavarman), 4.19 (brahmasaman, agnistoma-
saman), 7.19 (isudhanvan), 8.5 and 8.6 (vyaghracarman).
KB 2.1, 5.7, and 27.1 (devakarman), 5.5 (purvedyuhkarman
and pustikarman), 5.7 (pitrkarman), 8.7 (pasukarman), 27.1
(agnistomasaman), 30.11 (ratricchandas).
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GB 1.3.16 (sarvacchandas), 1.5.25 (svakarman), 2.1.23
(pustikarman, purvedyuhkarman), 2.6.6 (yajnaparvan).
TB 1.7.8.1 (sdrdulacarman).
SB 4.6.6.5 and 13.3.3.5 (brahmasdman), 5.3.5.3, 5.4.1.9,
and 11 (sardulacarman), 6.6.1.4, 7.3.1.4, etc. (adhvarakar-
man, agnikarman), 13.3.3.4 (Tnaitrdvarunasdman), 13.3.3.6
(acchdvdkasdman), 13.5.1.1 and 13.5.3.10 (agnistomasaman),
14.3.1.35 (patnlkarman).
SBK 1.1.2.5-6 (mrgasiras), 7.2.4.3 and 7.3.1.9-10
(sardulacarman).
JB 1.149, etc. (rathantarasdman), 1.155, etc. (acchdvd-
kasdman), 1.172, etc. (agnistomasaman), 2.240 (uttaravayas),
2.276 (deary akarman), etc.
PB 4.2.19, etc. (agnistomasaman), 4.3.1, etc. (hrahma-
sdman), 8.10.1, etc. (acchdvdkasdman), 9.2.7 and 15
(ksatrasdman), 9.2.20, etc. (rdtHsdman), 11.3.8 and 9
(somasdman), 13.9.22 and 23 (varunasdman).
SadB 4.2.12-14 (brahmasdman).
ArsB 1.378 (varunasdman), 2.3.11 (arkasiras), etc.
JAB 5.3, etc. (somasdman), Arkaparvan 3.9 (arkasiras),
etc.
SaB 1.5.15 (svakarman), 2.1.6 (setusdman), 2.3.3
(sarpasdman), 2.3.6 (arkasiras).
SatyB, p. 72 (brahmasdman, acchdvdkasdman).
VamsaB 1 (girisarman).
iSaiiA 1.5 (devacchandas), 3.5 (brahmayasas, brahmatejas).
TA 1.15.1, etc. (svatejas).
P.5.4.142 (chandasi ca) prescribes substitution of datR
for danta final in a Bahuvrthi compound in ritual litera-
ture. It excludes from the Vedic language Bahuvrihi com-
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pounds ending in danta. Yet there are some: krsnadanta at
AA 3.2.4 and SanA 11.4; visadanta at AVP 5.9.8; isikddanta
at AVP 1.44.2; ubhayatodanta at AA 2.3.1, SB 1.6.3.30, SBK
2.6.1.21, JB 1.128, 2.84, and 2.114, and SaB 1.8.2; and
anyatodanta at SBK 2.6.1.21 and JB 1.128, 2.84, and 2.114.
P.7.1.56 {srigramanyos chandasi) determines the form of
the genitive plural of srt and gramant as srlndm and
gramaniTidm, respectively. But genitive sutagramanyam occurs
at SB 13.4.2.5 and 13.5.2.7.
P.6.4.141 reads mantresv any ader atmanah (lopah 134)
"In mantras there is elision of the initial [sound a] of
atman when [the instrumental singular ending] an follows."
It is not easy to determine the precise meaning of this
sutra. It may not imply that atman never loses its initial
a before other case endings, since for all we know Panini
may have looked upon tman as a separate vocable, but this
sutra clearly excludes the occurrence of atmana in mantras.
This form is found, however, in mantras at the following
places: AVS 3.29.8; AVS 5.29.6-9 « AVP 13.9.7-8; AVS 8.2.8 «
AVP 16.3.9; AVg 9.5.31-36 « AVP 16.99.8; AVS 18.2.7; AVS
19.33.5 « 12.5.5; AVP 3.28.1, 16.100.5-11, and 16.119.1-3;
VSM 32.11 s VSK 35.3.8; and MS 2.8.14.
To the above cases the following may be added:
P.2.4.48 (hemantasisirav ahoratre ca chandasi) implies,
as Thieme (1935, 13) rightly pointed out, that Panini "must
have known sisira- as a neuter." However, sisira is mascu-
line at SVK 3.4.2; SVJ 2.3.3; AVS 6.55.2 and 12.1.36; AVP
17.4.6 and 19.9.3; SB 2.1.3.1, 2.6.1.2, 8.7.1.7 and 8,
13.6.1.10 and 11; SBK 1.1.3.1 and 1.2.3.6; JB 1.313, 2.51,
2.211, 2.356; and TA 1.6.1.
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P.3.1.118 (pratyapihhyam graheh [without chandasi; see
Eielhorn 1885, 192 (195); Thieme 1935, 16]) prescribes
pratigrhya- and apigrhya-. Katyayana's varttika on this
sutra confines it to Vedic literature (chandas) and
Pataiijali mentions the alternatives pratigrahya- and
apigrahya-. The last two forms were apparently not known to
Panini, yet apratigrahya- occurs at SaB 1.7.2.
4, What patterns arise from these data? Which Vedic
texts did Panini know, and which did he not know? We shall
try to arrive at an opinion on the basis of the forms
emphatically accepted or rejected by Panini himself.
4.1 Panini records a number of forms that occur in the
Rgveda and nowhere else. Among the forms he clearly
rejects, not one occurs in the Rgveda. To this must be
added the fact that P. 1.1.16-18 refer to Sakalya's Pada-
patha. The Padapatha was added to the collection of hymns
(excepting six verses; see Kashikar 1951, 44) and presup-
poses the latter. We may safely assume that Panini knew the
collected Rgveda, not just the individual hymns.
Note that this is in no way obvious. Panini knew Vedic
stanzas (re) and sacrificial formulas in prose (yajtcs)--hoth
of these went by the term mantra—besides brahmana and
kalpa. He nowhere says that he knew the mantras in collec-
tions. In this connection it is interesting to observe that
the term that came to designate such collections (samhita)
did not yet have this meaning in Paninf s grammar and in the
Vedic scriptures. There it is synonymous throughout with
sandhi. The samhita-patha, as opposed to the pada-patha, is
the version of the text with sandhi.
4.2 The question as to whether the Vedic collections,
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the Samhitas, existed in Panini's time as collections
becomes pertinent with regard to the Taittiriya Samhita, We
saw that three forms prescribed by Panini occur in the
Taittirtya Samhita and nowhere else (2.2, above). All these
words occur in mantras. This means that possibly Panini may
not have known the brahmana portions of the Taittiriya
Samhita, This possibility is supported by the fact that
these brahmana parts frequently contain a conspicuous
non-Paninian feature, viz., the ending -ai instead of -as
(see Caland 1927, 50; Keith 1914, l:cxlv f.). Note also
that the brahmana portion of the Taittiriya Samhita refers
twice (6.1.9.2, 6.4.5.1) to Aruna Aupavesi, whose grandson
Svetaketu Aruneya is characterized as modern in the
Apastamba Dharma Sutra (1.5.5).
All this suggests that the Taittirtya Samhita was
collected in its more or less final form at a late date,
perhaps later than Panini. This agrees with some facts
regarding the Taittirtya Brahmana and Taittiriya Aranyaka,
to which we now turn.
Both the Taittirtya Brahmana and the Taittiriya Aranyaka
contain forms that are explicitly rejected by Panini. The
Taittiriya Brahmana has idavatsarina, anuvatsarvria, itarad
(3.1, above), akdrsam, sabhya, and sardulacarman (3.2). The
Taittiriya Aranyaka has akdrsam, svatejas, and sisira (m.)
(3.2). It seems safe to conclude that these works were not
known to, or accepted by, Panini. The Baudhdyana and
Apastamba Srauta Sutras "accord in recognizing the whole
content both of the Brahmana and of the Aranyaka" (Keith
1914, lrlxxviii). Yet "it would be impossible, so far as
can be seen, to prove that to [these Sutras] even the
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Sanhita was yet a definite unit" (ibid., lxxix-lxxx). The
siltras only distinguish between mantra and brahmana, which
occur in each of the three, Taittirtya Samhita, Taittirtya
- 25
Brahmana, and Taittirtya Aranyaka.
The interrelationship of mantras and brahmana portions
of the three Taittirtya texts suggests that they, or parts
of them, once existed as an undivided whole. We see, for
example, that the brahmana portions of TS 2.5.7 and 8
comment on the mantras of TB 3.5.1 and 2; TS 2.5.9 on TB
3.5.3.1-4.1; TS 2.6.1 and 2 on TB 3.5.5-7; TS 2.6.7 on TB
3.5.8; TS 2.6.9 on TB 3.5.10; and TS 2.6.10 on TB 3.5.11
(Keith 1914, lrlxxxiv). TS 3.5.11 supplements TB 3.6.1,
giving the mantras for the hotr for the animal sacrifice
(Keith 1914, 1:286, n. 4). Keith (1914, lrlxxix) comes to a
similar conclusion on the basis of the Srauta Sutras: "So
far as we can judge there is no trace of any distinction
being felt by the Sutrakaras between the nature of the texts
before them."
It is not impossible that the creation of a Padapdtha
differentiated the Taittirtya Samhita from Taittirtya
Brahmana and Taittirtya Aranyaka, just as the Rgveda may
conceivably have been collected by the author of its
Padapdtha (Bronkhorst 1982a, 187).
The fact that Panini derives the term Taittirtya, in the
sense 'uttered by Tittirf, in P.4.3.102 does not, of
course, prove that the Taittirtya texts, as now known, were
known to him. Panini probably knew the mantras, or a number
of them, that are now part of the Taittirtya Samhita, and he
may indeed have considered them taittirtya 'uttered by
Tittirf.
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Note, finally, that the Taittirlya Samhita appears to
borrow from the Aitareya Brahmaria 1-5, as argued by Keith
(1914, lrxcvii f.); see also Aufrecht (1879, vi, 43If.) and
Keith (1920, 46). The Aitareya Brahmana itself, including
its first five chapters, deviates in a number of points from
Panini (4.5, below).
4.3 Some of the other Samhitas of the Yajurveda sin
occasionally against Panini.
The Vajasaneyi Samhita has atmaria, masculine sisira, and
one Tatpurusa compound in -an (vyaghraloman). It shares
this, however, with the Maitrayanl Samhita.
The Maitrayanl Samhita has sabhya, some Tatpurusa com-
pounds in -as and -an, atmana; note further dadhrati (see
note 19, above). These deviations from Panini in the
Maitrayanl Samhita are most surprising because Panini
appeared to know both the mantra and brahmana portions of
this text (see 2.3, above). This warns us once again that
we cannot assume that the texts we know now existed in the
same form in Panini's day.
4.4 Did Panini know the Atharvaveda? Two forms pre-
scribed by him are found only there, one in the Saunaklya
version and one in the Paippalada version. However, opposed
to these two forms are numerous others forbidden by Panini.
They include gamayam cakara, gamayam cakartha (3.1),
akarsam, aruksat, sabhya, several neuter Tatpurusa compounds
ending in -an and -as, visadanta and islkadanta, haricandra,
atmand, and sisira (masc.) (3.2).
One might raise the question of whether the word-forms
in the Atharvaveda may not have been Vedic in Panini's
opinion, that is, whether, perhaps, they were covered by
99
non-Vedic rules of the Astadhyayl. This is suggested by
Balasubrahmanyam's remark (1984, 23):
Among the seven khyun- derivatives taught by
P[anini] in A[stadhyayi] 3.2.56, subhagamkaranl
and priyam-karanam are only attested in the Samhita
texts of the [Atharvaveda]--the former occurring at
[AVS] 6.139.1 and AVP 7.12.5, and the latter at the
Paippalada Samhita (3.28.5; 6). Neither in the
other Vedic Samhitas nor in the Brahmana-Aranyaka
texts, do we come across these derivatives.
Balasubrahmanyam's observation is misleading in that subha-
gamkaranl is not taught in P.3.2.56 nor anywhere else in the
Astadhyayi. This is so because a varttika of the Saundgas
(Mbh, 2:105, 1.8; on P.3.2.56) is required to provide subha-
gamkarana with its feminine ending, i, as shown by Balasu-
brahmanyam himself. Thus, P.3.2.56 did not derive suhhagam-
karanl in the Atharvaveda. The fact that the Atharvaveda
contains two more words of the same kind {ayaksmamkaranl at
AVB 19.2.5 and AVP 8.8.11; sarupamkaranl at AVB 1.24.4 and
AVP 1.26.5; see Balasubrahmanyam 1984, 25f.) and that these
words are not even partially derived in Panini's grammar,
makes it less than likely that the priyamkaranam of AVP
3.28.6 was meant to be explained in P.3.2.56.
An interesting confirmation that the Atharvaveda did not
exist as a collection until long after the other three Vedas
were collected is found in the Chandogya Upanisad. Sections
3.1-5 make a number of comparisons, or rather identifica-
tions, of which the following are of interest to us.
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Section 3.1 states that the bees are the res, the flower is
the Rgveda; in 3.2 the bees are the yajus (pi.), the flower
is the Yajurveda; and in 3.3 the bees are the samans, the
flower is the Samaveda. The interesting observation comes
in section 3.4, where the bees are the atharvangirasah and
the flower is itihasapuranam. In 3.5, finally, the bees are
the hidden teachings (guhya adesah), which may be the
Upanisads, and the flower is Brahman (n.). Since the athar-
vangirasah constitute the Atharvaveda as we know it, the
logic of the situation would have required that the flower
in 3.4 be identified with the Atharvaveda. The fact that it
is not hardly allows an explanation other than that the
author of this passage did not know of such a definite
collection of atharvans and angirases. Itihasa and purana
certainly do not designate the Atharvaveda, neither sepa-
rately nor jointly (see Horsch 1966, 13f.).
Bloomfield (1899, 2f.), too, came to the conclusion
"that many hymns and prose pieces in the AV. date from a
very late period of Vedic productivity." Indeed, "there is
nothing in the way of assuming that the composition of such
texts as the AB. and SB. preceded the redactions of the
Atharvan Samhitas."
Patafijalf s Mahabhasya cites in its opening passage the
first lines of the four Vedas; these apparently existed as
collections in those days (second century B.C.). The first
line is sam no devir abhistaye, which begins the Paippaldda
version of the Atharvaveda. Patanjali even informs us of
the size of the Atharvaveda known to him, saying (Mbh,
2:378, 1.11; on P.5.2,37): vimsino'hgirasah. This fits the
- _" 27
twenty books of the Paippalada Samhita. We may conclude
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from this that the Paippalada Samhita existed in its present
form, at any rate, in the second century B.C.
4.5 The Aitareya Brahmana transgresses Panini's rules
in containing itarad, nominative avam (3.1), and several
neuter Tatpurusa compounds in -an (3.2). It is also inter-
esting that AB 7.17 has the periphrastic perfect amantrayam
asa, as opposed to P.3.1.40, which allows only kr in such
formations (Keith 1936, 747). We also find optatives in
-(ay)ita instead of -(ay)eta (Renou 1940, 11), and the
ending -ai for both genitive and ablative -as (Caland 1927,
50), not prescribed by Panini.
By way of exception some older arguments adduced by
Keith (1920, 42f.) to determine the date of the Aitareya
Brahmana will be reviewed here (see also Bronkhorst 1982,
276). The language of this Brahmana is said to be "decid-
edly older than the Bhasa of Panini," on the basis of
Liebich's Panini (1891). The circularity of Liebich's argu-
ments has been shown elsewhere (Bronkhorst 1982, 275f.). The
fact that Yaska knew the Aitareya Brahmana is irrelevant,
since it is very likely that he is later than Panini (Bronk-
horst 1984, 8£). The Aitareya Brahmana contains indications
that it knew the Rgveda before the completion of the ortho-
epic diaskeuasis but this implies nothing in view of the
fact that the orthoepic diaskeuasis of the Rgveda was not
completed until long after Panini (Bronkhorst 1981). The
absence of reference to metempsychosis must be viewed against
the background of the unwillingness of orthodox Brahmanism
to let these ideas find entrance into their sacred texts
even at a time when they had become generally known and
widely accepted (Bronkhorst 1989, 125).
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4.6 The other Brahmanas that are considered early are
the Kausitaki Brahmana, Pancavimsa Brahmana, Jaiminiya
Brahmana, and Satapatha Brahmana (Renou 1957, 14). We can
be brief about them.
The Kausitaki Brahmana has a number of forbidden words:
saprabhrti, sodarka, and itarad, besides many neuter
Tatpurusa compounds in -an and at least one in -as. Like
the Aitareya BrahmaTia, it has optatives in -(ay)ita and -ai
for -as.
The Pancavimsa Brahmana, too, has saprabhrti and
sodarka, as well as nominative yuvam, and many neuter Tat-
purusa compounds in -an.
The Jaiminiya Brahmana goes against Panini's grammar in
having itarad, many neuter Tatpurusa compounds in -an and
-as, ubhayatodanta and anyatodanta, and masculine sisira.
The Satapatha Brahmana deviates from Panini's grammar in
the words itarad, nominative avam, akarsih, sahhya, an accu-
sative rather than a genitive for the object of presya, many
neuter Tatpurusa compounds in -an, ubhayatodanta, genitive
plural -gramanyam, and masculine sisira.
The Kanva version of the Satapatha Brahmana, finally,
deviates in fewer respects, containing a few neuter
Tatpurusa compounds in -an and -as, ubhayatodanta and anya-
todanta, an accusative rather than a genitive for the object
of presya, and masculine sisira.
5. The above considerations must be treated with
caution. For one thing, it is not known in any detail what
changes were made in the texts during the process we refer
to as their "orthoepic diaskeuasis." This implies that we
cannot be altogether sure what features of those texts can
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be used to determine their relationship with Panini's
Astadhyayl. We also do not know how many serious deviations
from Panini's explicit statements must be considered evi-
dence that Panini was ignorant of a particular text.
Further, we should remember that we made an assumption,
which may not be acceptable to everyone, that Panini's gram-
mar can be taken seriously.
Neither should we be rash in concluding that Vedic texts
that transgress the rules of Panini repeatedly were for that
reason completely unknown to Panini. The problem is that,
probably, no Vedic text has a single author. All are
collections of parts of more or less heterogeneous origin.
This applies to the Samhitas as well as to the Brahmanas and
Aranyakas. The most we can conclude from the deviations
between the majority of Vedic texts and Panini's grammar is
that Panini did not know much of Vedic literature in its
present form, that is, in the collections known to us. Much
of Vedic literature was still in a state of flux in Panini's
day, and had not yet reached the unalterable shape in which
we know it.
These considerations are of value with regard to the
texts that would seem to have been unknown to Panini on the
basis of the evidence reviewed in this article. They are,
however, of equal value where the texts that appear to have
been known to Panini are concerned. The Rgveda may be an
exception; it was known to Panini along with its Padapatha,
which leaves little room for major changes other than
sandhi. But we must be cautious with respect to such texts
as the Maitrayani Samhita and Kathaka Samhita. It is true
that they contain words prescribed by Panini, which occur
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nowhere else, but this proves no more than that Panini was
acquainted with certain portions of them, if it proves any-
thing at all.
The regional origin and early spread of most of the
Vedic texts may account for Panini's lack of acquaintance
with some of them. Panini is held to have lived in north-
west India. Texts from other parts of the country may only
have become known to him if they were generally accepted as
Vedic in their region and beyond it.
Notes
* This study was carried out as part of a project of
professors M. Witzel and T. E. Vetter, which was financed
by the Netherlands Organization for the Advancement of
Pure Research (Z.W.O.). In particular, Professor Witzel
took a lively interest in the project. One of his own
fields of specialization is the geographical distribution
of Vedic schools in different periods. It is hoped that
from that side additional evidence will come forth to
shed light on the problems discussed here. Meanwhile,
Witzel's "Tracing the Vedic Dialects" (1989) has
appeared, which, unfortunately, could not be taken into
consideration for the present article.
1. For a survey, see Cardona (1976, 226-28). Some important
articles have been reproduced and discussed in Staal
(1972, 135-204).
2. This means that one cannot conclude from certain peculi-
arities of sandhi in the Maitrayani Samhita which are
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not described by Panini, that they "escaped his observa-
tion," as Palsule (1982, 188) claims.
3. Balasubrahmanyam (1981, 400) notes that in the sample
studied by him, "three per cent of the exclusive Vedic
vocabulary differs from P[anini]'s accentual system, and
four per cent of the common vocabulary manifests the
apparent difference between P[anini] and the Veda with
reference to the systems of Krt accentuation."
4. Even Katyayana and Pataiijali sometimes ascribe an accent
to a Vedic word that deviates from the accent found in
the surviving texts (see Balasubrahmanyam 1974, 3, on
sthasnu).
5. The fact that the Phitsutras of Santanava ascribe to
arya, jyestha, and kanistha the accents found in the
extant Vedic literature is reason to think that Santanava
is later rather than earlier than Panini; cf. Kielhorn
(1866, If.) and Devasthali (1967, 39f.). Kapila Deva
Shastri (Sam 2018, 28f.) argues for an earlier date of
the Phitsutras on insufficient grounds (Cardona 1976,
176).
6. Cf. Eiparsky (1980, 69) and Devasthali (1984, 137).
7. Thieme (1985) shows that the accents prescribed by
Panini in the case of words that are commonly used to
address people are the initial accents of the vocative.
He concludes that Panini's accents are later than the
(differing) Vedic ones. This may be correct, yet it
does not by itself prove that all the texts having Vedic
accentuation in these cases are older than Panini. It
is certainly conceivable that the Vedic texts were com-
posed in a form of language that was kept archaic also
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in its accents. Paninf s bhasa, too, is younger than
Vedic, yet Panini does not for that reason necessarily
postdate scriptures that use the Vedic language.
8. Note that MS 1.5.12 (p. 81 1.2-6) uses ratrt in the
language used by the gods and ratri elsewhere; this was
pointed out to me by Professor Witzel.
9. P.2.3.62, 4.39, 73, 76, 3.2.88, 5.2.122, 6.1.34, 70, 133,
178, 2.199, 4.75, 7.1.8, 10, 103, 3.97, 4.78. Cf. Shiva-
ramaiah (1969).
10. It goes without saying that the generality of such rules
can be restricted in various ways such as the presence of
rules that account for exceptions (apavada).
11. For a brief description, see Chakrabarti (1980, 134-36)
and Jha (1942, 294-99).
12. The following examples are taken from Bhartrhari's dis-
cussion of uha in his commentary on the Mahabhasya (see
below).
13. We should not be misguided by this late date. Bhartr-
hari made use of works on Mimamsa older than Sahara's,
among them probably the one by Bhavadasa. See Bronk-
horst (1989a).
14. The relevance for grammar is, of course, that in this way
it can be decided whether or not Vedic rules are to be
used in the modified mantras. Note that Kumarila's
Tantravarttika on PMS 1.3.24 maintains that uha is
brought about without the help of grammar but rather with
forms found in the Veda.
15. &!§S 6.1.15, similarly, prescribes substitution of medha-
pataye or medhapatibhyah for, apparently, medhapati-
bhyam, as instances of uha.
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16. ghas replaces ad before aorist endings according to
P.2.4.37 {lunsanor ghasl).
17. The value of this case is somewhat in doubt since TB
2.8.2.5 cites the same mantra as RV 10.47.1 with
jagrbhnd; it may have contained jagrbhma.
18. My friend Dr. Harry Falk points out in a forthcoming
article that Panini cannot have known AVS 6.16.3, the
reason being that Panini derives ailayit from elayati:
the same mantra contains the form Hay a (avelaya), so
that Panini, had he known AVJ§ 6.16.3 as a whole, would
have derived ailayit from ilayati rather than from
elayati.
19. This was pointed out by Manjul Mayank in a paper read at
the Seventh World Sanskrit Conference, Leiden, 1987.
20. The corresponding plural dddhrati occurs at TS 2.3.1.2,
5.3.9.2; MS 2.2.1; and KS 11.6. However, the juxtaposi-
tion of dadharti, dardharti, dardharsi, and other finite
verb forms seems to indicate that the precise form
dddharti is meant.
21. For example, P. 7.1.57 (goh pdddnte) prescribes that the
genitive plural of go at the end of a verse-foot in
ritual literature is goriam. This is illustrated in RV
10.47.1. But the Kdsikd rightly observes that there are
exceptions: RV 10.166.1 has gavam at the end of a verse-
foot.
22. The Kanva parallel &BK 6.1.3.12 (chdgdndm havisdm
prasthitam presya) seems to be the only example in Vedic
literature in which P.2.3.61 is obeyed. Note that the
single vdrttika on P.2.3.61 is intended to make the rule
invalid where the oblation is prasthita. This would
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justify all, or almost all, deviations from Panini's
rule, yet the fact that Panini says nothing about
prasthita in this context shows that he did not know, or
accept, these counterexamples. Similarly, see Navathe
(1987).
23. bahvojas in RV 8.93.2 is considered a Bahuvtthi, and not
therefore a Tatpurusa compound, by Oldenberg (1909-12,
2:144). somaparvabhih in RV 1.9.1 = AV1§ 20.71.7 = VSM
33.25 = VSK 32.2.8 = SVK 1.180 = SVJ 1.2.1.7.6 can be
derived from -parva, by P.7.1.10.
24. Note that the insufficiency of Panini's grammar with
regard to the Vedic data has been known for a long time
in the Paninian tradition. Kumarila Bhatta, in his
Tantravarttika, cites in this connection SVK 2.1006 =
SVJ 4.17.11 (madhya apasya tisthati), which has apasya
instead of apam.
25. Caland (1921, 3) observed that the Apastamba Srauta Sutra
refers to mantras of the Taittirtya Samhita by way of
their initial words, and to those of the Taittirtya
Brahmana by citing them in full. Kashikar (1968, 400)
has also shown that mantras from the Taittirtya Brahmana
are often quoted by pratika. The Bharadvaja Srauta Sutra
follows a similar practice (Kashikar 1968, 401).
26. That is, not even the forms ayaksmamkarana and sarupam-
karana, without the feminine i, are derived.
27. Note that the Mahabhasya also prefers the Paippalada






AL Abhyankar and Limaye's edition of Bhartrharf s
Mahahhasyadipika
ApSS Apastamba Srauta Sutra
ArsB Arseya Brahmana
AsvSS Asvaldyana Srauta Sutra
AVP Atharvaveda (Paippalada)
AV§ Atharvaveda (Saunakiya)
BAU(K) Brhaddranyaka Upanisad (Kdnva)
BhaSS Bharadvdja Srauta Sutra
CE "Critical edition" of Bhartrhari's Mahahhasyadipika
ChU Chdndogya Upanisad
DrSS Drdhydyana Srauta Sutra
HiSS Hiranyakesi Srauta Sutra
JAB Jaiminiya-Arseya-Brahmana, edited by Bellikoth
Ramachandra Sharma. Tirupati: Kendriya Sanskrit
Vidyapeetha. 1967.
JUB Jaiminiya Upanisad Brahmana
KB Kausltaki Brahmana
KS Kdthaka Samhitd
LSS Latydyana Srauta Sutra
Ms Manuscript of Bhartrhari's Mahdbhdsyadipikd
MS Maitrdyanl Samhitd
MSS Mdnava Srauta Sutra
P. Paninian sutra
PB Pancavimsa Brahmana
PMS Purva Mimdmsd Sutra
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SaB Samavidhana Brahmana
SadB Sadvimsa Brahmana, edited by Bellikoth Ramachandra
Sharma. Tirupati: Kendriya Sanskrit Vidyapeetha.
1967.










VaSS Vardha Srauta Sutra
Bibliography
Aufrecht, Theodor, 1879: Das Aitareya Brahmana. Bonn:
Adolph Marcus.
Balasubrahmanyam, M. D., 1964: "The accentuation of arya in
Panini and the Veda." 26th International Congress of
Orientalists. New Delhi. Summaries of Papers, III,
54-55.
-, 1966: "An accentual problem in Panini and the Veda
apropos of the word hdyana-T Bulletin of the Deccan
College Research Institute 25, 43-58.
I l l
y 1969:
 uArya< an accentual study." Indian Anti-
quary, Third Series, 3 (R. N. Dandekar Felicitation
Volume), 112-27.
9 1972: "Vedic sriyase and Panini 3.4.9." Vishvesh-
varananda Indological Journal 10, 7-10.
, 1974: "Panini 6.1.209-210." Charudeva Shastri
Felicitation Volume. Delhi, 189-93.
? 1974a: "Katyayana and some Vedic formations."
Samskrtavimarsah 1(2), 1-4.
? 1981: The System of Krt Accentuation in Panini and
the Veda. Tirupati: Kendriya Sanskrit Vidyapeetha
(Kendriya Sanskrit Vidyapeetha Series No. 32).
, 1983: "An accentual note on Vedic vodhave?
Surabhi. Sreekrishna Sarma Felicitation Volume.
Tirupati: Sri Venkateswara University, 229-40.
, 1984: "Suhhagamkarani in AV 6,139,1." Amrtadhara.
R. N. Dandekar Felicitation Volume. Delhi: Ajanta
Publications, 21-27.
Bhartrhari: Mahabhasya Dipika. (1) Edited by K V. Abhyan-
kar and V. P. Limaye. Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental
Research Institute. 1970 (Post-Graduate and Research
Department Series No. 8). (2) Partly edited by V.
Swaminathan under the title Mahabhasya Tlka. Varanasi:
112
Banaras Hindu University. 1965 (Hindu Vishvavidyalaya
Nepal Rajya Sanskrit Series Vol. 11). (3) Manuscript
reproduced. Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Insti-
tute. 1980. (4) "Critical edition" and translation.
Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute. To
date, six volumes have been published: Ahnika 3 by G.
B. Palsule (1983); Ahnika 5 by V. P. Limaye, G. B.
Palsule, and V. B. Bhagavat (1984); Ahnika 6, part 1,
by V. B. Bhagavat and Saroja Bhate (1986); Ahnika 1
by Johannes Bronkhorst (1987); Ahnika 2 by G. B.
Palsule (1988); and Ahnika 4 by G. V. Devasthali and G.
B. Palsule (1989).
Bhat, M. S., 1968: "The Vedic stem ratri- and Panini."
Journal of the Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic
Society 41-42 (1966-67, N.S.), 8-11.
Bloomiield, Maurice, 1899: The Atharva Veda. Asian Publica-
tion Services. 1978.
-, 1906: A Vedic Concordance. Delhi, Varanasi, and
Patna: Motilal Banarsidass. 1964 (Harvard Oriental
Series, Vol. 10).
Bronkhorst, Johannes, 1981: "The orthoepic diaskeuasis of
the Rgveda and the date of Panini." Indo-Iranian
Journal 23, 83-95.
-, 1982: "The variationist Panini and Vedic." Indo-
Iranian Journal 24, 273-82.
113
? 1982a: "Some observations on the Padapatha of the
Rgveda." Indo-Iranian Journal 24, 181-89.
, 1984: "Nirukta, Unadi Sutra, and Astadhyayi."
Indo-Iranian Journal 27, 1-15.
9 1989: "L'indianisme et les prejuges occidentaux."
Etudes de Lettres (Lausanne), April-June 1989, 119-36.
, 1989a: "Bhartrhari and Mimamsa." Studien zur Indo-
logie und Iranistik 15, 101-17.
Caland, W. (tr.), 1921: Das Srautasutra des Apastamba.
Gbttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht.
9 1927: "On a paragraph of Vaidic syntax/' Ada
Orientalia 5, 49-51.
-, 1928: "Eine vierte Mitteilung uber das Vadhula-
sutra." Ada Orientalia 6, 97-241.
-, (tr.), 1928a: Das Srautasutra des Apastamba.
Sechszehntes bis vierundzwanzigstes und einunddreis-
sigstes Buch. Amsterdam: Koninklijke Akademie van
Wetenschappen.
Cardona, George, 1976: Panini: A Survey of Research. Delhi,
Varanasi, and Patna: Motilal Banarsidass. 1980.
114
Chakrabarti, Samiran Chandra, 1980: The Paribhasas in the
Srautasutras. Calcutta: Sanskrit Pustak Bhandar.
Devasthali, G. V., 1967: Phitsutras of Santanava. Edited with
introduction, translation, and critical and exegetical
notes. Poona: University of Poona. (Publications of the
Centre of Advanced Study in Sanskrit, Class C, No. 1).
-, 1984: "Panini and Vedic--a critique." Annals of
the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute 64 (1983),
137-48.
Gonda, Jan, 1975: Vedic Literature (Samhitas and Brahmanas).
Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz (A History of Indian
Literature, Vol. I, Fasc. 1).
Goto, Toshifumi, 1987: Die "I. Prasensklasse" im Vedischen.
Wien: Verlag der Qsterreichischen Akademie der
Wissenschaften.
Hoffman, Karl, 1974: "Panini VII 2, 69 sanim sasanivamsam."
Munchener Studien zur Sprachwissenschaft 32, 73-80.
Horsch, Paul, 1966: Die vedische Gatha- und Sloha-Literatur.
Bern: Francke Verlag.
Jha, Ganganatha, 1942: Purva-Mimamsa in its Sources. Second
edition, 1964. Varanasi: Banaras Hindu University.
115
Joshi, S. D., and Roodbergen, J. A. R, 1981: Patanjali's
Vyakarana-Mahabhasya, Prdtipadikdrthasesdhnika
(P.2.846-2.8.71). Pune: University of Poona (Publica-
tions of the Centre of Advanced Study in Sanskrit,
Class C, No. 14).
Kapila Deva Shastri, Sam 2018: Samskrta Vyakarana mem
Ganapatha k% Parampara aura Acarya Panini. Ajmer:
Bharatiya-Pracyavidya-Pratisthana.
Kashikar, C. G., 1951: "The problem of the Galantas in the
Rgvedapadapatha." Proceedings of the All-India
Oriental Conference 13 (1946), 39-46.
, 1968: "The Taittiiiya-Brahmana in relation to the
Sutrakaras." Pratiddnama. Festschrift Franciscus
Bernardus Jacobus Kuiper. The Hague and Paris: Mouton,
398-408.
Keith, Arthur Berriedale (tr.), 1914: The Veda of the Black
Yajus School entitled Taittiriya Sanhita. 2 parts.
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press (Harvard
Oriental Series 18, 19).
-, (tr.), 1920: Rigveda Brahmanas: The Aitareya and
Kausitaki Brahmanas of the Rigveda. Delhi, Patna, and
Varanasi: Motilal Banarsidass. 1971 (Harvard Oriental
Series 25).
116
-, 1936: "Panini and the Veda." Indian Culture 2,
735-48.
Kielhorn, Franz, 1866: Qantanava's Phitsutra. Mit verschie-
denen indischen Commentaren, Einleitung, Uebersetzung
und Anmerkungen herausgegeben. Genehmigter Nachdruck.
Nendeln, Liechtenstein: Kraus Reprint, Ltd. 1966
(Abhandlungen der Deutschen Morgenlandischen Gesell-
schaft, IV. Band No. 2).
-, 1885: "Der Grammatiker Panini." Gottinger Nachr.
1885, 185-99. Reprinted in Kleine Schriften I, 188-
202. Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1969.
Kiparsky, Paul, 1980: Panini as a Variationist Edited by
S. D. Joshi. Pune: Centre of Advanced Study in San-
skrit, in collaboration with the MIT Press, Cambridge,
Mass., and London.
-, 1982: Some Theoretical Problems in Panini's Gram-
mar. Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute.
Kumarila Bhatta: Tantravarttika. In: Mimamsadarsana. Edited
by Kasinatha Vasudevasastri Abhyamkara and Pt. Ganesa-
sastri Josi. Poona: Anandasrama. 1973-84 (Anandasrama
Samskrtagranthavali 97).
Liebich, Bruno, 1891: Panini: Ein Beitrag zur Kenntnis der
indischen Literatur und Grammatik. Leipzig: H. Haessel.
117
Mayank, Manjul, 1990: "Paninfs acquaintance with the
Atharvaveda." In: Panini and the Veda. Edited by
Madhav M. Deshpande. Leiden: E. J. Brill.
Navathe, P. D., 1987: "On the prasthitam havih." Annals of
the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute 68
(Ramakrishna Gopal Bhandarkar 150th Birth-Anniversary
Volume), 645-51.
Oldenberg, Hermann, 1909-1912: Rgveda. Textkritische und
exegetische Noten. 2 vols. Berlin: Weidmannsche Buch-
handlung (Abhandlungen der koniglichen Gesellschaft der
Wissenschaften zu Gottingen, phil.-hist. Klasse, N.F.
Band XI Nro. 5 and Band XIII Nro. 3).
Palsule, G. B., 1982: "Two Vedic rules of Panini: 8.3.47 and
8.3.10." Golden Jubilee Volume. Poona: Vaidika
Samsodhana Mandala, 185-88.
Pdninlya Siksd. Edited by Manomohan Ghosh. Calcutta:
University of Calcutta. 1938.
Patafijali: Vydkarana-Mahdhhasya. Edited by F. Kielhorn.
Third Edition by K V. Abhyankar. 3 vols. Poona:
Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute. 1962-72.
Renou, Louis, 1940: "Sur certaines anomalies de l'optatif
Sanskrit." Bulletin de la Societe de hinguistique de
Paris 41, 5-17.
118
-, 1953: "Le Veda chez Patanjali." Journal Asiatique
241, 427-64.
9 1957: Altindische Grammatik: Introduction generate.
Nouvelle edition du texte (by Jacob Wackernagel) para
en 1896, au tome I. Gbttingen: Vandenhoeck and
Ruprecht.
Scheftelowitz, Isidor, 1906: Die Apokryphen des Rgveda.
Hildesheim: Georg 01ms Verlagsbuchhandlung. 1966.
-, 1919: "Die Nividas und Praisas, die altesten
vedischen Prosatexte." Zeitschrifb der Deutschen
Morgenldndischen Gesellschaft 73, 30-50.
Schroeder, Leopold von, 1879: "Ueber die Maitrayani Samhita,
ihr Alter, ihr Verhaltniss zu den verwandten Qakha's,
ihre sprachliche und historische Bedeutung." Zeit-
schrift der Deutschen Morgenldndischen Gesellschaft 33,
177-207.
-, 1880: "Das Kathakam und die Maitrayani Samhita."
Monatsherichte der Koniglich Preussischen Akademie der
Wissenschaften zu Berlin (1879), 675-704.
-, (ed.), 1881-86: Maitrayani Samhita. Parts I-IV.
Leipzig: F. A. Brockhaus.
-, 1895: "Das Kathaka, seine Handschriften, seine
Accentuation und seine Beziehung zu den indischen Lexi-
119
cographen und Grammatikern." Zeitschrift der Deutschen
Morgenldndischen Gesellschaft 49, 145-71.
Shivaramaiah, B. K, 1969: "A note on 'bahulam chandasi."'
The Mysore Orientalist 2(1), 7-11.
Staal, J. F. (ed.), 1972: A Reader on the Sanskrit Grammar-
ians. Cambridge, Mass., and London, MIT Press.
Thieme, Paul, 1935: Panini and the Veda, Studies in the
early history of linguistic science in India. Allaha-
bad: Globe Press.
, 1938: Der Fremdling im Rgveda. Eine Studie iiber
die Bedeutung der Worte ari, arya, aryaman und arya.
Leipzig: Deutsche Morgenlandische Gesellschaft.
Reprint: Kraus Reprint, Ltd., Nendeln, Liechtenstein.
1966.
, 1985: "Nennformen aus Anrede und Anruf im San-
skrit." Munchener Sttodien zur Sprachwissenschaft 44
(Festgabe Karl Hoffmann) I, 239-58.
Wackernagel, Jakob, 1896-1930: Altindische Grammatik.
Gottingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht.
Whitney, W. D., 1893: "The Veda in Panini." Giornale della
Societd Asiatica Italiana 7, 243-54.
120
Witzel, M., 1989: "Tracing the Vedic dialects/' In:
Dialectes dans les Htteratures indo-aryennes. Edited
by Colette Caillat. Paris: Institut de Civilisation
Indienne (Publications de I'lnstitut de Civilisation
Indienne, Fasc. 55), 97-265.
121

ON PANINI, SAKALYA, VEDIC DIALECTS AND
VEDIC EXEGETICAL TRADITIONS1
George Car dona
0 Panini refers in his Astadhyayi to certain
features of speech that are attributed to Sakalya. In
particular, some of the Astadhyayi rules concern aspects of
Sakalya's dialect as reflected in his padapatha to the
Rgveda. These sutras wee of interest in connection with
aspects of Sanskrit dialects at the times of Panini and his
predecessors. They establish that Sakalya, the author of
the padapatha to the Rgveda, antedated Panini. Sakalya also
gives us evidence in his padapatha for dating an important
dialectal split in early Indo-Aryan. Moreover, the evidence
of the Astadhyayi concerning forms of the type aduksat
allows a perspective on how Panini viewed the samhitapatha
and the padapatha of the Rgveda.
1 Let me consider first two sutras in which Panini
deals with features of Sakalya's padapatha.
1.1 Astadhyayi 1.1.16: ?
?) states that, according to Sakalya, a vowel o whose
occurrence is determined by a sambuddhi ending has the class
name pragrhya if it is followed by iti that does not stem
from a rsi. That is, -o of vocative singular forms is
classed as a pragrhya element under these conditions. A
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pragrhya vowel is exempt from replacements that regularly
2
apply to vowels followed by other vowels in close junction.
Astadhyayi 1.1.16 thus says that Sakalya has -o in vocative
singular forms before iti, which does not occur in the
original text attributed to a rsi.
This accords with what is known about Sakalya's
padapatha to the Rgveda. For example, corresponding to the
samhitapatha of Rgveda 1.2.1a, 2a: cffW
the padapatha has W{t %% | 3TF I frf| I,
3 f f l : I VJ|<<T[ I. The Rgvedapratisakhya accounts for the
data in question by providing that -o of a vocative form is
called pragrhya, then saying that a pragrhya element remains
unchanged before the i- of iti in the padapatha and before
- 3
vowels in the samhita text that stems from rsis.
___>. *"*
1.2 Similarly, Astadhyayi 1.1.17: 3̂ T 3? I states that,
according to Sakalya, the particle u is replaced by a nasal-
ized vowel that is long and pragrhya. This accords both
with what is known of the padapatha to the Rgveda and what
is provided for in the Rgvedapratisakhya. For example,
corresponding to the samhitapatha ^M\M H^H^cicll 3" I
(Rgveda 1.24.8b), the padapatha has ^PT I Ĥ TPT I 3FJ
t f̂  I. Rgvedapratisakhya 1.75 ^ ^ tI) states that, according to the teaching
of Sakalya, a unisegmental element u that is connected with
iti—that is, the particle u followed by iti in the pada-
- 5
patha-is both lengthened and nasalized.
1.3 Clearly, Astadhyayi 1.1.16 is best interpreted as
reflecting what iSakalya does in his padapatha. Moreover,
although the padas of any padapatha are generally followed
by pauses, thus placing their final segments in prepause
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position, Sakalya's letting iti directly follow pragrhya
-o, and also um, has a parallel in his procedure. Consider
briefly some examples of words with -h in the Rgveda pada-
patha corresponding to -r of the samhitapatha, together with
pratisakhya rules that serve to relate the two. The Rgveda-
pratisakhya recognizes a rhotacizing -h, which it calls
rephin. In general, -h preceded by a vowel other than a or
a is classed as rephin, and such a visarjaniya goes to -r
7before a vowel or a voiced consonant. For example, the
samhitapatha of Rgveda 3.26.7a has 3j|H<I^H , and the corre-
sponding padapatha text is 3jlM: I SThFH U There are also
words like pratdh, however, which have -r before vowels and
voiced consonants although they have prepause -h following
an a-vowel. For example, corresponding to Rgveda 7.41.1a:
and 1.16.3a: S-sJ^ldgclMS. . . , the
padapatha has SlcT: I # ^ T I STcT: I %*&{ I S 3 H | I and
Hid: I S^MQ I. Accordingly, the Rgvedapratisakhya provides
Q
that pratdh has a rephin h. Of course, the change to r does
not apply for h followed by a voiceless consonant or pause;
for example, Rgveda 4.35.7a: HICIWJCHRSI] 5 ^ ^ has pratds.
Moreover, both rephin and non-rephin h assimilate to
Q
following voiceless consonants; for example, nas, as in
Rgveda 10.128.9a: ^ HWHHI . . . (padapatha % I ^: I ^
STFTT: I . . .), alternates with nah and nas, but not with
*?wir. In his padapatha, Sakalya lets pratkr and itt occur
in close conjunction (HidRid I ĉPT I 3[f^": I . . .), thus
showing that pratdh (--> pratds; see note 9) has a rhota-
cizing -h. Naturally, if the first vowel of iti in the
padapatha is to condition the occurrence of -r in an item
with rephin h, the two words have to be pronounced in close
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junction (samhitayam) within the padapatha. Similarly, by
letting a vocative form with -o be followed by iti in close
junction, where a non-pragrhya vowel o would go to avy
Sakalya shows that in his dialect the vowel of such a voca-
tive form is pragrhya.
2 From what has been shown up to this point, it must
be accepted both that Sakalya, the author of the padapatha
to the Rgveda, preceded Panini and that Panini refers to him
explicitly. This is of import to another point, which more
directly concerns some dialect variation in Vedic.
2.1 It is well known that early Vedic had variants of
the types daks- and dhaks-. It is also demonstrable that
the variants belong to distinct dialects of early Vedic.
Given that the type daks-, with an unaspirated base-initial
consonant, shows the effects of deaspiration ("Grassmann's
Law") on forms that, in early Indo-Iranian, also showed the
progressive assimilation that goes under the label "Barthol-
omae's Law," and that the type dhaks- is immediately and
plausibly accounted for as an innovation through analogic
spread of variants with aspirated initials after the Indo-
Aryan devoicing of clusters such as *-ghzh-, I think it
proper to consider, with earlier scholars, that the types
daks- and dhaks- are respectively archaic and modern. Now,
in Sakalya's dialect, as in the language that Panini
describes, the modern type dhaks- is the norm. Accordingly,
Sakalya consistently gives forms like adhuksat instead of
aduksat where the samhitapatha has the latter (see the paper
alluded to in note 11).
2.2 Another fact concerning such variants-which, to
my knowledge, has not been emphasized by earlier scholars—
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is that Panini does not specifically account for the type
daks-. The Astadhyayl has sutras accounting for the type
dhaks-. Thus, -h of a verb is generally replaced by -dh but
-gh substitutes for -h of a verb that begins with d-, and an
aspirated stop replaces an unaspirated stop b d d g in a
syllable of a verb that ends in an aspirate at a word
12boundary and at a morpheme boundary before -s- and -dhv-.
With retroflexion and devoicing, then, forms like adhuksat
are derived from aduh-sa-L But no special provision is
made in the Astadhyayl to derive forms like aduksat
2.3 This can hardly be considered simply an oversight.
Forms of the type in question occur too frequently in the
Rgveda and other Vedic texts to allow this assumption and
Panini does explicitly provide for Vedic forms like bhari-
bhrat, with aspirated bh- instead of unaspirated b- in an
13abhyasa syllable. Another possible reason is that Panini
may have been led to omit accounting for forms of the type
daks- because these were somehow stigmatized, parts of
dialects not viewed as acceptable. This possibility can be
ruled out, however, for several reasons. First, it is
difficult to maintain that Panini would consider stigmatized
forms that were not at all uncommon in the Rgveda, which is
part of the accepted corpus of sacred Vedic texts. To be
sure, certain pronunciations, belonging to particular reci-
tational schools, could and were stigmatized. It is pre-
cisely within the traditions of the Rgveda, moreover, that
such censure is made most explicit. Two examples will
suffice to bring out this point. There were some recita-
tional traditions in which, instead of hiatus sequences
-e a-, -G a-, one had -e e-, -o 6-, with initial short
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vowels e- o-, which were considered the results of assimila-
tion. In the Rgvedapratisakhya, such pronunciation is not
merely mentioned; iSaunaka explicitly remarks that the
accepted tradition of recitation is different. The
Rgvedapratisakhya also takes note of certain peculiarities
involving the pronunciation of sequences with yamas, sounds
produced when non-nasal stops are followed by nasals, as in
paliknih 'gray3 and amathnat 'tore away\ iSaunaka gives the
general rule concerning yamas: non-nasal stops become corre-
15sponding yamas when they precede nasals. He goes on to
note two peculiarities in the recitational tradition repre-
sented by Gargya: a nasal vocalic segment (nasikya svara-
bhaktih) is inserted after a yama, and if the yama is
aspirated, as in amathnat, an aspirated segment follows
it. Moreover, iSaunaka explicitly says that one is to
17avoid (varjayet) the addition of an aspirated segment.
On the other hand, iSaunaka does not suggest in any way
that variants of the type daks- were considered unacceptable
in recitational traditions. On the contrary, he simply
18lists forms of this type, thereby implying nothing other
than that these forms are irregular in terms of the norms of
his own and Sakalya's speech, that is, that they are
archaisms found in the samhitapatha.
2,4 We have, therefore, to seek another reason for
Panini's not formulating sutras to account for variants of
the type daks-. Now, it is generally accepted that the
padapatha of a Vedic text, although historically later than
its corresponding samhitapathay is taken as the source of
the samhitapatha in terms of derivation. iSaunaka explicitly
formulates this position, which is found stated also in the
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19Nirukta. In accordance with this, commentators like
Sayana cite forms of the type adhuksat instead of aduksat in
the course of commenting on pertinent passages. There is no
reason whatever to assume that Panini's attitude should be
any different. Accordingly, he would accept that JSakalya's
padapatha to the Rgveda served as the basis for deriving, by
rules of morphophonemic conversion, the samhitapatha of this
tradition. Given this, it is not unreasonable to suppose
that Panini did not consider it necessary to account for
forms of the type daks- through rules of his own grammar.
Since the basic forms were already given in the padapatha,
he did not need to formulate special rules to account for
unaspirated initial consonants in the type daks- any more
than he needed to formulate rules for introducing affixes to
derive bases such as bhlma, which Panini accepts as being
derived with affixes of the unddi set. Thus Panini fits
right in with a long tradition of considering the padapatha
the source text by means of which the samhitapatha and reci-
tations such as the kramapatha are accounted for.
The conclusion I am led to also fits in with another
aspect of Panini's relation to the Rgveda. Astadhyayl
2.4.80: 3^% M ^ g ^ l ^ ^ l ^ ^ l R u i R ^ ck I accounts for a
series of aorist forms in mantras by providing that the
abstract suffix Zt-that is, cli-is deleted after certain
verbs. Among the verbs given is dah. According to commen-
tators, moreover, the sutra accounts for the root aorist
form dhak (3sg. injunctive), which western exegetes derive
from dagh 'reach'. Paniniyas and others derive dhak from
dah, although they give contextually appropriate glosses.
For example, in his comments on RV 6.61.14b: OJTT R" 3TT ^ ,
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Sayana glosses ma . . . dhak with nahhidaha, then explains
that this means 'do not push . . . away* (*TT • • . 3TF W
HlRcjS T̂ slI^W). Commenting on the same passage repeated in
Taittirtya-brahmana 2.4.3.1, Sayana glosses with ma dhaksih,
then says that this means 'do not cause . . . to disappear,
perish' (*TT V^ *TT SfTSft: *TT RHUSH I). There is, indeed, no
sutra of the Astadhyayi other than 2.4.80 that accounts for
the morphological formation of dhak. Accordingly, it is
most reasonable to accept that Panini, too, considered this
a derivative of dah. This implies that he accepted not only
a received text of the Rgveda but also a tradition of exege-
sis according to which dhak was considered a form of dah.
3 Summary. There is irrefutable evidence that
Panini knew Sakalya's padapatha to the Rgveda. In this
padapatha, iSakalya regularly gives forms of the modern type
dhaks- instead of archaic forms of the type daks-, where the
samhitapatha has the latter. In his Astadhyayi, moreover,
Panini does not formulate rules especially to account for
unaspirated initials in forms of the type daks-. This is
most appropriately explained on the assumption that Panini
took the padapatha forms as the Vedic forms to be explained
directly and accepted, and that the archaic forms of the
samhitapatha were to be accounted for by other rules, proper
to pratisakhya treatises. This stand accords with what is
accepted in Indian traditions of exegesis. We should
consider not only that Panini accepted interpretations
reflected in the padapatha but also that he received texts
like the Rgveda together with particular exegetical tradi-
tions that he accepted.
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Notes
1. The first part of this paper (1.-1.3) was originally
submitted, on January 6, 1983, for publication in the
felicitation volume for Dr. U. P. Shah. Unfortunately,
this has yet to be published, at least to my knowledge.
Nor has the editor of the proposed volume, Dr. S. K
Bhawmik, responded to inquiries concerning the volume's
publication. I have, therefore, incorporated a revised
version of my contribution in the present paper.
2. Astadhyayl 6.1.125: ^dH'JSII 3rf*t f ^ W (Wfr̂ TT ??**).
3. Rgvedapratisakhya 1.68: 3ilcp|<l 3)HRCIW|: STpf: I , 2.51-
52: ]
4. I leave out of consideration the arguments found in the
Mahabhasya and later works concerning whether Astadhyayt
1.1.17 should be split into two rules.
5. The padapatha to the Vajasaneyisamhita also has pragrhya
um for u of the samhita text, and the Vajasaneyiprati-
sakhya accounts for this (1.95, 4.94: 3WTt S^T: I ,
6<P\i) Ŝ cRft qltW^Hlftl*^ I), but it is known that Panini
was not directly acquainted with the Vajasaneyisamhita,
and if, as some scholars maintain, the author of the
Vajasaneyisamhita is the same Katyayana as the one who
composed varttikas on Paninian sutras, Panini could not
have known this work. Details concerning other pada-
pathas are not directly germane to my discussion.
6. See Panini, a Survey of Research (The Hague: Mouton,
1976; reprinted Delhi, 1980: Motilal Banarsidass), page
274, for a brief survey of different views concerning
this point.
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7. Rgvedapratisdkhya 1.76, 4.27: JM\ M
8. Rgvedapratisdkhya 1.81: Hid: I.
9. Rgvedapratisdkhya 4.31-32: 3 #
R I. Rgvedapratisdkhya
4.33-34: ^mtclWffr ¥$ 3T I 3 7 ^ W& provide for
optional assimilation of -h before velar and labial
stops—where -h alternates with jihvdmuliya and
upadhmdniya—and spirants that are not the result of
retroflexion. Although editions of the Rgveda regularly
give padas with -h before s- in passages such as 4.35.7a
and 10.128.9a, I have cited the pertinent passages with
full assimilation (-s s-) in accordance with Rgveda-
pratisdkhya 4.32.
10. In 1,3, I have rehearsed briefly some facts I would have
assumed to be well known to all informed scholars,
because of what Johannes Bronkhorst has asserted on
pages 184-85 of his paper, "Some Observations on the
Padapatha of the Rgveda" (Indo-Iranian Journal 24:181-89
[1982]): "We get into difficulties if we try to further
specify whether P. 1.1.16 is about the Padapatha or about
the Samhitapatha. It cannot be about the Padapatha, for
there is no sandhi between words, so that no purpose is
served by saying that a final o is pragrhya. The sutra
must, of necessity, be about the Samhitapatha. But
there is no Hti which is not uttered by a Rsf in the
Samhitapatha! The only way to make sense of this sutra
may be to assume that for Panini the Samhitapatha and
the Padapatha were not two different texts but two forms
of one and the same text. Panini puzzles over the ques-
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tion how the Mss. of the Rgveda (=Padapatha) must be
read such that a correct recitation (=Samhitapatha) is
the result" (emphasis added). Patently, Bronkhorst's
claim rests on a false appreciation of Sakalya's full
procedure. Clearly, there could be pronunciation with
close junction {samhitayam) in the padapatha, so that
the Rgvedapratisakhya quite rightly distinguishes
between this and the close junction that occurs in the
original Vedic text (arsi samhita; see note 3).
11. See "On the Dialect Status of Vedic Forms of the Types
daks-ldhaks-? appearing in the felicitation volume for
Bh. Krishnamurti.
12. Astadhyayi 8.2.31-32: l?t 3": I qi^TdiS: I , 8.2.37:
13. Astadhyayi 7.4.65:
^ I In connection with bharibhrat,
note that this sutra also accounts for -n-, that is,
for bhari- instead of bhar-. The rule accounts for
other irregularities, which need not be considered here.
14. Rgvedapratisakhya 2.82: ScKI fPfld: I. On the pronun-
ciations in question and their historical background,
see "Some Neglected Evidence Concerning the Development
of Abhinihita Sandhi," Sttodien zur Indologie und
Iranistik 13-14 (1987) [= Festschrift Wilhelm Rau]:
59-68.
15. Rgvedapratisakhya 6.29:
It is not necessary to consider here
details concerning differences among various Prati-





19. Rgvedapratisakhya 2.1: tificll H^H^fd: I, Nirukta 1.17:
«q^<uIHJ HHqiR I. As shown,
Yaska not only remarks that a samhitapatha has a pada-
patha as its source but he also says that pratisakhyas
of different Vedic branches take the padapatha as their
original text. As is well known, Bhartrhari later con-
siders another position, involving a different interpre-
tation of the compound padaprakrti, according to which
the continuously recited text is the source for the
divided padapatha, Durga discusses the alternatives in
his comments on the Nirukta passage cited but this does
not concern us in the present context.
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THE SYNTACTIC ROLE OF ADHI- IN THE
PANINIAN KARAKA-SYSTEM*
Achyutananda Dash
The Paninian karaka system is the keystone of the
syntactic and semantic relations in Sanskrit grammar. The
term karaka is not defined by Panini but later grammarians
and logicians accept the definition of karaka as kriyanva-
yitvam karakatvam, that is, 'a karaka is an item construed
with an action'. The description of karaka relations in
Panini's grammar is no doubt scientific but the hierarchy of
the Paninian karaka system, as it is presented in the
Astadhyayl, sometimes remains ambiguous to modern students.
However, considerable research is in progress, especially
among orientalists and modern linguists in the schools of
Relational Grammar (RG) and Transformational Generative
Grammar (TGG), on different aspects of the concepts and
theories of relations between the verb and its nominal
dependents.
In this paper, an attempt is made to represent the
syntactic and semantic role of adhi-, a pre-verb (PV)/ pre-
position (PP), in the Paninian karaka system. According to
Panini's grammar, adhi- is both an upasarga and a karmapra-
vacanlya {kmpv). It is necessary to provide here some
explanation of the status of an upasarga and a kmpv in a
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sentence. According to Panini, the twenty-two PVs/PPs
starting with pro,-, etc., are called upasargas when they
have an intrinsic semantic relation with the verb (V) (see
P. 1.4.58-59). To clarify: when the PVs pro,-, etc., bring
some modification or extension of the meaning of a V, then
they are called upasargas. Thus, Katyayana defines upasarga
- 2
as kriyavisesaka upasargah. On the other hand, they (pro,-,
etc.) are called krnpvs when they have the status of an
independent word and are related semantically to a noun
(NP). As kmpvs, they govern either accusative, locative, or
ablative case-endings (see P.2.3.8-11).
Adhi- is called an upasarga if and only if it can bring
some change in the sense of the verb root or if it can
extend its meaning. For instance:
(1) adhigacchati sastrartham
'(He) understands the meaning of the sastra'.
Here, the original meaning of the verb root gam- is 'to go'
but when it is associated with adhi- the root meaning is
changed to 'understanding*. Such is the magic touch of an
upasarga, which brings a total (sometimes partial) modifica-
tion in the meaning of the verbal base.
Our present problem lies with P. 1.4.46 and P. 1.4.48,
wherein we find that, when intransitive roots like siN- 'to
sleep', stha- 'to stay, as- 'to sit', and vas- 'to reside'
are associated with the PV adhi-, the locative item gets the
karaka designation karman and accordingly an accusative
case-ending is assigned to it by P.2.3.2.
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Before stepping into the real discussion on this issue,
one point is worth noting. According to the vaiyakaranas,
each and every karaka relation is based upon the "designa-
tions" or "labels" of the respective karakas given by Panini
but not on their semantic definitions. On the other hand,
the Naiyayikas are of the opinion that the karaka relation
in Panini's grammar can be represented on the basis of the
semantic definition of respective karakas to the extent that
this is possible (cf. Jha 1984). Though the Naiyayika's
view is quite logical and scientific, it is not always true
to the Paninian description of karaka relations. To my
mind, the problem of adhi is one of the exceptions to the
above-mentioned notion of the Naiyayikas.
To pinpoint the problem, let us consider these examples:
(2) ladhi-slN-l sa vai daksine bhage dhiyate, tasmad
daksinam bhagam pumsah stry adhisete I
(Sam.Ar. 2.4)
(3) / -do- /
That/She is kept on the right side, so the
woman sleeps on the right side of the man'.
Candrapldah sayanatalam adhisisye I
(K 19, 206)
'Candrapida [the king] slept on the [royal]
bed'.
(4) ladhi-stha-l brahma 'dhyatisthad bhuvanani dharayan I
(Tai.Br. 2.8.9.7)
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'Holding upon [the worlds], the Supreme
Lord [Brahman] resides in the worlds'.
(5) / -do- I adhitisthati lokam ojasa sa vivasvan iva
medinipatih I (Ki. 2.38)
'He, the lord of the earth [the king],
resides upon the world by [his] vitality,
just like the sun'.
(6) ladhi-as-l darbhans tu na 'dhyasita I
(Tai.Br. 3.7.3.3)
'But [the Hota] should not sit upon the
darbhas, i.e., the sacrificial grass'.
(7) / -do- I aye simhasanaTYi adhyaste vrsalah I (Mu. 3)
'Hey! The vrsala is seated upon the
[royal] throne!'
Hundreds of such examples may be found in pre-Paninian
and post-Paninian literature. What we find interesting for
our study is this. When verbal bases like silSf- 'to sleep',
stha- 'to stay, and as- 'to sit' are preceded by the PV
adhi-, then locative items like daksinabhaga and sayanatala
in (2) and (3), bhuvana and loka in (4) and (5), darbha and
simhasana in (6) and (7), respectively, get accusative case-
endings. According to Panini, an accusative case-ending is
assigned to a grammatical object by P.2.3.2 (karmani dvitl-
138
yd) and a locative case-ending is assigned to a locative
item by P.2.3.36 (saptamy adhikarane ca). Strictly speak-
ing, on the basis of the syntactic and semantic notions
found in Panini, the said locative items, as defined in
P. 1.4.45 (adharo 'dhikaranam), must get the locative case-
ending according to P.2.3.36. Instead we find an accusative
case-ending to these locative items. What, then, is the
logic behind such use of a Natural Language (NL)? For the
Paniniyas, that is, the followers of the school of Paninian
grammar, there is no problem because Panini's special rule
P. 1.4.46 (adhisihsthasam karma) says 'the (designation)
karman is assigned to the substratum of the action denoted
by the verb roots silSf- "to sleep", stha- "to stay", and as-
"to sit", when they are preceded by adhi-. But this expla-
nation is not adequate for the study of Sanskrit as an NL
because, even after the association of the PV adhi- with
intransitive verbs like slff-y stha, etc., they do not change
their basic verbal meaning. Neither is there any indication
that transitivization (of the intransitive verbs) takes
Q
place. Let us look into the problem using some traditional
examples:
(8) harih vaikunthe sete I 'Hari sleeps in vaikunthal
N P 1 NPLOC V
= (8a) NPX + N P L 0 C + V ( )
(9) harih vaikuntham adhi-sete I 'Hari sleeps in vaikuntha'
N P 1 NPACC P V V
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= (9a) NPX + N P A C C + PV-V ( )
In (8), the locative case-suffix -iSfi with the NP
(vaikuntha) expresses the substratum. But in sentence (9)
the locative NP occurs with an accusative case-ending -am
and the verb is preceded by a PV adhi-. According to the
traditional interpretation, the PV adhi- transitivizes the
intransitive verbs, and thus the accusative case-ending is
quite justifiable.
Here the main problem lies: are intransitive verbs such
as sete, etc., really transitivized when they are associated
with the PV adhi-? Do substrata like vaikuntha, etc.,
become the object in a real sense? First let us see what
traditional scholars have to say on this issue.
In the school of Navya-Nyaya, Jagadisa, the author of
Sabdasaktiprakasika, finds in such examples the identity of
the objecthood and locationhood, which is difficult for us
to accept.
Gadadhara, the author of Vyutpattivada, remarks that in
the sentence
(10) sthalim adhisete I '[He] sleeps on the ground'
the accusative case-ending with sthall ('the ground') ex-
presses the adharatva or adhikaranatva ('substratum').
He accepts that the root is initially intransitive and its
intransitivity is retained even though it is seen in its
transitive form. In his opinion, in order to give a
formal/grammatical justification, Panini has to make an
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exceptional rule, giving the label karman to the locative
item.
Gadadhara also offers another explanation on the grounds
that adhisete means sayanam karoti, where sayana is taken to
be the kHyaphalam (that is, the result of the action) of
the verb karoti. Thus, due to the expression of the action,
which is delimited by the result (that is, phalavacchinna-
vyaparavacakatva), (10) can be a transitive construction.
According to this second assumption, roots such as siN-,
etc., when preceded by the PV adhi-, are transitivized and
are used only in the conventional sense (nirudhalaksana).
Finally, Gadadhara abandons this second suggestion and
reverts to the initial intransitivity of the root. Here,
of course, he thinks in the correct direction. As we well
know, the intransitive verb does not become transitive even
after its association with the PV adhi-. The only uncon-
vincing thing here is that he tries to impose a new meaning
(in the present case adhikavanatva) on the accusative case-
ending (almost all the Naiyayikas do the same). Moreover,
he ignores the role of adhi- in the present context.
Grammarians say that, though vaikuntha is not the real
object, it is a grammatical object. By grammatical object,
they mean any item that is given a designation of karman by
Panini.
Almost all the Naiyayikas and the Vaiyakaranas accept
the dictum adharasya antcsasanikakarmatvam, that is, the
objecthood of the substratum is based on the instruction
(given by Panini). The term anmasanikakarmatva means
that, although it is not the real object, it is assumed to
be so on the basis of Paninf s instruction. This discussion
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shows that almost all the Naiyayikas tried to provide a
logical explanation for such a phenomenon of an NL but they
failed because, and only because, they ignored the role of
the PV adhi- in these constructions.
Thus, in my hypothesis, the PV adhi- has an important
role in the syntactic and semantic relations of the items in
these sentences. And, I hope, there are strong grounds for
my hypothesis in the traditional school of grammar as well
as in modern linguistics.
The Hypothesis
In the present context, adhi- is not an upasarga as it
does not show the characteristics of an upasarga. There-
fore, I assume it to be a karmapravacaniya (kmpv) because it
has an intrinsic semantic relation with the NP and
expresses/implies the meaning 'substratum'. Since we do
not see a locative case-ending with the NP vaikuntha, the
example does not violate the general principle ananyalabhyas
sabdarthah or uktarthanam aprayogah. The accusative case-
ending with the NP vaikuntha is also justifiable because a
kmpv can govern dvitiya by P.2.3.8.
On this hypothesis, there may arise some major objec-
tions. The first could come from a traditional scholar, who
might ask how adhi- can express/imply the sense adhikarana
'substratum'. Second, how can adhi- be considered a kmpv
when Panini does not state so in this context? Third, if
adhi- is considered to be a kmpv, how can one explain the
passive constructions?
To the first objection it might be countered that in
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example (8) the locative case-ending expresses the substra-
tum but in (9), due to the "raising" of adhi-, the same
meaning is obtained from both sentences. This shows that
adhi- either expresses or implies the meaning adhikarana,
'substratum'. Pataiijali in his Mbh. says: adhir uparibhage
9
vartate. This implies that the meaning of adhi- is adhi-
karana. The author of Balamanorama, a commentary on SK 542
(P. 14.46), says: adhis tu saptamyarbhasya adharasya dyotakah.
With all this evidence we can assume that the meaning of
adhi- is adhikarana 'substratum'. Therefore, the locative
case-ending is not seen after the NP vaikuntha and there is
a linkage between vaikuntha and adhi-. The accusative case-
ending (-am) following the NP vaikuntha has no meaning in
the present construction and is used only for the correct-
ness of the sentence (that is, sadhutvarthakam). Therefore,
with this internal and external evidence, we can assume that
the meaning of adhi- is 'substratum' without hesitation.
To the second question, the answer will be as follows.
The PV adhi- holds true to the definition of kmpv because it
is semantically related to the NP in this construction, but
not to the VP. Here, I must make it clear that we do not
see the same nature of kmpv in sentences such as:
(11) anu harim surah I 'the gods are after Hari'
kmpv
Here anu has the status of an independent word and is seman-
tically related to the NP. If we closely examine all the
kmpvs in Panini's Astadhyayi, we will find two varieties of
kmpvs. I will call them kmpv-1 and kmpv-2. Kmpv-1 is that
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which has the status of an independent word and is semanti-
cally related to the NP. Moreover, it is neither associated
nor compounded with the VP. Kmpv-2 is that which is asso-
ciated with the verb but has an intrinsic semantic relation
with the NP. Our present example (9) is the second variety
of kmpv (kmpv-2). Such kmpvs are also evident in tradi-
tional examples:
(12) nadlm anvavasitd send I (SK 549 on P. 1.4.85)
NPACC kmPv-PV v N P i
'the army camped alongside the river'.
(13) kutah adhydgacchati I (SK 554 on P. 1.4.93)
Ad.V. kmpv.PV V
'whence does he come'.
In these examples, the kmpv-2s anu and adhi are associated
with the VPs.
The third question is: how can one justify the passivi-
zation of such constructions as (9), etc., in Sanskrit?
This needs more clarification. Let us consider the follow-
ing examples:
(14) yad adhydsitam arhadbhis tad dhi tlrtham pracaksate I
(Ku. 6.56)
'that is called a "sacred place," which is inhabited
by venerable persons'.
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Another example is quoted by Nagesa in Vaiyakarana-
Siddhanta-Manjusa as:
(15) antah kancukibhir lasanmanidharair adhyasita
bhumayah I
(i) 'the interior grounds are occupied by the ser-
pents possessing glittering jewels (on their
hoods)'.
(ii) 'the harems are occupied by the chamberlains
wearing glittering jewels'.
In these examples we find the root as-, which is asso-
ciated with adhi- and bears the passive mark Kta; thus, the
NP is marked with instrumental case-ending. According to
the tradition, the passive suffix Kta expresses karman by
the Paninian rule P.3.4.72 / SK 3086 {gatyarthakarmaka-
slisasinsthasavasajanaruhajiryatibhyas ca). Therefore, if
adhi- is considered to be a kmpv-2 and the accusative case-
ending is assigned by P.2.3.8 but not by P.2.3.2, then how
can one account for the passive sentences? The passive
suffix Kta is taught in connection with a karman but not in
connection with a kmpv.
To justify passivization in these constructions, I shall
present two arguments. One is based on the Relational
Grammar (RG) of modern linguistics and the other on the
interpretation of the Paninian rules P.3.4.72 / SK 3086 and
P.3.4.76 / SK 3087.
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Argument One
Before I begin to discuss this issue, it is necessary to
explain roughly the different nature and status of passivi-
zation in Sanskrit. Generally, in Sanskrit, passive con-
structions can be classified into three groups:
(i) Accusative passive or personal passive
(ii) Unaccusative passive or impersonal passive
(iii) Unergative passive or pseudo-passive
To exemplify these according to the maxim of sthalipula-
kanyaya, consider the following examples:
(16) devadattena odanah pacyate I
'the rice is being cooked by Devadatta'
This represents passive type (i).
(17) phalitam vrksaih I 'the trees have borne fruit'
This represents passive type (ii) (see Postal 1986).
(18) sesah adhisayitah harina I
'the serpent is being slept on by Hari'
This represents passive type (iii). The unergative passive
is subjective and intransitive, and formally contains a
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1-arc, but not a 2-arc. In RG terminology, "1" identifies
the subject, "2" the direct object, and "3" the indirect
object. To introduce the basic theory of passivization in
RG, let us consider two simple sentences in English.
(19) John took that book.







According to RG, the passive clause is characterized in
terms of at least two linguistic strata or grammatical rela-
tions. In (21), "John" heads a 1-arc in the first stratum
and a Cho-are (Chomeur = unemployed) in the second, while
"that book" heads a 2-arc in the first stratum and a 1-arc
in the second. Under the interpretation of Relational
Networks (RNs), (21) embodies the claim that "John" bears
the 1-relation at the first linguistic level and the Cho-
relation at the second, while "that book" bears the 2-
relation at the first stratum (level) and the 1-relation at
the second. Moreover, here A sponsors B and B erases A.
So, also, C sponsors D and D erases C (see Postal 1986, 17).
Thus it is claimed that the passive involves at least two
strata, or levels, of structure. This is called the
"bistratal" theory of passive (cf. Perlmutter 1984, 4-5).
Similarly, the Sanskrit sentences
(22) devadattah odanam pacati I
'Devadatta cooks rice'
(23) devadattena odanah pacyate I
'The rice is being cooked by Devadatta'
can be explained by the bistratal theory of passive. In
(23), -ya-, which is one of the morphological markers of
passivization in Sanskrit, clearly represents the 2-1
Advancement Construction (cf. Rosen 1984, 55-56).
148
With this background of passivization in RG, let us try
to explain our present problem, which is somehow complicated
and has an overlapping structure. Let us consider sentence







Here the passive sentence (18) presupposes two underlying
constructions:
(18a) harih sese sete I
'Hari lies on sesa, the serpent'
(18b) harih sesam adhisete I
'Hari lies on the serpent'
In diagram 2, hari bears the 1-relation on the first and
second levels and the Cho-relation on the third level. The
sesa bears the LOC-relation on the first level, the 2-
relation on the second and third levels, and the 1-relation
on the third level. Moreover, A and B both sponsor G, and G
erases only A. Also, B sponsors C, and C erases B; D spon-
sors E, and E erases D.
Diagram 2 is my modified version of a structure origi-
nally proposed by the relational grammarian Paul Postal in a
personal communication to P. Dasgupta, who had consulted him
about this type of Sanskrit sentence. Postal states: "the
key thing is that, there is some element bearing a non-
nuclear relation which advances to 2, leaving a copy.
Suppose it is a locative. Then there will be a locative
copy. In English, since locatives are in general flagged,
this copy will be, yielding things like
[25] The serpent is lain on by Hari.. 10
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because, the copy pronoun itself is invisible in English.
It would seem that what goes on in Sanskrit involves in some
way incorporation of the copy or conceivably, of the
preposition which flags it, into the verb."
Perlmutter and Postal (1984) and Postal (1986) have
recorded some evidence from Bantu languages that locatives
and instrumental can advance to 2-relation in an NL. Here,
of course, the locative advancement to 2-relation is seen
with the "raising" of a complement (adhi-), a PV, which
takes the responsibility of the intrinsic relation of loca-
tive with the "marquee" and a grammatical adpositional link-
ing with the intransitive verb sift-. Thus, here the passive
marker Kta is justifiable after the advancement of the loca-
tive to the 2-relation. Moreover, such passivization never
violates the 1-Advancement Exclusiveness Law (1-AEX).
Such passive clauses are similar to "pseudo-passive"
clauses in English (cf. Postal 1986). Let us examine some
"pseudo-passive" constructions in English:
(26) The bed was slept in by the Shah.
(27) This hall has been played in by some of the finest
orchestras in Europe.
(28) The room was exercised in by the Spider Man.
(See Perlmutter and Postal 1984, 100-1)
Another significant point in this connection is that, as
a scientific and logical presentation of the structures of
an NL, the grammar of Sanskrit ought also to justify its
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"pseudo-passive" construction(s) with some morphological
element(s), which bears an intrinsic semantic relation to
the other regular grammatical elements in a sentence. Here
the PV adhi- has just such an important role in these
Sanskrit constructions.
Argument Two
As we have seen, according to the tradition, the rule
P.3.4.72 / SK 3086 (gatyarthdkarmakaslisasinsthdsavasa-
janaruhajiryatibhyas ca) teaches Kta in the sense of karman
(also in the sense of kartr and bhdva) and in the examples
(14), (15), (18), etc., the Kta expresses the same meaning
(see SK 3086 and Kdsikd on P.3.4.72).
In my opinion, in these sentences, the suffix Kta
expresses adhikarana but not karman by P.3.4.76 / SK 3087
(kto 'dhikarane ca dhrauvyagatipratyavasdndrthebhyah).
Thus, Kasikakara explains this aphorism as dhrauvydrthdh
akarmakdh, pratyavasdnnrthdh abhyavahdrdrthd iti svanikdya-
prasiddhih I dhrauvya-gati-pratyavasdndrthebhyah yah kto




The dhrauvydrtha roots as svanikdyaprasiddha are sifif-,
sthd-, as-, etc., when they are preceded by adhi-. In
support of this, an old kdrikd is quoted by Jagadisa as
"dhrauvydndm adhisindsasthdndm. . . . " (see SSP 2:173).
Bhattoji Diksita in SK explains dhrauvya as sthairyam, on
which the author of Bdlamanoramd writes a note as "dhrauvyam
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ity asya vivaranam sthairyam iti I sthiribhavanam,
upavesanasayanddikriyeti ydvat L"
All this evidence strongly supports our hypothesis that
the Kta suffix in examples (14), (15), (18), etc., expres-
ses adhikarana (and not karmari) by P.3.4.76, since we have
seen that the suffix Kta is taught only in the sense of
adhikaravia, kartr, and bhdva for the dhrauvydrtha roots.
Moreover, I did not find examples such as
(29) *vaikunthah adhisayyate harind I
(30) *anena dsanam adhydsyate I etc.
wherein '-2/a-', the passive suffix, is found in the sense of
karman.
Therefore, it can be stated that in such constructions,
both passive and active, the PV adhi- regularly expresses or
implies the sense of adhikarana Csubstratum') in pre- and
post-Paninian literature. Of course, a few exceptional
examples occur in pre-Paninian literature, for example:
(31) bhadraisdm laksmir nihitddhivdd I (Rg.V. 10.71.2)
(32) yasmin idarn adhitisthati I (Tai.Br. 1.1.3.6)
These variations of Vedic language need no comment, as
the Paninian description bahulam chandasi is enough to serve
the purpose. On the other hand, as far as our hypothesis is
concerned, adhi-, being a kmpv, can govern accusative case-
ending as well as locative case-ending by P.2.3.8 and 9,
153
respectively. We can thus give grammatical justification to
the locative phenomenon in Vedic language also.
Therefore, on the basis of the above arguments, I hope
there is every possibility that my hypothesis will be well
treated as a thesis.
Notes
* I am grateful to Paul M. Postal of IBM's T. J. Watson
Research Center, New York, for providing an explanation
of the present issue in light of RG. I express my
humble regard to my teachers, Dr. (Mrs.) Saroja Bhate,
Dr. V. N. Jha (C.A.S.S., University of Poona), and Dr.
P. Dasgupta (Deccan College, Poona), for their valuable
suggestions on this issue, each of which led to substan-
tial revision. Above all, I express my esteem to my
revered Guru and guide, Prof. S. D. Joshi, who has kind-
ly gone through this article; thus it is dedicated to
him.
1. See Joshi and Roodbergen (1975); Kiparsky and Staal
(1969); Cardona (1974), and Deshpande (1990).




3. Ostler (1979), on the example ramah parvatam adhyaste I
'Rama is settled on the mountain', agrees with the
impossibility of interpreting the accusative semanti-
cally. He thinks that when the intransitive verb is
compounded with adpositions it becomes transitive.
According to him, the compounding process creates a new
LE jointly from the verb's and the adposition's LEs.
After the compounding takes place, "it [the verb] takes
on a life of its own most particularly, it becomes
independent of the continued existence of the adposition
as an independent element" (p. 344).
Simply speaking, Ostler thinks along the lines of
upasargena dhatvarthah halad anyatra nlyate, which is
not the case in the present problem. As a matter of
fact, we see that the sense of the root, is kept intact
even after its association with the adposition. Only
the FS is found to be different.
4. On adhikaranatvam eva karmatvam, see SSP 2:173-74.
5. See the whole discussion in Vyutpattivada:
4
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6. See, sakalasadharanakarntatvarri ca samketavisesasamban-
dhena karmasabdavattvam eva hodhyam (Nagesa in VSM,
158).
7. See W , 144; and PVR, 607-8.
8. In this paper I am not concerned with the debate about
whether the upasargas and nipdtas express the meaning
(vdcaka) or imply the meaning (dyotaka). This issue
needs separate treatment; thus I have avoided it here.
9. See Mbh., 1:256; and Niruktam 1.3.21.
10. Postal actually used other nouns; I have changed the
example so that the discussion bears on sentence (18).
It should be noted that in the same letter Postal says,
"It is obviously very difficult to analyse a single
sentence without knowing much about the rest of the
language. My guess though is that. . . ." and he goes
on to propose the above analysis.
11. One may object that, by P.2.3.68, Panini teaches geni-
tive case-ending for the kartr when Kta conveys adhi-
karana. But how to account, then, for the instrumental
case-ending in examples (14), (15), (18), etc.? To this
objection my reply is: Katyayana and Patanjali have not
commented on this rule. But, in connection with the
earlier rule (P.2.3.67), to justify usages like ahind
srptam and aheh srptam, Katyayana suggests sesavijndndt
siddham (Va. 2, on P.2.3.67). I think the same explana-
tion is applicable in this context, so there will be no





























































Va. Katyayana's Vartika on Panini's Astadhyayl
W Vyutpattivada of Gadadhara
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PANINI 7.2.15 (YASYA VIBHASA):
A RECONSIDERATION*
Madhav M. Deshpande
1 Paul Kiparsky, in his 1979 book, Panini as a Vaca-
tionist, proposed a novel interpretation of the option terms
va, vibkasa, etc. Traditionally, Paninian commentators have
been unable to make significant distinctions between the
import of these terms, and have not offered a satisfactory
explanation of Paninf s definition of the term vibhasa, that
is, P. 1.1.44 (na veti vibhasa). According to the tradition,
these terms simply mean 'optionally. Kiparsky started with
the hypothesis that these terms in Panini could not simply
be synonyms and must have different meanings. He proposed
that va meant 'preferably*; vibhasa, defined by Panini as na
va, meant 'preferably not', or 'marginally; and anyataras-
yam meant 'either' or 'optionally. He then examined this
proposed interpretation by conducting a statistical study of
the relative frequencies of the optional outputs of all
option rules in Panini. His examination of Vedic and clas-
sical usage, especially the usage of Sanskrit in the text of
the Astadhyayl itself, overwhelmingly supported his hypo-
thesis. While, in terms of this outstanding statistical
demonstration, RLparskys interpretation is decidedly
preferable to the traditional view, it is still not without
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its problems and weak spots. Kiparsky himself is open-
minded about these. Thus, even while largely agreeing with
Kiparsk/s new interpretation, one needs to continue to
search for explanations for the remaining areas of concern.
2 P.7.2.15 {yasya vibhasa) is one such area. Though
this rule is crucial to Kiparsk/s thesis, he has not been
able to come up with a decisively conclusive interpretation
for it. According to the traditional interpretation, the
rule says that, when the augment iT is prescribed optionally
{vibhasa) in any context after a root, the augment does not
occur before the nistha suffix {-ta or -tavat) after that
root. Traditionally, this rule applies to all roots after
which iT is optionally prescribed with any option word.
This, then, brings rules with these different option words
under the scope of P.7.2.15 {yasya vibhasa). For instance,
P.7.2.56 {udito va), in its traditional interpretation, says
that the gerund suffix -Ktva optionally takes the augment iT
after a root with the marker U. Thus, for a root such as
kramU {Dhatupatha 1.502), we get the optional gerund forms
krantvd and kramitva. Traditionally, P.7.2.56 {udito va)
comes under the scope of P.7.2.15 {yasya vibhasa) because
the tradition does not make a distinction between va and
vibhasa. By P.7.2.15 {yasya vibhasa), a root such as kramU
can only have a past-participle form without iT, that is,
krdnta, and the rule prohibits the derivation of kramita.
3 Kiparsky, to be consistent in his interpretation,
needs to show that only the vibhasa rules, and not the va or
anyatarasyarn rules, come under the scope of P.7.2.15 {yasya
vibhasa). He has given considerable thought to problems
posed by this and related rules (1979, 146-59) but this long
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discussion is by his own admission inconclusive. He real-
izes (p. 158) that, in a straightforward application of his
interpretation, roots with the marker U, which are subject
to P.7.2.56 (tcdito va), cannot be subject to P.7.2.15 (yasya
vibhasa) because in his new interpretation these terms are
mutually exclusive. The result would be that roots with the
marker U, if they are set roots, would have their past-
participle forms with the augment iT. In this Kiparsky sees
a problem (p. 158): "It is true that there are some verbs
with diacritic U which do have iT in the nistha forms, e.g.,
dhavU 'run' (p.p. dhavita). But the great majority of them
lack iT there." Thus, strict application of Kiparsky s
interpretation would allow a great many past-participle
forms with the augment iT and this goes against both tradi-
tion and usage as cited by Kiparsky himself.
In the traditional interpretation, there is no routine
way to derive forms such as dhavita. Its derivation is
achieved by traditional commentators by making P.7.2.15
(yasya vibhasa) nonobligatory (anitya). They achieve this
through a debatable jnapaka "indication." While such
"indications" are routinely accepted in the works of tradi-
tional Sanskrit commentators, they seriously compromise our
ability to test Panini's grammar and tend to reduce its
systemic integrity.
4 Kiparsk/s discussion is complicated by the fact
that he suggests two alternative readings for the term
vibhasa in P.7.2.15 (yasya vibhasa). These are as follows
(1979, 157):
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Reading (1): "at most (only) a vibhasa 'marginal' option"
Reading (2): "at least a vihhasa 'marginal' option"
Of these two, reading (1) is more strictly in accordance
with Kiparsk/s general interpretation of the term vibhasa
but, as he himself states (p. 158), "Reading (1) does not
correspond to usage in the past participles of the verbs
with diacritic U (P.7.2.56)." Kiparskys reading (2), in
his own words (p. 158), is "equivalent in its effect" to the
traditional reading. In effect, it includes all option
terms under vibhasa. Even reading (2) leaves some problems
unresolved, and, more importantly, its acceptance would
amount to saying that vibhasa occasionally includes va.
This would be damaging to Kiparskys main thesis. He is
careful not to say this openly, hence his wording "at least
a marginal option." However, it is unlikely that one could
read the words at least into the rule without any textual
basis for it. Strictly, the word vibhasa stands only for
vibhasa and nothing else. Then, the question of whether
this notion of vibhasa is inclusive of all option terms must
be kept a separate issue.
5 There are additional issues. Kiparsky (pp. 44-45)
says that "na . . . va is equivalent to vibhasa, and na
vibhasa, i.e., na na va, is equivalent to plain va" This
may be fine as regards logical equivalences but a rule
containing the term va, and having na continuing from a
previous rule, would obviously be problematical. Is it a va
rule because it contains the term va? Or is it a vibhasa
rule because the cumulative logical value of na and va is
the same as that of vibhasa? The same problem would arise
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in rules containing the word vibhasa with a na continuing
from a previous rule. Are logical equivalences sufficient
to transfer designations if the term vibhasa in P.7.2.15
(yasya vibhasa) is taken as referring to rules with the
designation vibhasa?
This is also related to problems created by using the
principle of anuvrtti, "continuation of words into following
rules." This principle is no doubt part of Panini's gram-
mar, yet we do not fully understand its working. At the
hands of commentators, it has become, like many other
features of the Astadhyayi, a device to generate desired
outputs rather than a method to seek Panini's intention-
ality. For instance, on P.7.2.65 (vibhasa srji-drsoh),
Kiparsky follows tradition by continuing the words thali,
na, and it (p. 151) into this rule. With these words conti-
nued, the rule, according to Kiparsky, means "The 2pl.
perfect ending -tha marginally fails to take iT after the
roots srj 'emit' and drs 'see.'" This would mean that
normally the affix -tha after these roots does take iT.
Kiparsky, however, remarks (p. 151) that "Whitney cites only
saskartha (classical), not sasarjitha, which goes against
Panini's preference." In continuing na into this rule,
Kiparsky follows the tradition but there seems to be no
reason to do so, and it is clearly not continued into the
following rules. Thus, if the word na is not continued into
P.7.2.65 {vibhasa srji-drsoh), then its interpretation a la
Kiparsky would be that -tha marginally takes iT after srj
and drs. This would be more in line with the attested
usage. A problem in using the traditional notion of conti-
nuing words such as na, va, or vibhasa as the basis for a
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modern Kiparskyan interpretation is that the tradition made
no logical distinction between va and na va, on the one
hand, and va and vibhasa on the other. Thus, Kiparsk/s use
of the traditional anuvrtti as the basis for his interpre-
tation raises the spectre of an anachronistic expectation
that the traditional commentators implicitly believed in the
distinctions discovered by Eiparsky.
6 We can illustrate another problem by using P.7.2.65
(vibhasa srji-drsoh). If na is continued into this rule,
then the cumulative value of na vibhasa or na na va makes it
a va rule according to Kiparsk/s interpretation; as such it
cannot logically come under the scope of P. 7.2.15 (yasya
vibhasa). On the other hand, if na is not continued into
this rule, as I have argued above, then it remains a vibhasa
rule, which can come under the scope of P.7.2.15 (yasya
vibhasa). Given the fact that the past-participles of both
of these roots lack iT, that is, srsta and drsta, it may not
be appropriate that they come under the scope of P.7.2.15
(yasya vibhasa), which is expressly designed to prevent the
occurrence of iT. However, as both of these roots are
inherently anit roots (listed in the anit karikas in the
Siddhanta-kaumudi, p. 177), which means they would not get
iT in the past-participle anyway, one sees no purpose in
bringing them under the scope of P.7.2.15 (yasya vibhasa).
This raises questions not only about Kiparsk/s interpre-
tation but about our most basic understanding of the func-
tion and scope of P.7.2.15 and other related rules.
In general, the same holds true for P.7.2.68 (vibhasa
garna-hana-vida-visam), which in Kiparsk/s interpretation
(p. 151) means "The perfect participle suffix -vas can
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marginally get IT after gam, han, vid and vis." All of
these verbs (with vid in the sixth conjugation according to
the Kasika-vHti on this rule) are inherently anit roots.
P.7.2.68 contains the word vibhasa (with no continuation of
na from previous rules claimed by anyone); hence, according
to the traditional view and Eiparsk/s view, this rule comes
under the scope of P.7.2.15 (yasya vibhasa). Here, too,
because the roots are themselves anit, one sees no purpose
in bringing this rule under the scope of P.7.2.15 to derive
past-participles without iT. (There is, however, some
difference of opinion concerning the set or anit nature of
the root vid among commentators. See Madhavtyadhdtuvrttih,
492.) Interestingly, P.7.2.65 and P.7.2.68 are the only
rules that could possibly come under the scope of P.7.2.15,
and also contain the word vibhasa, but in both cases the
purpose of bringing them under the scope of P.7.2.15 remains
unclear.
7 A similar situation prevails as regards our under-
standing of P.7.2.56 (vdito va) and several related rules.
On page 150 of his book, Kiparsky does not continue the word
na into this rule. Thus, this must be a va rule, not
subject to P.7.2.15 (yasya vibhasa). This interpretation
would then allow the derivation of past-participle forms
with iT for roots marked with the diacritic U. According to
Kiparsky (p. 158), this goes against recorded usage. On
page 159, he proposes another interpretation for P.7.2.56
(udito va). Here, he proposes to read this rule simply as
uditah, with na va continuing from previous rules, and
connect the word va in the traditional reading with the
following rule. In this procedure, Kiparsky is using tech-
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niques of textual alteration that remind one of Pataiijalf s
methods. Be that as it may, this novel interpretation of
P. 7.2.56 would make it a vibhdsd rule, because of the
proposed continuation of the words no, va, and thus the rule
would become subject to R 7.2.15. By this one can prevent
the derivation of past-participle forms with iT for roots
marked with the diacritic U, which in Kiparsk/s opinion
"fits the facts reasonably well" (p. 159).
8 Here I would like to raise a more basic question
regarding the word fact as used by Kiparsky. What "facts"
are we supposed to use to judge our interpretation of
Paninian rules? Recent research has shown that (1) several
extremely rare euphonic and syntactic phenomena, which are
clearly not statistically dominant in the classical lan-
guage, are most probably normal in Paninf s own Sanskrit;
and (2) the whole notion of "un-Paninian usages" is circu-
_ 2
larly dependent upon our interpretation of Paninf s rules.
In many respects, Paninf s own Sanskrit was markedly differ-
ent from what we now know as classical Sanskrit.
Such might be the case for rules like P.7.2.56 (icdito
vd) and P.7.2.44 (svarati-suti-suyati-dhun-udito va).
According to both Kiparsky and the tradition, these rules
come under the scope of P. 7.2.15, though for different sets
of reasons. Both claim that this helps prevent the deriva-
tion of past-participle forms with iT for roots marked with
the diacritics U, U, etc. According to Kiparsky, this fits
the facts of usage well, at least in the case of roots
marked with U.
Suppose one takes a more straightforward Kiparskyan view
and argues that both of these are vd rules because they
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contain the word va, and that therefore they are not subject
to P. 7.2.15 (yasya vibhasa). (Please note that this is not
Kiparsk/s own view.) This would allow the derivation of
past-participle forms with iT for roots marked with U> U,
and others. While, according to Kiparsky (p. 159), this
would not fit the facts reasonably well, there is evidence
to show that this interpretation is not without merit. The
















































Whitney also cites many anit forms for some of these roots
but the fact remains that the past-participles with iT for
roots marked with U are not as rare in usage as Kiparsky
claims.
[B] Evidence from Kasakrtsna's Grammar
Kasakrtsna's grammar is not available in its entirety.
Its fragments are available in a commentary in Kannada by
Cannavirakavi on a Dhatupatha ascribed to the tradition of
Kasakrtsna. This Kannada work has been rendered into
Sanskrit and published by Yudhishthir Mimamsak (1966). The
following extracts are from this Sanskrit rendering.
Kasakrtsna's date has been a subject of long debates and we
know little about his regional base. Some claim him to be
pre-Paninian but most likely he is post- Paninian and
pre-Katyayana. In any case, his grammar offers a unique
alternative glimpse of grammatical activity close to
Panini's time.
Cannavirakavi has preserved two rules of Kasakrtsna.
1) tcdanubandhdd id va (pp. 29-30)
2) udanuhandhad id va (p. 159)
On the face of it, rule (1) seems comparable to P.7.2.56
(tcdito va), and rule (2) seems comparable to a portion of
P.7.2.44 (svarati-suti-suyati-dhun-udito va). But, if
Cannavlrakavf s interpretation of these two rules is right,
170
they differ significantly from seemingly comparable rules in
Panini. Cannavirakavi explains this as follows.
(1) namu prahvatve sabde I vdanubandhdd id va I
ukdrdnubandhavato dhator id dgamo va bhavati I
namitam I (pp. 29-30)
(2) vrascil chedane I vdanubandhdd id va I ukdrdnu-
bandhdndm dhdtundm id dgamo va bhavati I vrscitah
vrsdtavdn I (p. 159)
According to the traditional explanation, P.7.2.56 (udito
va) says that the gerund affix -Ktvd optionally takes iT
after roots marked with U. It does not itself apply to
past participles. However, according to Cannavirakavi's
explanation, rule (1) of Kasakrtsna makes the augment iT
optional for the past-participle affix after roots marked
with U. This rule may also have applications for other
affixes but we have no information about them. Similarly,
P.7.2.44 (svarati-suti-suyati-dhun-udito va), according to
the traditional explanation, makes iT optional for any
drdhadhdtuka affix beginning with vaL (that is, consonants
excluding y) after the listed roots and roots marked with U.
But the tradition makes this rule subject to P.7.2.15 (yasya
vibhasa), which prohibits iT in past-participles from these
5 -
roots. Kasakrtsna's rule (2), according to Cannavirakavi,
makes iT optional for the past-participle affix after roots
marked with 17, and clearly does not seem to be subject to a
rule like P.7.2.15 (yasya vibhasa). We have no idea whether
Kasakrtsna's grammar even had a rule comparable to P.7.2.15.
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Cannavirakavi not only interprets the two rules of
Kasakrtsna in this way but in his commentary on the
Kdsakrtsna-Dhdtupdtha he tacitly applies these rules to
derive past-participles of roots marked with U and U. I
have examined the entire commentary and located the follow-






8) stivU ksivU nirasane
9) snusU adane
10) knusU hvarana-diptyoh
11) samU damU upasame si
12) tamU kanksayam
While the Paninian Dhatupatha lists namA for Kasakrtsna's
namU, most of the other roots are marked with U in both
traditions and about half of Kasakrtsna's participle forms
with iT are actually attested in known Sanskrit (as shown
above).
9 In conclusion, the above evidence points to a strong
possibility that one could accept Kiparsk/s new interpre-
tation of Panini's option terms without accepting his inter-
pretations of specific rules. A stricter interpretation of
a rule like P.7.2.56 (tcdito vd), in accordance with Kipar-
sk / s general thesis and in contrast to his specific inter-






















P.7.2.15 (yasya vibhasa) and yields forms that may not be
statistically dominant in the known classical language but
were evidently a common feature of the Sanskrit known to
ancient grammarians like Panini and Kasakrtsna. A possible
dialectal character of these forms certainly needs to be
further investigated by looking closely at the linguistic
evidence. While the problems connected with a fuller under-
standing of P.7.2.15 and related rules are difficult indeed,
this paper points to directions for possible solutions.
Notes
Originally presented at the Sixth World Sanskrit Confer-
ence, Philadelphia, October 1984.
dhdvu gatisuddhyoh I katham gatau dhdvito dhdvitavdn
iti I yasya vibhdseti nisedhasydnityatvdd ito Jnityatd I
bijam ca krticrtinrttndm iditkaranam I tad dhi svtdito
nisthayam [7.2.14] iti nisedhartham kriyate I yasya
vibhasa [7.2.15] iti nisedhasya nityatve tu tenaiva
siddhatvad anarthakam tat syat I [Dhatupradipah, pp.
44-45]. Iditkaranam 'yasya vibhasa' ityasyanityatva-
jnapanartham I tena dhavita ityddi siddhyatlty atreya-
maitreyau I svdmikdsyapau tu avayave 'caritarbhatvad
yanlunnivrttyartham iti I atra €yasya vibhasa9 nasti, lse
'sid9 ityatra ekdca ity anuvrtter idvikalpasyaivdbhdvdd
iti tayor abhiprdyah I [MddhavlyadhMuvrttih, p. 404].
The form patita presents similar problems. See
tanipatidaridrdndm upasankhydnam [Varttika on
sanwantardha. . ., etc.] iti pater vibhdsitetkasydpi
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'dvitiya sritatitapatitagatatya' iti nipatanad idagamah I
[Kasikavrttih on R 7.2.15]. The Siddhantakaumudi has the
same argument on P.6.452. Nagesabhatta in his Laghu-
sabdendusekhara on this rule seems to disagree with these
jiiapakas: anityatvajndpanad veti I idam bhasye na
drsyate I krntater tditvam ariarsam iti pare I [Vaiyakara-
nasiddhantakaumudi, tattvabodhinibalamanoraTnasekhara-
subodhinisahita. RajasthanasamskHagranthanwLla 42,
dvitiyo bhagah, p. 435]. Most commentaries discuss these
and other issues.
2. See Deshpande (1982; 1983).
3. For a brief discussion of various views, see Deshpande
(1974).
4. See Kasikavrtti and Siddhantakaumudi on this rule.
5. See Kasikavrtti and Siddhantakaumudi on P.7.2.15.
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ON IDENTIFYING THE CONCEPTUAL
RESTRUCTURING OF PASSIVE^ AS ERGATIVE
IN INDO-ARYAN
Peter Edwin Hook
One of the outstanding problems in the typology of case
and voice is devising a plausible model of the transition
from ergative-absolutive to nominative-accusative and vice
versa. For languages in the Indo-Aryan group of Indo-
European (as well as the Polynesian group of Austronesian)
scenarios have been proposed that derive the ergative con-
struction from a passive ancestor. For example, the Old
Indo-Aryan passive construction represented by
a) bhaktam devadattena pakvam
rice-NM devadatta-IN cooked
The rice (has been) cooked by Devadatta'
would have as its etymological reflex some 2,500 years later
the New Indo-Aryan ergative construction represented here by
Hindi:
b) devdatt ne bhat pakaya
devadatta ER rice-NM cooked
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'Devadatta cooked the rice'
When considered in detail, this proposal entails certain
difficulties. The passive construction, in languages (such
as English, Latin, and Japanese) that are generally consi-
dered to have one, is a marked construction in which the
patient of the action, not the agent, has many of the pro-
perties associated with the grammatical category of subject.
Examples include deletability/inferability under identity
with the subject noun phrase of a preceding clause in
coordinate constructions (St. John went out and was slain by
the dragon), a tendency to precede other noun phrases (in
particular, the agent noun phrase), and control of reflexi-
vization (John was defeated by himself). By contrast, its
constructional descendant, namely, the absolutive noun
phrase in ergative-absolutive constructions, has none of
these properties. What is not known is the sequence of
stages and syntactic reanalyses through which the agent and
patient noun phrases in the original passive construction
pass as they evolve into the ergative and absolutive.
When we examine the OIA passive in detail, we discover
that it is syntactically quite unlike the passive in modern
Indo-Aryan (or in English). Many of the subject properties
that one would expect to find in the nominatively cased
patient noun phrase in the Sanskrit passive seem already to
have been lost by the time of Patafijali (circa the second or
third century BC). For instance, the instrumental agent
noun phrase is free to precede the nominative patient if the
discourse structure warrants it (example from paspasa ad V
13):
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c) na hi paninina sabdah proktah
not for Panini-IN words-NM taught
Tor it was not words [=language] that were taught by
Panini (but rather sutras [=grammar])?
Furthermore, the nominative patient noun phrase in the OIA
passive is not the one inferred to be (or deleted as) the
2
agent of a conjunctive participle:
d) tatah sabdad abhijndya sa vyaghrena
then voice-AB recognize-CP he-NM tiger-IN
hatah
killed-NM
'The tiger recognized him by his voice and killed him'
(Not 'He recognized the tiger by his voice and was then
killed by him')
Contrast this example (from the Hitopadesa) with the passive
in NIA, in which the nominative patient in a passive may be
the antecedent of the missing (or inferred) noun phrase
(example from Sharma 1969, 38):3
e) altuniya cahta-tha ki bahram ko gaddi se
Altuniya wanted that Bahram DT throne AB
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u t a r - k a r p h i r s u l t a n b a n a d i y a j a - y . . . .
depose-CP then sultan make given go-OPT
'Altuniya wanted to be made sultan after having removed
Bahram from the throne'
and where the conjunctive participle itself has developed a
passive form (example from Kashmiri):
f) su ratini yith sapon bendy
he-NM catch-INF come-CP became prisoner
'He was apprehended and put in prison/
g) vo gaid-kiye ja kar mursidahad lae gae
he-NM arrested go CP Murshidabad brought went
'. . . having been arrested, he was brought to M. . . .'
Of course, it could be the case that the NIA ergative is
not the etymological outcome of the OIA passive but, if we
assume as correct the suggestion that ergative systems arose
in Indo-Aryan as a result of the passive's encroaching on
and finally replacing the active as the unmarked voice (at
least in tenses based on the past participle), then what may
we consider the litmus test for identifying the "moment" at
which the community of Indo-Aryan speakers reanalyzed/
restructured the passive as ergative?
Linguists have not had notable success in developing
tight definitions for such predicate roles as agent and
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patient but it seems clear that, however else these cate-
gories are to be characterized, they are the least labile in
case-voice systems and probably persist as invariants in the
evolution of ergative from passive. Case, in the sense of a
set of nominal affixes, is a highly unstable category and
can appear or disappear independent of a language's typology
(Magier 1983). Much the same can be said for verbal affixes
of agreement, although it seems that either a system of case
affixes, pre- or postpositions, or a system of verbal agree-
ment affixes is required in order to recognize the presence
of ergativity. This leaves grammatical functions such as
subject and object as the diagnostic domain for identifying
the conceptual restructuring of the passive as ergative.
Specifically, the migration of subject properties from the
patient noun phrase in the passive at an earlier stage to
the agent noun phrase at a later one marks the completion of
the transition to the ergative. Between these two stages
there must be a period in which either both the agent and
the patient noun phrase have some claim to subject status or
neither of them does.
If linear precedence over other noun phrases in the
clause is a property of subject, then neither the agent nor
the patient of the passive in Pataiijali's Sanskrit has a
clear claim. Hock (1982) presents statistics to show that
in the Rig-Veda the patient noun phrase precedes the agent
of a passive 70 percent of the time. A similar sample from
Patanjali's Sanskrit shows the patient noun phrase preceding
the agent no more frequently than 50 percent of the time.
If control of reference (or the power to delete a co-
referent) in a conjunction (as in sentence d) is a subject
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property, then the agent noun phrase in Sanskrit has this,
regardless of case or voice, from the earliest period
onward. Does the patient noun phrase in the Sanskrit
passive have any syntactic properties that define subject?
One suggestion made by Keenan (1976a) as a result of his
study of Malagasy is that there are languages in which
relativizability is limited to subjects. That is, the
relative, or "shared," noun phrase in a relative-correlative
construction must be the subject in the relative clause.
Assuming that this property, qua diagnostic of subjecthood,
9
is something more than an arbitrary stipulation, we can
show that on this count the patient noun phrase in a
Sanskrit passive has at least one property of subject.
Relative constructions in OIA include those introduced
with some form of yad 'who, which', as in sentence (h), as
well as those in which a non-finite, participial form of the
predicate appears, as in sentence (i):
h) yo mdnavako vedan pathati tarn anaya
which-NM boy-NM Vedas-AC reads him-AC bring
'Bring the boy who is studying the Vedas'
i) vedan pathantam mdimvakam anaya
Vedas-AC reading-AC boy-AC bring
'Bring the boy who is studying the Vedas'
(lit. 'Bring the "Vedas-studying" bo/)
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In the first type the shared noun may, in either clause, be
of any predicate role and any case. In the second type the
shared noun must be either the agent or the patient of the
relative clause. Furthermore, in the corresponding simple
finite clause (that is, the clause from which, in a trans-
formational account, it would derive), it must appear in the
nominative case. This means that, if it is the patient of
its predicate, that predicate must appear in the passive
voice:
j) manavakena pathyamanan granthan anaya
boy-IN read-PASS-AC books-AC bring
*manavakah pathatah granthan anaya
boy-NM reading-AC books-AC bring
'Bring the books being read by the boy
In effect, the form of the participle shows the predicate
role ([+agent] or [+patient]) of the missing nominative in
the Sanskrit relative phrase in a manner quite similar to
Malagasy and other Austronesian languages (see Manaster-
Ramer, n.d.) and quite different from what is found in anal-
ogous constructions in Japanese, Korean, Marathi, Tamil,
etc., wherein the predicate role of the missing noun phrase
must be inferred from the context and/or by examining the
case marking of the remaining noun phrases in the relative
phrase. Compare the unchanging stem of the Marathi parti-
ciple kelala in (k) and (1):
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k) mala fon ke-lel-a manus kutha gela
me-DT phone do-PP-ms man-NM where went
'Where did the man go who phoned me?'
1) mi fon ke-lel-a mantes kutha gela
I-ER phone do-PP-ms man-NM where went
Where did the man go who I phoned?'
A second subject property that appears to characterize
nominative noun phrases in OIA, be they the agents of active
verb forms or the patients of passives, is the power to
"host" a dependent infinitival phrase. In the following
example, taken from Mahahharata 1.3.98, the agent of the
infinitive gantum 'to go' is coreferential with the patient
aham T of anujnd 'permit, allow5:
m) upadhyayena 'smy anujndto grham gantum
teacher-IN am permitted home-AC go-INF
'I have been permitted by my guru to go home'
We may say, then, that the nominative patient in (m) shares
with nominative agents the ability to condition (or
"trigger") deletion of coreferential noun phrases. There
are more controversial instances of this general kind, in
which the deleted/inferred noun phrase is (or would have
been) the nominative patient of the infinitive:
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n) samvdram netum icchami bhavadhhir
ocean-AC take-INF want-Is you-lN-p
'I want to be taken to the ocean by you'
To the extent that example (n) is admissible usage, we may
regard it as providing evidence of a third subject-defining
property for nominative patients: the power to be the target
of a deletion (or, in a nontransformational syntax, to be an
"inferred" noun phrase).
When we examine reflexivization in OIA, we find the kind
of confusion that is to be expected if the restructuring of
passive as ergative is accomplished by a feature-by-feature
transfer of subject properties from the patient noun phrase
to the agent noun phrase. During the period of Patafijali
(second-third centuries BC) the reflexive pronoun was
controlled by the nominative noun phrase, be it agent or
patient. Thus, in a syntactic discussion in Pataiijalf s
Mahahhasya, we have the following pair of examples (as cited
in Deshpande 1985, 10):
o) hanty atmanam p) hanyata atmamxi
kills self-AC is-killed self-IN
'X kills himself 'X is killed by himself
However, the text of Kalidasa's Malavikagnimitra, written
some five or six hundred years later, yields an example in
which the appearance of the reflexive is controlled by the
agent even when it is the instrumental noun phrase in a
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passive construction (example from Act 3, between verses 19
and 20):
q) maya yathakathancid atma vinoditah
me-IN in-whatsoever-way self-NM amused
'I amused myself in whatever way I could'
(lit. 'Myself was amused by me somehow or other')
A similar example can be found in the Hitopadesa {suhrdbheda
24):12
r) abudhair atma paropakaranlkrtah
fools-IN self-NM other's-tool-made-NM
Tools make themselves the tools of others'
13Constructions like (q) and (r) are exactly what one
should expect to find if one were to back-translate from
descendant ergative constructions in Middle (or New) Indo-
Aryan into the morphologically and syntactically ancestral
constructions of Old Indo-Aryan. For instance, in Kashmiri,
wherein the ergative construction is found in most past
tenses, the reflexive pronoun panun pan 'X's self is found
in the nominative case and the controlling or antecedent
noun phrase is in an oblique case:
s) koryav vuch panun pan enas manz
girls-ER saw self s self-NM mirror in
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The girls saw themselves in a mirror'
cf. kanydhhir drsta dtrrid darpanasya madhye
girls-IN seen self-NM mirror-GN middle-LC
The girls saw themselves in a mirror'
Works like Mdlavikagnimitra or the Hitopadesa, composed
in the scholastic language, were written at a time when
Sanskrit had long ceased to be anyone's mother tongue.
Through them, even if imperfectly, we may glimpse the evolu-
tion of the contemporary Indo-Aryan vernaculars. Construc-
tions like those of (q) and (r), which seem so unnatural in
English translation or in the context of the syntactic
structure of the Sanskrit of earlier periods, must be seen
as unconscious caiques on syntactic patterns found in the
spoken languages of the early centuries of the first millen-
nium. From the evidence that they provide we may conclude
that the restructuring of the Indo-Aryan passive as ergative
(at least in tenses based on the past participle in -ta or
-na) had reached completion by that time.
Notes
Earlier drafts of this paper date from 1976 (Hawaii) and
1978 (AOS Toronto). A more recent version was presented
at the 1986 annual meeting of the Association for Asian
Studies as part of a panel on passives in Asian lan-
guages organized by Noriko Nagai (Duke University). It
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has benefitted from discussions over the years with M.
H. Klaiman, Alexis Manaster-Ramer, Hans Hock, and Madhav
Deshpande, none of whom is in agreement with every part
of it.
1. See Regamey (1954) and Pray (1976) for Indo-Aryan, and
Hohepa (1969) for Polynesian. Estival and Myhill (1988)
looks at these and a number of other language groups.
Klaiman (1981) argues that the relevant ancestor con-
struction in OIA was already ergative and hence the
attempt to explain the development of the NIA ergative
from the OIA passive is misguided. She bases her argu-
ment on the use of past participles in OIA: if intransi-
tive, these modify their agents; if transitive, their
patients (gatah purusah vs. krtam karma, 'gone man' vs.
'done work'). However, since these participles have
morphological parallels in the branches of Indo-European
in which ergativity has not developed, their existence
in OIA cannot in itself be considered equivalent to the
ergativity that we find in the New Indo-Aryan languages.
The central issue is the transfer of subject properties
from the nominative patient NP in the "passive" to the
oblique agent NP (see Comrie 1978).
2. An example from Patafijali (paspasa):
a) atha kam padartham matva esa vigrahah




'So having assumed which element to be the word-
meaning is this analysis (of a compound) made?9
Here the nominative patient noun phrase vigraha (the
putative "subject" of the passive kriyate) is not the
antecedent of the missing/inferred agent noun phrase in
the subjoined clause kam padartham matva 'having infer-
red which sense'. Of course, the example, for pragmatic
reasons, hardly admits of an interpretation of vigraha
'analysis' as agent of matva 'having considered', and
thus it is less telling than the example from the Hito-
padesa in which either participant is endowed with the
physical ability to be the agent of the conjunctive
participle ahhijndya 'having recognized'. See Hook
(1976, 309, nn. 19, 20) for a discussion of an apparent
counterexample:
a) srisailasikharam drstva sarvapdpaih pramucyate
(name of place)-AC see-CP all-sins-IN is-freed
'Merely seeing S. one is freed of all sins'
3. The context makes it clear that Altuniya is the agent of
the conjunctive participle utar kar 'having deposed'.
In other instances the agent of the conjunctive partici-
ple is the same as the agent (even if implicit) of the
finite passive (example taken from Sharma 1969, 36):
a) unhone soca ki firoz ko gaddi se utar kar
they ER thought that Firoz DT throne AB depose CP
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kisi any yogy vyakti ko gaddi par
some other competent individual DT throne on
hithaya ja-y
installed go-OPT
'They thought that, having removed Firoz from the
throne, (they) should put some other competent person
on it'
4. From Grierson (1911, 1:75, sentence 93). The transcrip-
tion is mine. HI and lei are high central and middle
high central, respectively, lyl marks palatalization.
Contrast the corresponding Hindi given in Kachru (1980,
128, sentences 661-63).
5. From Premsagar, as cited in Schumacher (1977, 190). The
passive conjunctive participle seems not to be univer-
sally recognized for Hindi (see Kachru et al. 1976, 93).
6. In this paper I assume for agent and patient the defini-
tions given in the Astadhyayi for kartr and karman. See
Hook (1985, 265, 274, n. 5) for further discussion.
7. I am not considering the rare subtype of syntactically
ergative languages, such as Dyirbal, in which subject
properties cluster in the absolutive noun phrase and the
ergative construction is the unmarked (or only) mode of
expression.
8. Hock (1982, 131; 1986, 22) suggests that in the language
of the Samhita the subject (rather than the agent) noun
phrase of the passive is the (inferred) agent of the
conjunctive participle. This is appealing in the con-
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text of other evidence, which he adduces from word order
and reflexivization in order to demonstrate that nomina-
tive patient noun phrases in passive sentences have more
subject properties in early (as opposed to Classical)
Sanskrit. However, he no longer considers the conjunc-
tive participial data from the Samhita texts to be pro-
bative (personal communication).
9. Of course, the substantiality of a case made for some
given property's power to distinguish a putative cate-
gory depends on the degree to which other defining pro-
perties cluster together with it cross-linguistically.
10. The nominative form aham, qua patient of anujna, is
(like all nominative noun phrases in Sanskrit) optional
in this sentence. However, qua agent of the infinitive
form gantum, aham cannot appear in this sentence unless
it is simultaneously the agent (or patient) of the
finite verb.
11. This example, from Ramayana 4.58.33, is discussed in
more detail in Hook (1980, 81-82).
12. Notice that the controlling forms may a 'by me' in (q)
and abvdhair 'by fools' in (r) come to the left of their
anaphors.
13. The construction found in (q) and (r) is in most rele-
vant points isomorphic with the reflexive constructions
found in Tagalog and other Philippine languages (example
cited in Schachter 1976, 503):
a) iniisip nila ang kanilang-sarili
DT-think-about A-they TP their-self
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They think about themselves'
In Tagalog the antecedent of the reflexive must be the
"actor" (equivalent to "agent" in this paper). In an
earlier tradition of analysis the particle ang was taken
to mark the subject. Schachter (1976), in part on the
basis of reflexivization data like those in (a), con-
tends that, whatever the "topic" or cm<7-phrase in Taga-
log is, it is not the subject. The same argument,
mutatis mutandis, applies to the nominative noun phrases
in (q) and (r). See Hook (forthcoming) for further
discussion.
14. The Uktivyaktiprakarana provides explicit confirmation
of the dependency of late Classical Sanskrit syntax on
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A NOTE ON PANINI 3.1.26, VARTTIKA 8
Daniel H. H. Ingalls
In contributing to Professor Joshi's felicitation volume
I wish to choose a subject that will interest him. What
will be sure to interest him is Patafijalf s Mahabhdsya. But
what can I say of the Mahabhdsya that S. D. Joshi does not
already know, he who is the authority of both East and West
on that marvellous book? For something new I am left with
only minor matters, such as the following.
Varttika 8 on Panini 3.1.26 runs as follows: akhyanat
krtas tad acaste, krlluk, prakrtipratyapattih, prakrtivac ca
kdrakam.
Patanjali repeats and comments on this Varttika:
akhyanat krdantdn nij vaktavyah tad acasta ity asminn
arthe I krlluk, prakrtipratyapattih, prakrtivac ca karakam
bhavatlti vakta- vyam I kamsavadham acaste kamsam
ghatayati I halibandham acaste balim bandhayatlti I
In English: "[Among the uses of the causative suffix
NIC] there should be added this, that NIC is suffixed to a
stem ending in a krt suffix after [the name of] a story, in
the sense 'he tells this story\ One should also state that
the krt suffix then drops, the base reasserts itself, and
the case relationship becomes as it would be with the base.
Thus, kamsavadham acaste 'he tells the Death of Kamsa' [may
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be rendered as] kamsam ghatayati [literally,] 'he causes
Kamsa to be killed'; balibandham dcaste 'he tells the
Binding of Bali' [may be rendered as] balim bandhayati 'he
causes Bali to be bound."'
In the story title, Kamsavadha [The death of Kamsa], we
have an objective genitive compound composed of kamsa, plus
the root han, plus the krt suffix AP, used to form an action
noun (Pan. 3.3.75). Before the suffix AP, han must be
replaced by vadhd (Pan. 3.3.76). In the alternative form
of expression prescribed in our Vdrtika we begin by adding
NIC. Thus,
kamsa + vadhd + AP + NIC
Then the krt suffix (that is, AP) drops, and the base, for
which vadhd was substituted, is restored. Thus,
kamsa + han + NIC
Finally, the case relationship becomes accusative, as it
would be with the base, not genitive, as it is with the
derivative in compound. Thus,
kamsam ghdtaya(ti)
The same process is followed in transforming balibandham
dcaste into balim bandhayati.
What lies at the base of such usage is a hyperbole
(atisayokti) by which a poet or storyteller is regarded as
actually bringing about the events of which he speaks. This
202
sort of hyperbole occurs in languages other than Sanskrit.
It is especially common among the Classical Latin poets.
Thus, Horace (Sat 1.10.36-37) writes:
turgidus Alpinus jugulat dum Memnona, dumque
defingit Rheni luteum caput. . . .
'While the turgid poet Alpinus cuts the throat of
King Memnon; while he disfigures the muddy
headwaters of the Rhine. . . .'
Vergil (Eel. 6.62-63), expressing how a pastoral poet
tells the story of the metamorphosis of Phaethon's sisters
into alder trees, writes:
turn Phaethontiadas musco drcumdat amare
corticis atque solo proceras erigit alnos.
'Then he encloses the sisters of Phaethon with the
bitter moss of bark and sets them up as tall alder
trees'.
Or Horace again (Od. 3.25.3-6):
quibus
antris egregii Caesaris audiar
aetemum meditans decus
stellis inserere et consilio Jovis?
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'In what groves shall I be heard singing the glory
of great Caesar, to set him among the stars and in
Jove's council?'
These Latin examples employ the simplex rather than the
causative as prescribed by Katyayana's Varttika. But there
is no formal causative in Classical Latin. The alteration
of a root by addition of a causative suffix (for example,
decet > docet, necat > nocet) had ceased to be productive
before Classical Latin times. Furthermore, in these cases
the older Sanskrit language seems to have used the simplex
as readily as the causative. If my interpretation is
correct, a passage from the Taittiriya Samhita exhibits both
idioms.
As my interpretation of the passage (Tait. Sam. 2.5.2.4-
5) differs from that of Sayana, it will be well by way of
justification to translate the whole passage, which tells of
the killing of Vrtra, from the beginning of 2.5.2. In the
course of the story numerous ritual prescriptions are
explained. In fact, it is for their sake that the story is
told.2
"Tvastr, when his son had been killed, gave a soma
offering without Indra. Indra desired an invitation but
Tvastr did not invite him because Indra had killed his son.
Indra broke into the ceremony by force and drank of the
soma. Tvastr hurled what was left on the ahavaniya fire,
saying, 'Svaha! Grow to be Indrasatru'. In that he hurled
it [prdvartayat], Vrtra was called Vrtra. In that he said
'Svaha! Grow to be Indrasatru', Indra therefore became the
slayer of Vrtra.
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"On coming into being, Vrtra devoured Agni and Soma. He
kept growing-the length of an arrow-shot each time, on all
sides-until he covered {avrnot] these worlds. That is
o •
[another reason] why Vrtra was called Vrtra. Indra was
afraid of him. He ran to Prajapati, saying, 'One has been
born who will slay me'. Prajapati annointed Indra's vajra
for him and said, 'Strike him with this'.
"Indra advanced [against Vrtra] with the vajra. Agni
and Soma cried out, 'Do not strike. We are inside him'.
'But you are mine', [said Indra,] 'come out to me'. They
asked a reward. He gave them the agnisomiya offering that
is placed on eleven potsherds in the full-moon sacrifice.
They said, 'We have been chewed up; we cannot get out'. So
Indra produced from himself hot and cold fevers. That was
the origin of hot and cold fevers. Hot and cold fevers will
not kill him who knows thus the origin of hot and cold
fevers. Indra infected Vrtra with them so that when his
teeth chattered Agni and Soma came out. Indeed, the out-
breath and the in-breath left him. The out-breath is
ability [daksa] and the in-breath is will [kratu]. That is
why a man chattering with fever speaks [the charm]: '[Stay]
with me, ability and will' and his out-breath and his in-
breath remain in his body and he lives many years.
"Indra, calling the gods out of Vrtra, offered the
Vrtra-killing oblation at the full moon. Indeed, they tell
of the death of Vrtra at the full moon and they tell of his
increase at the dark of the moon. That is why the two
Vrtra-killing verses [vartraghni] are recited at the full-
moon ceremony and the two increase-making verses [vrdhan-
vatl] at the dark of the moon."
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The story continues, with Indra giving other ritual
rewards to sky and earth, then killing Vrtra, and finally
giving a ritual reward to cows. But we have reached the
passage that I think exemplifies our Varttika: ghndnti va
enam purn&Tnasa a, amdvasydydm pydyayanti. I take ghndnti
va enam to mean tadvadham (that is, Vrtravadham) dcaksate
and I take [Vrtram] pydyayanti to mean something like
Vrtravrddhim (or *Vrtrapydtim, if there were such a word)
acaksate. The first of these instances exhibits the
simplex, the second the causative. I fail to see what
subject can be assigned to the verbs, or how they make
sense, under any other interpretation.
In Classical Sanskrit literature I cannot point to any
instances of either locution except in the grammarians.
Patafijali himself, under the very next Varttika, furnishes
the example rajanam agamayati as equivalent to rajagamanam
acaste. In discussing the syntax of this phrase Nagoji adds
a counterexample, Devadattena pdcayati, as equivalent to
Devadattapdkam acaste. But these examples smell of the
inkhorn.
Notes
1. Such is the interpretation of the Kdsikd, which adds that
the ddesa is antoddtta, that is, vadhd. When the final
accented vowel of this substitute combines with the
unaccented a of AP (by ato gune 6.1.97), the resultant
vowel becomes accented (by ekddesa uddttenoddttah 8.2.5).
Boehtlingk (1887) in translating 3.3.76, takes the sub-
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stitute to be vadh expressed in the ablative case. Under
the entry vadha in the section "Paninf s Wortschatz" (p.
272*), he argues that if the substitute were vadha there
would be no need to include vadhi in 7.3.35. Perhaps.
But to make the substitute in 3.3.76 monosyllabic is to
accuse Panini of a more serious fault: vadh plus AP would
become *vadhah.
2. The standard translation by Keith (1914, 190) contains
several errors, which make some parts of the story
unintelligible. Keith mistranslates abhi samahhavat,
abhyanayat, and vartraghnam, despite the commentators,
who furnish the correct sense.
3. As Patanjali notes in the introduction to his work
(Kielhorn 1962, 2, 1. 11-12), Tvastr misplaced the
accent. He meant to say 'Indrasatru, a slayer of Indra'.
But the initial accent transforms the tatpumsa compound
into a hahuvrthi, meaning 'one whose slayer is Indra'.
Hence the denouement of the story.
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ON EKARTHlBHAVA AND VYAPEKSA
V. N. Jha
There is an age-long debate between the Grammarians
(that is, traditional Sanskrit grammarians) and the
Naiyayikas (logicians belonging to the school of Nyaya) over
the meaning of compounds. Does a compound form, as a single
unit, have a primary relationship with its meaning over and
above the relationships of the constituents of the compound
with their meanings? Is there any necessity of postulating
a relationship with the compound as a single unit, such that
primary relationships of the constituents of a compound,
with their respective meanings, are sufficient to account
for the meaning conveyed by the compound?
The Grammarians hold the view that it is necessary to
postulate an additional relationship (samarthya) in the
compound form as a whole, over and above the relationships
of the constituents of that compound, and that this expres-
sive capacity (or relationship) is called ekarthlhhava-
samarthya.
The Naiyayikas reject this proposal, maintaining instead
that the expressive powers (or relationships) of the con-
stituents of a compound are sufficient to account for its
meaning. This individual capacity of each constituent of a
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compound conveys the meaning-and through mutual expectancy
— 2the compound-meaning is understood. This is vyapeksa.
This paper is an attempt (1) to present faithfully some
of the Grammarians' salient arguments in support of their
stand for ekaHhibhava-samarthya, (2) to advance the
Naiyayikas' refutations of these arguments and present their
own position, and (3) to evaluate the arguments of both
3sides in order to draw some conclusions.
Par t I: The Grammarians* Position
The following are the grounds of the Grammarians' stand
in favor of ekarthxbhava in compounds.
Compound forms such as citraguh, etc., cannot generate
knowledge of citragosvdml 'the owner of the cows having
variegated color'. The Naiyayikas would explain the same
compound as follows: the word go stands for go-svamin 'the
owner of the cows' and the meaning of the word extra is
construed with 'cows' by the relation of identity, giving
rise to an understanding of citrabhinna-go-svamx 'the owner
of the cows that are identical to (the cows) having varie-
gated color'. But such an explanation is not acceptable
because the relation of the meaning of a word is not allowed
with a part of the meaning of another word.
To avoid this difficulty, the Naiyayikas could # let
'cows' be understood from the word go by primary relation-
ship, and by the secondary relation (laksana) let it convey
'the owner'. Then the meaning of the word extra can easily
be related to the cows since 'cows' are now the padartha and
not a part of the padartha. But this trick cannot be
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adopted either, since one would have to accept two relation-
ships in the same word, which is absurd.
Naturally, the Naiyayikas must then adopt another way,
namely, to say that the word go would itself convey citra-
go-svamin by laksaria, and that the word extra would perform
the function of indicating the intention of the speaker.
This will save the Naiyayikas from the earlier defect, no
doubt, but it will land them in another difficulty. For, if
the word extra is a mere indicator of the intention of the
speaker, then the formation of citraguh as a bahuvrxhi com-
pound itself would be impossible. This is so because the
rule that allows the bahuvrxhi compound is anekam anya-
padarthe, which means "when more than one word ending in a
case-suffix conveying a third entity come to be compounded,
that compound is a bahuvrxhi compound." Here, since the
word extra does not convey any meaning, and, since it simply
indicates the intention of the speaker, the bahuvrxhi is not
possible.
Moreover, according to the Naiyayikas, citraguh is a
sentence. As such it is conceived as having the property of
being the prompter of the visayata, described by the
visayata prompted by that word. And, although the meaning
of the word extra appears in the cognition, that cognition
is not caused by the word citra. Hence, because the
criterion that causes compounding (namely, the ekavakyatva)
is absent, there will be no compounding at all, which is
contrary to the facts of Sanskrit usage.
Furthermore, if what the Naiyayikas say is accepted,
then the Grammarians can also let the last phoneme a in
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ghata express the meaning 'pot' and let the other phonemes
be treated as mere indicators of the speaker's intention.
From what has been said above, it can be concluded that
the Naiyayikas' theory of tatparya-grahakatva cannot be
supported. Hence, the example of dtraguh compels one to
accept samasa-sakti or ekarthlbhava-samarthya.
Similarly, the compound praptodakah (gramah) '(the
village) that the (flood-)water has reached' cannot generate
the sabdabodha as vdaka-kartrka-prapti-karma (gramah) '(the
village is) the object of the reaching of the water' if
samasa-sakti is not accepted.
The Naiyayikas may let the word udaka stand for the
entire meaning of the compound by laksana and let the word
prapta be the indicator of the intention of the speaker.
This would not be proper, however, because an indicator of
the intention of the speaker can only be a word whose
expressed meaning forms the part of the meaning to be indi-
cated. Here the meaning of the word prapta (namely,
prapti-karta) does not form a part of the indicated sense
(tcdaka-kartrka-prdpti-karma) and so our only choice is to
accept the sakti in the whole of the compound (that is,
samuddya-sakti).
Likewise, if samvddyasakti is not accepted, another
problem will arise in the case of the compound pancagava-
dhanah 'one who has the wealth of five cows'. The Naiya-
yikas would let the word dhana itself convey, by laksana,
the meaning of the entire compound (panca-gavabhinna-dhana-
svami, that is, 'one who is the owner of wealth in the form
of five cows') and let the remaining portion of the compound
be an indicator of the intended meaning of the speaker. But
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in that case they cannot establish the identity relation
between the meaning of the word pancan and the meaning of
go, since in this explanation these words are not expressive
of any meaning but are merely tdtparya-grdhaka. And, if the
identity between these two meanings is not understood, it
should be accepted that there is no coreferentiality
(sdmdnadhikaranya) between pancan and go. As a result, the
samdsdnta-suffix tac cannot be added to it and one cannot
get the compound form pancagavadhana. Thus, the acceptance
of ekdrthtbhdva becomes imperative.
Similarly, in the compound rdjapurtcsah, the Naiyayikas
say that the constituent raja stands for rdjasambandhin, by
laksand, and that as a result this meaning is related to the
meaning of purusa by the relation of identity. But this is
not possible because the Naiyayikas are caught by their own
statements elsewhere. They make a general rule in order to
deny the grammaticality of such sentences as Handulah
pacati, in the sense of 'he cooks rice', as follows: prdti-
padikdHha-nistha-prakdratd-nirupita-visesyatd-sam^baTidhena
sdbdabodham prati visesyatd-sambandhena pratyaya-janyopa-
sthitih kdranam, that is, the remembrance of the meaning of
a suffix by the relation of visesyatd is the cause for a
verbal understanding arising by the relation of visesyatd
described by the prakdratd existing in the meaning of a
nominal stem.
Now, as this generalization does not allow the sentence
Handulah pacati to become grammatically correct, it also
will not allow the relation of the meaning of raja with that
of purusa since the meaning of purusa is not the qualificand
(visesya) remembered from any suffix.
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According to the doctrine of the Grammarians, such a
difficulty will not arise because, according to this
doctrine, the meaning of a nominal stem is always related to
that of a suffix alone and not to another stem-meaning.
Even in the sentence subhrah tandulah, the meaning of the
base subhra is related only to the meaning of the nominative
singular suffix.
Moreover, if the Grammarians were to attempt, as the
Naiyayikas do, to relate the meaning of raja with that of
purusa, by the identity relation, the Naiyayikas should
accept rdjapurusa as a karmadhdraya samasa and not as a
sasthi-tatpurusa. In that case the meaning of the samasta-
pada and the meaning of vigrahavakya (rajnah purusah) will
not match. Likewise, following Gangesa, if one says that
the word raja in this compound can stand for rdjasamhandha,
then the understanding from rdjapurusah should be rajasam-
bandhdbhinna purusah, which is absurd. To avoid all these
unwanted consequences it is wise to accept ekarthibhava.
In addition, in the compound upakumbham, an explanation
stating that the word kumbha can stand for kumbhasamlpa
'near the jar', and that the prefix upa can be treated as a
mere indicator of the speaker's intention, is not proper
either. Only where the indicated meaning is a qualifier,
the remembrance of what is indicated by the prefix upa is
not a qualifier but a qualificand. So the desired under-
standing cannot be obtained from the compound upakumbham if
vyapeksd is accepted.
Furthermore, if a samasa does not have ekarthibhava,
then, in the sentence citragum dnaya 'bring the owner of the
cows that have variegated color', the owner cannot be
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related to the meaning of the accusative case-ending. This
will be the case since a suffix causes the understanding of
its own meaning connected with the meaning of the base to
which it is added. Thus, here the base (prakrti) is
citragu, not go. The meaning of citmgosvami is not the
meaning of the stem go through a vrtti; hence, it is not
possible to relate the meaning of the accusative case-ending
with citragosvamin.
Also, the ekarthlbhava-samarthya must be accepted
because without it the case-ending following the stem
citragu- cannot be justified. If the compound unit citragu-
does not have ekarihibhava, this implies that the unit does
not express any sense as a whole. As a result, it cannot be
- 5
designated as pratipadika, and unless it is so designated
no case-ending can be added to it.
Moreover, unless samdsa-sakti is accepted, even the
yogarudhi word pankaja cannot express lotus in general,
since the constituent words alone can express the meaning
'lotus', that is, 'a flower that grows in the mud'. So the
Naiyayikas need not accept samudaya-sakti here. They need
not argue that, although a lotus growing in the mud can be
understood by the avayava-sakti in each constituent of the
word pankaja-, still, in order to remember the meaning as
lotus (that is, as possessed of "lotusness") it is necessary
to accept samuddya-sakti here also. Like a compound, it is
possible to understand lotus possessed of lotusness from
that word. Thus, as the Naiyayikas accept samudaya-sakti
with the word pankaja, they should accept it also in a
compound form.
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Similarly, unless we accept ekarthtbhava, the order of
the constituents of a compound has no significance. For
instance, there will be no difference in the understandings
arising from the sentence brdhmanah panditah (wherein
pandita is the predicate) and the compound pandita-brdhmana
(in which brdhmana is the predicate). This can be avoided
if we accept samdsa-sakti because in that case we accept the
sakti in the fixed sequence of constituents.
Because of the acceptance of samasa-sakti, the
Mimamsaka's arguments in the case of the interpretation of
prathama-bhaksah in the sentence vasat-kartuh prathama-
bhaksah can be supported. The compound prathama-bhaksa
conveys a single integrated meaning, namely, 'food to be
eaten first', only because there is ekdrthibhdva in it.
But, if vyapeksa is accepted, then prdthamya 'firstness'
cannot be predicated to bhaksa ('eating*) because this would
lead to the fault of eka-prasaratd-bhanga.
If someone utters the sentence rddhasya rdjapurusah with
the intention of conveying 'the man of the king who is
rich', this is not grammatical. But the ungrammaticalness
of such expression can be maintained only if one accepts
ekarthibhava. According to the vyapeksa theory, there is no
difficulty in using the above expression in that sense.
Thus, if rdjapurusa is a single unit, only then can the
meaning 'king' be considered a part of the word-meaning
'king's man'. The relation of the meaning of rddha will not
be possible with 'king' because of the operation of the
generalization, namely, paddrthah paddrthena anveti na
tadekadesena ('the meaning of a word is related to another
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word-meaning and not to a part of it'). This fact also
prompts us to accept the ekdrthibhdva-sdmarthya.
These, in brief, are the arguments of the Grammarians in
favor of accepting the ekdrthihhdva-sdmarthya. Let us now
turn to the reaction of the Naiyayikas.
Par t II: The Naiyayikas' Reply
The Naiyayikas have this to say.
Since there is no means of knowing the ekdrthibhdva-
sdmarthya, it is not proper to postulate innumerable saktis
in innumerable compounds. The Grammarians cannot argue that
Pdnini sutras (cdrthe dvandvah P.2.2.29, etc.) will cause the
knowledge of the like sakti of respective compounds, and
that therefore the Naiyayikas' contention is not true. If
it is accepted that those sutras also express the meaning of
the compound, then obviously it will be a case of vdkyabheda
since the same sutra will assign designation of a compound
and also express the meaning. Moreover, the Grammarians
accept as their siddhdnta that sutras such as cdrthe
dvandvah (P.2.2.29) merely designate a particular compound.
Turning towards the Grammarians' arguments in part I,
the Naiyayikas have the following to submit.
The Grammarians expressed the fear that the word go-, in
the compound citragu, stands for citragosvdmin by laksand.
This need not be true because, in anyapaddrthe vidyamdnam
anekam subantam samasyate, the expression anyapaddrthe
vidyamdnam means 'the causer of the understanding of a third
entity. This is equally applicable to the word extra, so
there are no grounds for fear.
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This contingency is applicable if the Grammarians'
theory of ekdrthxbhdva is accepted because, since the whole
unit citragu- is meaningful, and not an individual constit-
uent, they must accept that the word extra- has no meaning
in isolation. How, then, can they apply the designation
bahuvrxhi to the expression citragu-?
It is also claimed by the Grammarians that, if the word
extra- is treated as indicative of the intention of the
speaker, there will be no compounding at all. But this is
not well thought out. It is a fact that the appearance of
the meaning of the word extra is not caused by the remem-
brance of that meaning from the word extra. Still, the
understanding citrabhinnagosvamx does depend upon the juxta-
position of the words extra and go. Here doubt has no base.
According to the Grammarians, the final phoneme a of the
word ghata will become expressive of ghata if the tdtparya-
grahakatva-theory is accepted. But such a situation will
never arise since the primary relationship of the meaning
'pot' is established with the word ghata, not with a.
Moreover, how can the Grammarians compare the cases of
citragu- and ghata? In the case of citragu-, unless citra-
has meaning it cannot be an indicator of the indicated mean-
ing. But such is not the case with ghata. Here gh, a, and
t are not expressive of any meaning, so how can such a
contingency arise? To the difficulty posed regarding the
compound prdptodakah (gramah), the Naiyayika reply would be
as follows.
According to the Nyaya theory, an indicator of intended
meaning is conceived as that which causes knowledge of the
intended meaning. This, in turn, consists of its indicated
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meaning (sva-bodhya-ghatakartha-ghatitarthe tatparya-
grdhakasya laksaim-tdtparya-grdhakatva-niyamah). This prin-
ciple is applicable also in the case of prdpta. It is not
difficult to demonstrate the relation of the meaning of the
root prap- (namely, prdpti) and that of the past passive
participle -to Cthe agent').
In the case of pancagavadhanah, the Grammarians contend
that there can be no coreferentiality (sdmdnddhikaranya)
between the meaning of pancan and the meaning of go-, and
hence the suffix toe cannot be added. But this is not the
case because the meaning of sdTridnddhikaranya between x and y
is "being the generator of the knowledge of the meaning of x
related with the meaning of y through the relation of iden-
tity." "Being the meaning of y" means "being the locus of
the visayata prompted by the word yP The word extra does
prompt the visayata in the meaning of pancan in the verbal
understanding arising from the compound pancagavadhana.
Here, then, there is no difficulty.
The Grammarians state that, in the compound rdjapurusa-
the meaning of raja (namely, rdjasambandhiri), by laksana,
cannot be related to the meaning of the word purusa by the
relation of identity because, to a verbal understanding in
which the meaning of the stem is the qualifier, the remem-
brance of the meaning of the suffix is the cause. This is
not correct. The worry that, if such a kdryakdranabhava is
not accepted, the understanding tandula-karTnaka-pdkanukula-
krtimdn will arise from the sentence Handulah pacati is
also baseless. Juxtaposition of the word tandulam and the
root pac is in fact the expectancy (dkdnksd), so such an
understanding cannot occur. Hence, the kdryakdrawibhdva is
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unnecessary and there is no difficulty in the case of raja-
purusah.
Also, if one accepts that the meaning of raja- is
related to the meaning of purusa by the identity relation,
then the compound rdjapurusa- should be designated as karma-
dhdraya. But there is no reason to think like that. The
grounds for karmadhdraya is that (without resorting to
laksand) one meaning should be relatable to another by iden-
tity relation. Here the meaning rdjasambandhin is obtained
by laksand, so it cannot be considered a karmadhdraya
compound.
The Grammarians contend that, if raja- stands for
rdjasambandhin-, by laksand, then the meaning of the
compound rdjapurusah and the phrase rdjnah purusah will not
be symmetrical. This is groundless. There is no invariable
rule that the understandings arising from a compound form
and the underlying phrase {vigrahavakya) of that compound
form must be symmetrical. For instance, the understanding
arising from citrah gdvah yasya would be yatsambandhinayah
dtrdbhinna-gdvah. From citraguh the understanding will
arise as citrdbhinnagosanibandht (yah). This change in
qualifier and qualificand is unavoidable.
Moreover, how will the Grammarians apply their rule in
the case of the formation of the word Vaiydkarana? This
word is derived from the underlying sentence vydkaranam
adhite, which will result in the understanding (caitra-)
kartrka-vydkarana-karmaka-adhyayanam. But, from the complex
form Vaiydkarana- the understanding will be vydkaranddhya-
yana-kartr-. Naturally, the structure of the verbal under-
standing arising from a complex form need not be identical
220
with that of the phrase or sentence underlying that complex
form.
The Grammarians argue that, if by laksana, the element
raja- stands for rajasambandha, as Gangesa suggests, it
should be related to the meaning of purusa by identity rela-
tion, and that this is absurd. Such a claim is not proper.
If it were the case, the normal understanding will be
rajasambandhavan purusah. Of course, the general rule
namarihayoh bhedena anvaya-bodha-sthale vihhakty-arthopa-
sthitih karanam will have the same restrictions in the case
of compounds.
As a matter of fact, if this restriction is accepted,
there is no need to resort to laksana at all in the case of
tajapurusa. We can easily understand it as rajanirupita-
svatva-van purusah.
Likewise, the Grammarians think that, simply because the
Naiyayikas hold that in the compound upakumhham the word
kumbha itself stands for kumbha-samipa, by laksana, and that
upa is merely an indicator of the speaker's intended sense,
it will violate the rule dyotyartha-visesanaka-sabdabodham
prati dyotyaHhopasthitih karanam. This is mistaken. 0ne
cannot generalize such a rule since it will not work in the
case of pratisthate. Here the root stha means 'absence of
movement', the prefix pra indicates movement, and the indi-
cated movement appears in the understanding as the qualifi-
cand. Similarly, there is no difficulty if samipya, indi-
cated by upa, appears as the qualificand.
The contention that, unless samasa-sakti is accepted, the
meaning of the accusative case-ending cannot be related to
the meaning of citragu- in the sentence dtragum anaya, is
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not proper. The Naiyayikas accept that a suffix causes an
understanding of its own meaning as connected with the mean-
ing of the base. In the present case, the word go is the
base; hence, there is no difficulty in obtaining the said
relationship.
The argument that, unless ekarthlbhava is accepted, a
compound form cannot achieve the designation pratipadtka-,
and that as a result no case-ending can be added to a
compound form, is also without foundation. The word
arthavat-, in the sutra: arthavad adhatuh apratyayah
pratipadikam P. 1.2.45, is accepted to stand for vrttimad-a-
visayaka-pratity-avisaya by laksana, which means "not being
an object of an understanding that does not have anything
that has vrtti" Naturally, both (that which has vrtti and
that which consists of that which has vrtti) are included
under the domain of pratipadika, so there is no difficulty
of justifying the designation of pratipadika in the case of
compounds.
If this explanation is not acceptable, the Naiyayikas
suggest that the designation of pratipadika can be derived
from the next rule of Panini, namely, krt-taddhita-samasas
ca P. 1.2.46. It should be noted that Panini, after declar-
ing the designation of pratipadika for a meaningful sequence
that is neither a root nor a suffix, extends the designation
separately to complex forms such as primary derivatives,
secondary derivatives, and compounds. This in itself indi-
cates that Panini does not consider a complex form as having
any vrtti over and above the vrtti for the constituents of
the complex forms.
The attempt to pose a problem in the case of the word
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pankaja (by considering it a complex form) will not be
successful. For remembering the flower as a lotus, it is
necessary to resort to samwdaya-sakti. One cannot look to
the laksana for help here because, unless the entire expres-
sion pankaja has primary relation (sakti), it cannot have
secondary relationship. Therefore, the suggestion that
samasasakti be accepted on a par with the word pankaja is
not acceptable.
Another reason proposed for the acceptance of
ekarthlbhava is the fixed order of the members of a com-
pound, giving rise to a fixed structure of subject and
predicate, as in the case of pandita-brahinariah and brdhmanah
panditah. This is invalid. If separately remembered mean-
ings are grounds for the formation of a structure of the
qualifier-qualificand type, then (as in the case of the word
hart-) ten remembered meanings would all be related as the
qualifier and the qualificand. This is absurd. Thus, the
intention of the speaker always determines the subject and
the predicate, and there is no need for ekarthlbhava.
Similarly, in explaining the prathamya-visista-vidhana
in the Vedic sentence vasatkartuh pmthamabhaksah, the
Grammarians plead for the acceptance of samasasakti. This
is not necessary. Ekaprasaratabhanga here means "not having
the capacity on the part of the constituent elements of the
compound to cause the understanding in a fixed order of
subject and predicate." As noted above, such an understand-
ing depends upon knowledge of akanksa and tdtparya, so there
is no need to accept samasasakti at all.
Finally, the Naiyayikas point out that, if ekarthlbhava
is accepted in the case of compounds, compounds such as
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sasasrnga will not get the designation pratipadika, accord-
ing to the theory of the Grammarians, since there is no
meaning to that compound. No such difficulty arises in the
Naiyayika's theory since we know that, even if a compound is
denied ekarthihhava-samarthya, the pratipadika-samjna can
easily be given to it by the rule krt-taddhita-samasas ca.
If the Grammarians wish to justify their position by
accepting a conceptual meaning (hatcddhartha) of sasasrnga,
they will not succeed because the Naiyayikas have already
criticized and refuted the existence of any conceptual
meaning.
From all this it is clear that the Naiyayikas do not
need ekarthihhava-samarthya in compounds. Even without
accepting this, they can explain the proper understanding
arising from a particular compound form.
Par t Ills Analysis and Conclusions
By now we are fully acquainted with the respective posi-
tions of the Grammarians and the Naiyayikas on the issue of
ekarthihhava and vyapeksa. The entire issue can be reformu-
lated as follows.
If the sequence xy is a compound in which x has a rela-
tion with its meaning (say, x')f and y also has a relation
with its meaning (say, yf), then is it necessary to postu-
late another relationship for the entire sequence xy? "Yes"
is the answer of the Grammarians and "no" is the answer of
the Naiyayikas.
Before advocating either side, let us analyze the situa-
tion further. It seems to be a general assumption on the
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part of the Grammarians that the meaning of the underlying
phrase and the meaning of the corresponding compound form
should be identical. Naturally, rajnah purusah and
rajapurasah have identical meanings but the difference
between these two expressions is that, while the relation
between the king and the man is expressed by the genitive
ending (-as) in the expression rajnah purusah, the same
relation is expressed by the compound form rajapurusah even
after deletion of the genitive suffix. In other words, to
determine the meaning of the deleted element expressed by
the compound, the Grammarians consider it necessary to
postulate ekarthibhava-samarthya in the whole sequence
rajapurusah. The test seems to be as follows.
If the sum of the meanings of x and y is not equal to
the meaning of xy, then it is necessary to postulate an
independent relationship between the meaning of xy and the
compound xy. In other words, if xy expresses (xy)\ which
is not merely xf + y' (where x' is the meaning of x, and y'
is the meaning of y), then there must be a separate relation
between xy and (xy)\
This is a very reasonable stand on the part of the
Grammarians, and, in fact, this criterion decides and justi-
fies a compound entry in any dictionary, too. But the real
question is: if it is possible to show that xy expresses xy
+ y\ is there any reason why one should attempt to postu-
late an extra relationship since it would be unnecessary and
hence redundant? In other words, if raja~(x), in the
compound rajapuncsa (xy), can express rajasambandhin (x')9
and if purusa-(y) expresses purusa 'man' (y')> and if
rajapuTasah (xy) conveys rajasambandhi purusah (x' + y'), it
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is clear that xy expresses x' + y\ In that case, it is a
matter of logical parsimony (laghava) on the part of the
Naiyayikas, who reject the proposal of the Grammarians.
But the question still remains unanswered: How can the
element raja- express rdjasambandhin? The Naiyayikas'
answer is very simple. They accept two relations between a
linguistic element and its meaning, namely, samketa or sakti
- ' 7
'primary relation', and laksana 'secondary relation'.
Thus, by laksana one can obtain the meaning of raja- as
rajasamhandhin. Of course, one can challenge the acceptance
of laksana itself. Needless to say, the Naiyayikas have met
that challenge also. But for want of space I will not go
into that now. I shall present the Naiyayikas' position on
laksana on another occasion.
I would like to point out in this connection that the
rejection of ekarthibhava by the Naiyayikas is based on an
epistemological and logical point of view. The questions of
whether the paraphrasing of the expression samarthya as
ekarthibhava and vyapeksa is right or wrong, and whether the
rule samarthah padavidhih (P.2.1.1) is an adhikara sutra or
a parihhasa, axe not examined here.
Finally, I would like to point out that the entire
dialogue between the Grammarians and the Naiyayikas is based
upon certain fixed assumptions. One is the maxim ananya-
labhyah sabdarthah, which decides what could be considered
as the expressed meaning of a morpheme. According to this
maxim, the expressed meaning of a morpheme is 'that which is
not obtained in any other way\
Furthermore, a padartha is defined by the Navya
Naiyayikas as vrtya pada-pratipadya eva padarthah ity
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ahhidhiyate, and vrtti stands for samketa and laksana both.
Naturally, rajasambandhin obtained from the word raja- by
laksana is a padartha.
Another assumption is the correspondence between mean-
ings known from compounded expressions and uncompounded ones
such as rajapumsa and rajnah purusah. Here the Gram-
marians apparently have assumed that the structure of the
verbal understanding arising from a compound should match
that of the underlying uncompounded phrase. The Naiyayikas
point out, in rebuttal, that there are no grounds for
generalizing this assumption universally. The qualifier-
qualificand structure (visesya-visesanabhava) may vary from
case to case. Nevertheless, the total meaning intended by
the speaker would remain the same.
Other, similar assumptions are made by the Grammarians,
some of them technical and others analytical, for example,
the karyakaranabhava and the theory of the root meaning
being the prime qualificand in verbal understanding
(dhMv-artha-mukhya-visesyaka-sabda-bodhah). Such assump-
tions of a particular school of thought impose restrictions
on its line of argument. The Naiyayikas, as is demonstrated
in part II, have questioned some of these assumptions and
9
have shown that they need review. An impartial judgment is




1. Kaiyata defines it as yatra paddni upasarjantbhuta-
svdrthdni nivrtta-svdrthdni va pradhdndrthopaddnat
vyarthani arthdntardbhidhdytni va sa ekarthtbhavah. In
other words, ekdrthtbhdva is that (process) in which the
constituent words (of a compound) have their meanings
either subordinated or lost, and have either become
redundant, by adopting a (different) primary sense, or
convey a sense other than their own sense. For a better
paraphrase, see S. D. Joshf s English translation of
Pataiijalf s Vyakarana Mahabhasya (SaTnarthahnika) (Pune:
University of Poona, 1968), pp. 8-9. To be precise,
ekdrthibhava can be defined as visesya-visesana-
bhdvavagahy-ekopasthiti-janakatvam (Nyayakosa, by
Bhimacarya Jhalklkar, Bombay Sanskrit Series, No. 49
[Bombay: 1893. Third ed., 1928], p. 71), that is,
"being the producer of a remembrance in which the mean-
ings of a complex formation appear as qualifier and
qualified."
2. Kaiyata's definition of vyapeksd is paraspardkdnksd-
rupd vyapeksd, that is, vyapeksd is of the form of
mutual expectancy (between two words conveying their
meaning separately). To be exact, vyapeksd can be
defined as paraspara-nirupya-nirupaka-hhavapanTia-
visayatd-prayojakatve sati ekarthopasthitya janakatvam
(Nyayakosa, p. 971), that is, "being the prompter of the
visayatds, which are mutual describers of each other,
and at the same time not being the producer of the
remembrance of a single integrated meaning."
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3. I have benefitted immensely from the English translation
of the SamartKahnika of Patanjali's Mahdbhdsya (on
P.2.1.1) by Professor S. D. Joshi (Pune: C.A.S.S.,
University of Poona, 1968).
4. Cf. Panini 5.4.92 (gor ataddhitaluki).
5. A pratipadika is defined as arthavad adhatur apratyayah
pratipadikam (P. 1.2.45).
6. Ekaprasaratd-bhanga is a fault. It has two meanings:
(1) vakyabheda^ and (2) change of sequence in the under-
standing of the predicate and the predicated. Thus, the
sentence vasat-kartuh prathama-bhaksah should be inter-
preted as (1) 'the hotr should eat camasa', and (2) 'he
should eat first'. This is a fault of vakyabheda.
According to the second interpretation of the fault,
from the sequence prathama hhaksa, the knowledge of the
vidheya (namely, of prdthamya) arises first; that of
uddesya (namely, bhaksa) arises later. Hence, a fault.
See Arthasamgraha (Marathi translation), by S. M. Paran-
jape (Bombay: Nirnayasagara Press, 1927), p. 194.
7. Sanketo laksana ca arthe padavrttih, Saktivdda, by
Gadadhara, with commentary, Adarsa, by Sudarsanacarya
Sastrf (Bombay: Sri Venkatesvara Press, 1923), p. 1.
8. Saktivada, p. 2.
9. The position of other types of complex formations, such
as primary derivatives, secondary derivatives, denomina-
tives, etc., has not been analyzed here.
10. I am indebted to my guru, Pandit T. S. Srinivasa Sastri,
for inspiring this paper.
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PARTS OF SPEECH IN PANINI
Dinabandhu Kar
Parts of speech deal with the division of words into
certain classes such as substantives, adjectives, pronouns,
adverbs, and verbs. Works on grammar often give definitions
of these classes but it is not always clear whether this
division of words into various groups is based on considera-
tions of form, meaning, or syntactic function.
Panini knew this illogical nature of parts of speech, so
he does not go deeply into their precise nature in his
grammar. He divides words (pada) into two classes,
suhantas, those which end in case-inflections, and tinantas,
those which end in personal endings. Subanta words, on
formal consideration, can be further subdivided into two
groups, avyayas, those which are indeclinables, and an-
avyayas, those which are not indeclinables. Indeclinables
are subdivided into two groups, svaradi and nipatas.
Nipata, in its turn, consists of cadi, upasargas, gatis, and
karmapravacaniyas. Under this formal description, a parti-
cular item can belong to more than one subcategory. For
instance, anu in anu-gacchati is called pada as it takes
hypothetical case-ending su, which is subsequently deleted
according to P.2.4.82. Thus, it is a subanta. Again, it is
an avyaya as it comes under nipatas according to P. 1.1.37.
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It is an upasarga as it is enumerated in the pradi gana and
is connected with the verb gacchati according to P. 1.459.
It is also called gati according to P. 1.4.60. Semantically,
it is called asattvavacana as it refers to abstract meaning.
Formally, it does not vary in number, gender, or case.
Tinanta words denote action and can be subdivided into
three classes under syntactic considerations. These divi-
sions are JcaHaH, karmani, and bhdve (P.3.4.69). Verbs
that denote active sense belong to the first group, while
those conveying passive sense belong to the second category.
Intransitive verbs denote bhava 'state' in impersonal
passive.
All of this concerns formal classification. The reason
for leaning heavily on formal considerations is that mean-
ing, though most important, is also the most difficult cate-
gory to deal with satisfactorily in any system. So Panini,
realizing this inherent difficulty, avoids as far as possi-
ble the grouping of words on purely semantic grounds for his
grammatical theory. The classification of formal categories
is theoretical in his system but the semantic categories in
it are considered primitive. Hence, though these semantic
categories are not defined in his grammar, they are taken as
the basis on which the system of formal classification is
built.
Semantic definitions of parts of speech presuppose the
possibility of identifying entities, qualities, actions,
states, or processes. Panini took all of them into consi-
deration while writing his grammar because he could not deal
with semantic categories without the assumption of entities,
qualities, etc., as they exist in the external world. The
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external world consists of a number of these individual
objects, class entities, states, qualities, and processes,
and language is meant to represent them in one way or
another in communication. Language must establish ways and
means to represent these various factors through its vocabu-
lary, which is, of course, limited compared to the actual
entities of the outside world. Therefore, some sort of
hierarchical relationship should be assumed among these
entities so that basic and secondary semantic features can
be established, features that will later be expressed by the
vocables of the language concerned. Consequent upon this
stand, the Astadhyayl provides the following classifica-
tions.
(i) Dravyavacana or Ekasesa
These terms are taken to stand for such first-order
entities as individualized objects, things, or persons. For
instance, the word gauh 'cow* in the expression gauh carati
'the cow is grazing*, or gandhah 'smell' in the expression
tlvrah gandhah 'this strong smell', are dravyavacana terms,
as they stand for individualized objects to which qualities
can be ascribed. They do not refer to abstract entities.
Panini prescribes the ekasesa operation in connection with
these dravyavacana words.
(il) Jativacana
Jativacana terms refer to the distinction between refer
ence to individual object and class entities in general.
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They are common nouns that stand for objects in general and
refer to entities divested of individual characteristics.
Thus gauh 'cow* will be considered a jativacana word when it
is applied to any cow, whether black, white, or variegated.
From the grammatical point of view, Panini uses the term
jati for specific operations that are not applicable to
proper names. Words of this variety refer to first-order
entities because, in this case also, they describe concrete
things.
(iil) Bhavavacana vs. Kriyavacana
Bhavavacana words refer to states, whereas kriyavacana
or karmavacana words refer to process or happening. This
distinction is also applicable in the case of verbs. For
instance, gotvam refers to a state, whereas hrahmanyam
refers to a process or happening associated with Brdhmana 'a
brahmin'. Similarly, the verb asti refers to a state,
whereas karoti refers to a process. Words of these types
stand for second-order entities that are slightly more
abstract than first-order entities because, though they are
connected with concrete objects, they are not as tangible as
the objects with which they are connected.
There is no word for "noun class" in the Astadhyayi but
entities belonging to the first and second orders may be
roughly called nouns. The term visesya, which some think is
2
equivalent to noun, is actually not equivalent. Panini




The term gunavacana stands for modifiers of the dravya
vacana class. Patanjali calls them guiwpasarjana dravya
'substance to which qualities are subordinated'. They can
be called, roughly, qualitative adjectives. Some can func-
tion semantically as adverbs also. For example, in uccaih
pathati 'reads loudly, ucca 'high' is an adverb, whereas in
uccaih grhani 'high mansions', it is an adjective. These
gunavacana words describe qualities of nouns and when they
are adverbially used they modify an action. But there is no
evidence to show that Panini meant the term gunavacana to
include adverbs.
(v) Sarvanaman
Words of this class are not semantically defined in
Panini's system. Scrutiny of sarvadi gana, which is called
sarvanaman in the Astadhyayl, leads us to the conclusion
that these words are either determiners or qualifiers. The
demonstrative pronouns sah, yah, ay am, etc., determine their
reference to be definite, whereas pronouns like sarva,
visva, kali, etc., are quantifiers as they determine the
size of the reference in question. The personal pronouns
yusmad, asmad, and tad determine the person of the verb as
speaker, spoken to, or spoken about. These pronominal-class




Samkhya 'numerals' are regarded as classifiers and they
indicate the number of entities being referred to. Words
like eka 'one', dvi 'two', and bahu 'many are singulari-
zing, dualizing, and pluralizing classifiers. Panini has
indirectly referred to their semantic features by such rules
as samkhyayah gunasya nimane mayat (P.5.2.47).
(vii) Adverbs
Adverbs have no corresponding term in the Astadhyayi.
Panini regards them as avyayas and usually lists them in the
svaradi class. They also include adverbial compounds
treated in the avyaylbhava compound section. Krt adverbs
and taddhita adverbs are also treated as avyayas (P. 1.1.38-
41). Not a single, specific, semantic feature can be
ascribed to all of them. There are adverbs of degree such
as atyantam and adhikam; adverbs of manner such as tusnlm
and dram; adverbs of time such as kada9 yada, and tada; and
adverbs of place such as yatra, tatra, and kutra. The
semantic function of adverbs is evaluation of action. So,
in a sense, they are gunavacana words, as they describe the
qualities of verbal action. They are asattvavacana because
they do not speak about the features of an observable
entity. Since kriya is a process, it cannot be observed as
a whole.
Nipatas are also called asattvavacana (P. 1.4.57). Mean-
ing denoted by them cannot be said to occur as a participant
in action. All the preverbs, prepositions and postpositions
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come under nipata. Avyaya is a wider term, which includes
all nipatas and items found in the svaradi list.
To conclude this discussion, there are basically two
classes of parts of speech, the "major" and the "minor/' in
Paninf s system. The major class includes words that refer
to the first- or second-order entities. The characteristic
feature of the.major class is that the items included under
it enter into syntactical relations with verbs. This class
includes substantives, adjectives, pronouns, etc. The minor
class constitutes indeclinables such as adverbs mentioned in
the svaradi list, particles (cadi), preverbs (upasargas),
prepositions (gatis) and postpositions (karmapravacantyas).
The distinguishing feature of this class is that items
included in it are asattvavacanas since they do not refer to
concrete objects.
Another interesting feature of both classes is that
items in the major class are always inflected words, whereas
items in the minor class are not inflected forms in Paninf s
system of description. Thus, we see a sort of correspon-
dence between the syntactic and semantic functions of items
described by Panini. This correspondence is found in a
majority of cases. Therefore, it will not be an exaggera-
tion to assert that Panini, in his description of parts of
speech, followed a consistent plan and accordingly used




1. For a detailed discussion, see Dinabandhu Kar, "Semantic
















































































This is Panini's aksarasamamnaya, the enumeration and
grouping of the sounds of Sanskrit popularly called the
Sivasutras (or Mahesvarasutras). The Sivasutras form an
indispensable part of the grammar, and their structure is
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thoroughly intertwined with, and determined by, that of the
Astadhyayl. Abbreviations (pratyaharas) are defined on the
Sivasutras and other similarly organized lists by the con-
vention that if x is followed in the list by the marker Q,
then x Q denotes the set of elements x , x -, . . . x .
The phonological classes defined in this way are referred to
in hundreds of rules in the Astadhyayl.
Both traditional and modern discussions of the Siva-
sutras recognize that their structure is motivated in large
part by the fundamental principle of economy (simplicity,
laghava), which governs Panini's entire grammatical system.
The reasoning from economy goes like this. To be grouped
together in a pratyahara, sounds must make up a continuous
segment of the list. Economy requires making the list as
short as possible, which means avoiding repetitions of
sounds, and using as few markers as possible. Consequently,
if class A properly includes class B, the elements shared
with B should be listed last in A; the marker that follows
can then be used to form pratyaharas for both A and B. In
this way the economy principle, by selecting the shortest
grammar, determines both the ordering of sounds and the
placement of markers among them.
For example, the order of simple vowels at the beginning
of the Sivasutras (see the first two rows of [1]) is con-
strained by the fact that the grammar must refer to the
following groupings of them:
[2] 1. a, i, u, f> I (=
2. i, u, r9 I r= iK)
2
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3. u, r, (I) r= uK)3
4. a, i, ^ (= aN)
which, by the reasoning of the preceding paragraph, requires
the partial ordering
[3] a < i < u < r, I
and markers after u and after the liquids.
Much of the structure of the Sivasutras has been suc-
cessfully explained by this kind of reasoning from economy
(Faddegon 1929, Thieme 1935, Staal 1962, Cardona 1969). But
there remains a substantial residue where economy is at
first sight not at stake. For example, the order of r and I
in row 2 could be reversed without complicating the grammar
because every pratyahara needed in the grammar that includes
one of them can also include the other. The same is true of
5
e and o in the next row. The systematic character of
Paninf s grammar makes it likely that there is a rational
basis for the order of these elements as well-but what?
Staal (1962) and Cardona (1969) have each suggested such
a rational basis for the cases that are not explained by
economy. Staal's idea is that among alternative, equally
simple orderings, that of the previous set of homorganic
elements is given preference. Though Staal does not
actually discuss the vowels, his proposal would readily
explain the order e, o as continuing the order i, u of the
first row.
Cardona argues instead that some aspects of the
Sivasutras reflect the strictly phonetic arrangement of the
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Pratisakhyas that served Panini as a starting point. This
was modified as necessary by inserting markers into it and
by reordering its elements, and otherwise retained. On this
view, the iSivasutras' order e, o would simply reflect the
order of the traditional listing e, at, o, an. So Cardona,
too, appeals to a notion of continuity, only his continuity
is historical rather than structural and system-internal, as
Staal's is.
However, neither of these accounts, or even the two of
them together, can be the whole story. For example, the
order of r and I in row 2 cannot be carried over from
o o
previous homorganic sounds in the list, for there are none.
And it cannot be carried over from the Pratisakhyas' sound
n
lists, because they did not include L
In this paper I argue that the structure of the Siva-
sutras follows entirely from the principles used in the
construction of Panini's grammar. This is because the prin-
ciple of economy and the logic of the special case and the
general case (samanya I visesa) applies in the construction
of the metalanguage as well as in the formulation of the
grammatical rules. As we have seen, the groupings of sounds
needed for the grammar induce a set of partial ordering
constraints on their listing. We will now show that these
ordering constraints, when formulated in accordance with
Paninian principles of economy and generalization, have as
their unique solution the Sivasutras.
In order to develop this idea, we must spell out exactly
how economy figures in Panini's system and how it is related
to generalization.
242
Cardona (1969, 28, 30, 41) argues that economy for
Panini is "consequent on generalization": "the analysis of
linguistic materials in order to formulate generalized rules
is Panini's way of achieving economy (laghava)" I think
this view-which I thoughtlessly endorsed in Kiparsky (1979,
227)~is not correct. It is certainly not true that Panini
8avoids prolixity only where generalization is at stake.
The rules of the Astadhyayl systematically maximize economy,
whether or not this leads to generalization in any given
case. Anuvrtti often ranges over entirely disparate rules,
in which case it achieves economy but not generalization
(Staal 1970, 503). Indeed, some means of concision system-
atically employed in the grammar are never "consequent on
generalization." For example, whenever Panini can compress
phrases into compounds, he invariably does so, even though
this achieves nothing beyond the saving of syllables. This
is true even for compounds that are not derived from
analytic expressions but are simply alternative expressions
of the same semantic content, namely dvandvas and bdhu-
wthis. The vowels of a given quality are invariably
denoted by their short representative, even though by
Paninfs sdvarnya convention (1.1.69) the long one would
have done as well. S. D. Joshi (voce) has brought to my
attention the striking fact that Panini even tends to order
the words in a rule in such a way that the number of sylla-
9
bles in it will be minimized by sandhi.
Still, this does not mean that Panini is after economy
for its own sake. The reverse of Cardona's formulation does
hold: economy is Panini's way of achieving generalization.
More precisely, the maximization of economy is what ensures
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that the generalizations will emerge in the grammar. This
can be concluded from the fact that Panini introduces abbre-
viatory conventions into his metalanguage if, and only if,
they make it possible to bring out significant generaliza-
tions in the grammar. So the theoretical goal of generali-
zation is implemented by seeking the most economical
description possible in the framework of an appropriately
constructed metalanguage of grammatical description. The
economy requirement works "blindly" in the service of this
global objective, and is not expected to yield generaliza-
tions in each local instance.
In consequence of its purely formal nature, the economy
principle typically leads to vacuous overgeneralization.
Simplification is mandatory even if it means extending the
conditions of a rule to cases that can never arise. But
(and equally importantly) overgeneralized formulations are
only chosen where economy requires it. Among a set of
equally simple formulations covering all the cases, Panini
chooses the most restrictive one. There are, then, two
principles at work, which, tending in opposite directions,
fix the form of the grammar: the dominant principle that the
most economical formulation is preferred, and the subsidiary
principle that among equally simple formulations the most
restrictive is preferred.
These principles govern all aspects of the system,
including the use of pratyaharas. Some examples follow.
Rule 8.4.53 [4] illustrates overgeneralization enforced
by economy. Since h does not cluster with stops, the more
restrictive jhaR (stops and fricatives) could have been used
instead of jhaL (stops, fricatives, and h) in rule 8.4.53.
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Economy, however, forces jhaL because it is carried over by
anuvrtti into the next rule, 8.4.54 [5], where it is abso-
lutely necessary:
[4] 8.4.53 jhalam jas jhasi 'obstruents (jhaL) are
replaced by voiced unaspirated stops (jaS) before
voiced stops (jhaS)9
[5] 8.4.54 abhyase car ca (53 jhalam jas) 'in
reduplication, (obstruents) are replaced by
(voiced unaspirated stops) and by voiceless
unaspirated segments (caRJ
Similarly, the class yaN (y, v, r, I) is specified as the
prevocalic replacement of the single root iN 'go' in 6.4.81
ino yan, where obviously the more specific y would have done
equally well. The reason is that yaN is continued into the
more general rules that follow (6.4.82 through 6.4.87),
where its extra coverage becomes functional. Examples of
this type can easily be multiplied.
Among equally economical formulations, the most restric-
tive is chosen. For example,
[6] 7.4.61 sarpurvah khayah (60 sesah) 'unvoiced
stops (khaY) after fricatives saR remain'
which states that fricative + stop clusters are exceptions
to the general rule deleting all but the first consonant in
reduplication, could have been vacuously generalized to
apply after the more inclusive set of sounds saL (s, s, s,
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h) rather than after just the fricatives, for h never
clusters with stops. Panini has chosen the more specific
formulation of the rule, which only extends to the actually
occurring cases. Similarly,
[7] 8.3.33 maya uno vo va (32 act) 'uN is optionally
replaced by v between m, n, n, n (maY) and a vowel
or diphthong (aC)'
specifies maY, which includes m, n, n, n rather than naY
(n, m, n, n, ri), even though the overgeneralization would
have been harmless, as n does not occur in word-final
position.
All these principles hold equally well for the construc-
tion of the metalanguage. Technical terms are never intro-
duced solely for brevity's sake. Their purpose is rather to
allow the rules of the grammar to express significant
generalizations. But, if Panini needs to coin a new word
for this purpose anyway, he makes it maximally short,
usually no more than a mora (cf. such cover terms as bha,
ghu, ghi, ti and abstract underlying forms of the type yu,
vu, jhi, v, I, cli). And nothing in the metalanguage is
motivated solely for the purpose of avoiding vacuous over-
generalization. Specifically, no markers in the Sivasutras
are introduced merely to avoid overgeneral pratyaharas. For
example, uK in 7.2.11 includes u, r, I but since there are
no roots in I the last case never arises. A pratydhara that
excludes it, however, would require a new marker and in the
absence of positive motivation such a marker is not put in.
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Given the subgroupings that the grammar must refer to,
these considerations alone dictate the organization of the
Sivasutras. This will now be shown.
The complex vowels and diphthongs e, o, ai, au must be
placed immediately after the simple vowels because of the
groupings
12[8] 1. a, i, u, r, I, e, o, ai, au (= aC)
° ° 13
2. i, u, r, I, e, o, ai, au (= iC)
3. e, o, ai, au (= eC)
15
4. ai, au (= aiC)
5. e, o r= eN)16
The semivowels must be grouped with the vowels into
[9] 1. y, v, r, I r= yaN)17
2. a, i, u, r, I, e, o, ai, au, h, y, v, r, I
1 83. i, u, r, I, e, o, ai, au, h, y, v, r, I
r= i 1 9
4. a, i, u, r, I, e, o, ai, au, h, y, v, r
(- af/20°
and with the other consonants into
21[10] 1. h, y, v, r, I plus consonants (= hah)
22
2. y, v, r, I plus consonants (- yaR)
23
3. v, r, I plus consonants (= vaL)
4. r, I plus consonants (= raL)
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Together, [8], [9], and [10] yield, in addition to confirma-
tion for a < i in [3], the new ordering constraints
[11] 1. h < y < v < r < I
2. simple vowels < complex vowels, diphthongs <
semivowels
So far, this adds up to:
[12] 1. The simple vowels must be listed together.
2. The complex vowels (e, o) must be listed
together.
3. The diphthongs (at, an) must be listed
together.
4. The semivowels must be listed together.
5. Simple vowels, complex vowels, diphthongs, and
semivowels must be listed together.
6. The order of the series must be: simple vowels
< complex vowels, diphthongs < semivowels.
7. Within the vowels, the order must be: a < i <
u < r, I.
o ' o
8. Within the semivowels, the order must be: h <
y < v < r < I.
Note that the order within both vowels and semivowels in
[12-7, 12-8] coincides almost completely with the "sonority
hierarchy" assumed by modern phonologists and phoneticians.
Although no such hierarchy was to my knowledge ever expli-
citly proposed in India, it emerges here as a by-product, as
248
it were, of Panini's purely distributional analysis of
Sanskrit phonology.
An equally remarkable outcome is that, in terms of place
of articulation, the ordering of vowels in [12-7] is fully
consistent with the ordering of the corresponding semivowels
in [12-8]. In this case, of course, Panini must have been
well aware of the phonetic classification behind the corres-
pondence. However, the fact that it emerges from the
distributional analysis is still significant. It shows
that, even if Panini had begun with altogether different
assumptions, or with none at all, he would still have come
up with a parallel arrangement of vowels and semivowels.
Because the ordering constraints [3, 11-1] are subjected
to the same logic of generalization as everything else in
25
the system, they are combined and generalized to:
[13] velars/pharyngeals < palatals < labials < retro-
flexes < dentals
The generalized ordering constraint [13] fixes the so
far indeterminate order of the syllabic liquids r, I, the
complex vowels e, o, and the diphthongs ai, au.
The ordering of e, o before at, au is dictated by
simplicity because it allows a shorter pratyahara for the
class e, o, ai, au, viz. eC (rather than *aift).












The groupings in [15] require, by the same reasoning as
above, that the nasals and voiced stops come next in that
order. They are demarcated by M, S, respectively, giving
the pratyaharas
[15] 1. vowels, diphthongs, semivowels, nasals, voiced
stops (aS)26
2. semivowels, nasals, voiced stops (kaS)
- 28
3. v, r, I, nasals, voiced stops (vaS)
4. voiced stops jhaS
29
5. vowels, diphthongs, semivowels, nasals (aM)
30
6. y, v, r, I, nasals (yaM)
Notice that the previously seen subdivisions of the semi-
vowels reappear in va§ and yaM, reaffirming [11] and the
generalized [13].
The voiceless stops and the fricatives must follow, in
that order, with the marker Y after the former, to give the
groupings
[16] 1. y, v, r9 I, nasals, voiced stops, voiceless
stops (yaY)31
322. nasals, voiced stops, voiceless stops (maY)
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33
3. voiced stops, voiceless stops (jhaY)
4. voiceless stops (JchaY)
and with the marker R after the latter, to give
[17] 1. y, v, r, I, nasals, voiced stops, voiceless
stops, fricatives (yaR)
2. voiced stops, voiceless stops, fricatives
(jhaR)36
37
3. voiceless stops, fricatives (khaR)
oo
4. fricatives (saR)
Within the voiceless stops, aspirated stops precede unaspi-
rated stops in order to allow the latter to be grouped with
39the fricatives (caR). The same order is motivated in the
voiced stops by the fact that bh patterns with the sonorants
(yaN), on which see below.
The consonant h, already listed as the first of the
semivowels, must be listed a second time at the end of the
Sivasutras because it must also be included in two sets of
groups: among the obstruents (haL) and the fricatives (saL),
as well as in the classes vaL and raL mentioned above. This
is the only repetition necessary in the system.
In sum, the order of the series must be
[18] nasals < voiced aspirates < voiced unaspirates <
voiceless aspirates < voiceless unaspirates <
fricatives < h
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If we now arrange the series of consonants according to
[18], put the consonants within each series according to
place of articulation according to [13], and add pratyaharas


































from which the arrangement of the actual Sivasutras can be
derived by the minimal local modifications needed for conso-
nantal pratyaharas as follows.
The three nasals n, n, n must be grouped together as a
class, which figures in
[20] 8.3.32 narno hrasvdd act namun nityam 'after a
pada ending in nam preceded by a short vowel and
followed by a vowel or diphthong (aC), [the
initial augment] nam is obligatorily inserted'
Theoretically, the palatal nasal n could be included in naMy
too, because palatals cannot occur at the end of a pada, as
noted at [7]. Hence there are two possible specific
(visesa) ordering constraints for nasals that could override
the general (samanya) ordering constraint [13]:
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[21] 1. ii, m < n
2. m < n, fi
These alternatives can be visualized as rearrangements of
[13] by moving either the velar to the right after the
labial or the labial leftward to the beginning of its row.
As far as the rules of the grammar are concerned, there is
no difference in simplicity between the two; both differ
from the general place-ordering constraint [13] in the
minimal possible way.
Panini's choice of [21-1] over [21-2] is justified by
two independent considerations involving, respectively, the
subsidiary principle and the dominant principle stated
above. The first is that vacuous overgeneralization is
avoided. On the second alternative, naM would include not
only n, n, n but vacuously also n. Therefore, the first,
which is equally simple but allows a more restrictive formu-
lation, is preferred.
The second reason for choosing [21-1] is that it gener-
alizes to both the aspirated and unaspirated series of
voiced stops in a desirable way. First, the order corres-
ponding to [21-1] yields classes that exclude the palatal
stops required for the "Grassmann's Law" alternations
{budh-s — > bhut-s), in which jh, j do not participate
(jabh-s -> japs) (8.2.37). If [21-1] is extended to
nasals, these classes can be designated as bas, bhas.
Doing this by [21-1] (rather than, for example, simply
placing the palatals in front) has the additional advantage
of restricting yaN. This pratyahara, which defines the
environment for stem-final lengthening (7.3.101, 102), must
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cover n, m, y, bh but could be allowed to include vacuously
gh (and, indeed, all the voiced aspirates except dh). By
generalizing [21-1] from nasals to the voiced aspirates, the
vacuous overgeneralization is reduced to the necessary
minimum (jh).
So the optimal special (visesa) ordering constraint,
superseding the general [13], is
[22] palatals < labials < velars
(for voiced consonants)
Could [22] be generalized even further, to all the
consonants? The answer is no. In the two voiceless stop
series, the coronal consonants eh, th, th, c, t, t must be
grouped together. This requires the special ordering
[23] kh, ph < ch, th, th, c, t, t < k, p
which, with the applicable cases of the general constraints
[13] and [18] within each subgroup, yields Paninfs ordering
of these series. Insertion of the marker V after the coro-
nals allows them to be grouped as chaV (8.3.7).



































12. k p Y
13. s s s R
14. h L
which completes the construction of the Sivasutras.
Having seen how the Sivasutras' ordering of the conso-
nants follows from Paninian principles of generalization, we
can compare it to Cardona's alternative account. This
involves starting with the Pratisakhyas' listing of conso-
nants by place of articulation going from the back of the
mouth to the front:
[25] n fi n n m
To get from [25] to the first row in [24] we would then have
to assume that two sounds, m and n, were moved to the left
to create the actual Sivasutra grouping. But there was no
need to move the latter. Simply moving m to the head of the
list, and leaving n in place, would have been sufficient,
for the reasons explained above.
A similar problem would arise for the voiced stops if we
assume, with Cardona, that the Sivasutras were made by mini-
mally reordering an original
[26] gh jh th dh bh
g j t d b
The pratyahara yaN must include bh and exclude dh, and gh,
jhf dh may or may not be included in it because they don't
begin any suffixes of the relevant class. So the minimal
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change was then merely to shift bh to the left of dh. Why,
then, was it shifted so far to the left? (Our answer is
that it is not shifted: in virtue of [13], it is already
there.) And, for the voiced unaspirated stops, the question
is: why move the labial at all?
I conclude that the assumption that the Sivasutras have
been reordered from an earlier Pratisakhya-type listing does
nothing to explain their structure.
By this I do not mean that Panini in fact started from
scratch in constructing the Sivasutras. On the contrary, it
is virtually certain that he was acquainted with one or more
phonetically arranged listings of sounds such as those found
in the Pratisakhyas, and it is even quite possible that
there were previous Sivasutra-style arrangements that he
knew. It is also quite possible that Panini started with
one of those earlier arrangements and reordered it. What I
do claim is that such earlier works are in no way required
to explain the Sivasutras, and that therefore we cannot make
any inferences about Paninf s sources for the Sivasutras
from their structure.
An analogy may help to make the point clearer. An exam-
ination of Paninf s phonological rules shows that many of
them are similar to sound changes assumed to have taken
place in earlier stages of Sanskrit, and, moreover, that the
order in which the rules have to be applied is similar to
the relative chronology of the corresponding sound changes.
But it would be absurd to conclude from this that Panini
based his grammar on a historical phonology of Sanskrit,
reordering its rules where necessary. A contemporary gener-
ative phonology of a language would have the same property,
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and if the job were done right it should make no difference
whether the author knew anything about the history of the
language. Rather, because of an interesting property of
language, its synchronic and diachronic analyses are going
to be significantly related even if they are arrived at
independently. Similarly, the fact that phonetic and phono-
logical works on Sanskrit arrived at closely related classi-
fications of its sounds is the result of a fundamental fact
about language itself-that phonetic and phonological
features are drawn from the same set—and does not warrant
the conclusion that one classification was historically
modeled on the other.
It is said that god Siva revealed these fourteen classes
of sounds to Panini to get him started on the Astadhyayi.
We might now want to see a deeper point in this legend. Our
conclusions imply that if we did not possess the text of the
Astadhyayi, but merely a pretheoretical description of
Sanskrit phonology, the main principles of Paninfs grammar
could be inferred just from the way the phonemes of Sanskrit
are organized in the Sivasutras.
Notes
1. 6.1.101 ff., 6.1.182.
2. 1.1.3, 1.1.48, 1.2.9, 5.1.131, 6.1.77, 6.1.127, 6.3.61,
6.3.121, 6.3.123, 6.3.134, 7.1.73 ff., 8.2.76.
3. 7.2.11, 7.3.51.
4. 1.1.51, 6.3.11, 7.4.13, 8.4.57.
5. Of course, if e and o were reversed, the pratyahdras
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that now begin with e would begin with o. Since no
pratyahara begins with either r or I, no rule would even
have to be changed in any way if they were reversed.
6. Notice that unlike the economy principle, this would be
specific to the construction of the Sivasutras.
7. Cardona (1969, 38). More compelling examples of this
point will be given below.
8. This point has been insightfully discussed by Henry
Smith, of Stanford University, in a paper to appear in
the Journal of Indian Philosophy.
9. Therefore, the maxim ArdhawMralaghavena putrotsavam
manyante vaiyakaranah 'grammarians value the saving of
half a mora like the birth of a son' has more than a
grain of truth, and Cardona (1969, 41) is wrong in ridi-
culing the "mania for matralaghava" as "a property of
lesser original Indian grammarians [sic]." It is quite
natural to have faith in a principle, which, in concert
with an appropriately designed metalanguage, reveals
deep generalizations in the grammar of Sanskrit.
10. E.g., jhaY rather than jhaS in 8.4.62 because of 8.4.63,
and jhaL in 8.2.26 because of 8.2.31.
11. The avoidance of vacuous overgeneralization is, however,
not observed as rigorously as the economy principle. In
particular, jhaL (e.g., 1.2.10) and aC (e.g., 7.2.89),
which are practically synonyms of "consonant" and
"vowel," are often overused. Another case is iN for iT
in 8.3.57.
12. 1.1.10, 1.1.14, 1.1.47, 1.1.57, 1.1.59, 1.1.64, 1.2.27,
1.2.28, 1.3.2, 2.2.34, 2.4.66, 3.1.22, 3.1.62, 3.1.97,
4.1.56, 4.1.89, 4.1.121, 4.1.156, 4.1.170, 4.2.72 ff.,
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4.2.109, 4.2.113, 4.3.67, 4.3.72, 4.3.150, 4.4.64,
5.1.39, 5.3.78, 5.4.57, 6.1.62, 6.1.77, 6.1.125,
6.1.134, 6.1.188, 6.1.205, 6.2.83, 6.2.119, 6.2.138,
6.2.190, 6.2.194, 6.3.68, 6.3.74, 6.3.101, 6.3.119,
6.3.135, 6.4.16, 6.4.62, 6.4.63, 6.4.77, 6.4.163,
7.1.61, 7.1.72, 7.1.73, 7.1.97, 7.2.3, 7.2.10, 7.2.61,
7.2.67, 7.2.89, 7.2.100, 7.2.115, 7.2.117, 7.3.72,
7.3.87, 7.4.47, 7.4.54, 8.2.21, 8.2.108, 8.3.32, 8.3.34,
8.3.89, 8.4.12, 8.4.29, 8.4.46, 8.4.49.
13. 6.1.104, 6.3.68.
14. 1.1.48, 6.1.45 ff., 6.1.78, 8.2.108.
15. 1.1.1, 7.3.3, 8.2.106.
16. 1.1.2, 6.1.69, 6.1.94, 6.1.109.
17. 1.1.45, 6.1.77, 6.4.81, 6.4.156.
18. 1.1.51, 6.3.111, 7.4.13 ff., 8.4.57.
19. 1.1.69.
20. 8.3.3, 8.3.9, 8.4.2, 8.4.63.
21. 1.1.7, 1.2.10, 1.2.26, 1.3.3, 3.1.12, 3.1.22, 3.1.83,
3.1.124, 3.2.149, 3.3.121, 6.1.68, 6.1.174, 6.1.179,
6.3.9, 6.3.10, 6.3.59, 6.4.2, 6.4.24, 6.4.49, 6.4.120,
6.4.150, 6.4.161, 7.2.3, 7.2.7, 7.2.85, 7.2.113, 7.3.89,





25. Within the grammar, the convention holds that vowels and
consonants are not homorganic (1.1.10). But such
generalizations as [13] are, of course, not part of the
grammatical system, and logically prior to it, so they
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naturally do not obey its rules (though they are arrived














38. 7.4.61, 8.3.28, 8.3.35 ff., 8.3.58, 8.4.49.
39. 1.1.58, 8.4.54 ff.
40. To be precise, bas requires this order by economy; bhas
could in principle include all the aspirates because
1.1.50 sthane 'ntaratamah 'in replacing, the closest
[replacement is chosen]' would give the right results.
Exclusion of jh from it is preferred, however, because
it avoids vacuous overgeneralization.
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BHAVANANDA ON "WHAT IS KARAKA?''
Bimal Krishna Matilal
Professor Shivram Dattatray Joshi has devoted his
scholarly activities to interpreting Panini and the
Paniniyas. He has critically examined the traditional
commentaries and made a significant contribution to the
modern study of Sanskrit grammar, Panini, and linguistics.
He has also been the source of inspiration for many scholars
of younger generations. I admire his critical outlook and
penetrating insight into the Paninian tradition and I wish
to take this opportunity to add a personal note. I respect
Professor Joshi as my satirthya. We both studied at Harvard
with Professor Daniel H. H. Ingalls, although at different
times. On this occasion, I wish to honor him by contri-
buting to his felicitation volume a brief note on the notion
of karaka in Nyaya and grammar, which spans the twin areas
of grammar and logic. This is undoubtedly a subject that
combines both his interests and mine.
There has been much discussion in recent years about the
notion of karaka in the Paninian system of Sanskrit grammar.
Modern exponents of Paninfs grammar (and it goes without
saying that Professor Joshi holds a unique position among
them) have revived the old controversy about whether the
karaka categories are only "a reflection of case form"
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(Whitney 1893; reprinted in Staal 1972, 166) or are "logical
or ideational relations between a noun and a verb" (Faddegon
1936, 18). But, in fact, these exponents have gone further
in generating controversies regarding the status of karaka
categories: are they extralinguistic, "purely" semantic,
syntactic, or syntactico-semantic? That a karaka is not
what we call a "case" in Latin or western grammar is fairly
obvious, hence there is no need to belabor the point. This
is true despite the fact that what has been described as
case grammar by C. J. Fillmore (1968) is probably very simi-
lar to Panini's system. This state of affairs is not sur-
prising for the simple reason that from a distance one tree
looks exactly like another but as one draws nearer the dis-
tinction becomes clearer. Hence, Cardona is right in empha-
sizing the need for caution and subtlety in this matter.
I do not wish to repeat the arguments and counterargu-
ments that surround the question of the actual status of the
karaka categories. Obviously, they are neither "purely
semantic" nor "purely syntactic," as far as Panini's own
system of grammar is concerned. The karakas were intro-
duced, as far as I can see, as an expedient that would faci-
litate Panini's own description of the Sanskrit language in
general, and would, in particular, mediate between the
introduction of affixes in words and the representation of
certain semantic relations. Cardona says that Panini's
karaka classifications "serve as intermediaries between
grammatical expressions and their semantics" (1978, 221).
What I intend to do, then, is throw some light on other
aspects of the problem, deriving my material, and insight,
from the writings of the Nyaya system, particularly from an
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old exponent of the school, Vatsyayana (350 A.D.), and a new
- 2
philosopher, Bhavananda (c. 1570 A.D.). It is by no means
clear whether this rather different approach to explaining
Panini's section on karaka can in any way resolve part of
the old controversy between semantic and syntactic cate-
gories. But it is also possible that the issue is entirely
counterproductive, for the controversy is heavily dependent
upon our ability to draw a sharply fixed and nonarbitrary
line between what we call semantics and what we call syntax.
Elsewhere I have expressed doubts about this matter on
3
different grounds. The point is not that such a sharp line
of demarcation between grammar and syntax, on the one hand,
and meaning (or semantics), on the other, cannot be drawn,
but that such a line is movable by the particular theories
of grammar. Therefore, in one view, we see that karaka
categories in general, and the karma-karaka (=object) in
particular, are grammatically pertinent (for they regulate
particular rules of affixation, affix replacement, and so
on) but the subclassification of karma-karaka as 'effected'
(karya), 'affected' (vikarya), and 'reached' (prapya) is a
matter for the domain of semantics. In another view, even
this subclassification can be considered syntactically
pertinent. However, since Panini's principle concern was to
derive and account for grammatical forms that occur within
sentences, and the relations among such forms, the former
view seems to be more compatible with his system of grammar.
The same fact may explain why Panini does not recognize a
distinction between agents (kartr) that are sentient beings
and those that are not, and why he classifies both things, a
man (Devadatta) and an axe, as agents receiving the same
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analysis and derivation. On the other hand, expediency
prompted Panini to recognize this distinction in rule
1.3.88, which accounts for the active endings there after a
causative verb despite the fact that the "pre-causative"
primitive root-verb usually has middle endings.
It is also known that Panini and the Paninlyas were
sahdapramanakah, as Pataiijali truly emphasizes (and as K. A.
Subramania Iyer [1948] more recently argued). This means
that we should stress the point that grammar is concerned
not with ontology but with what people say, how people speak
of things and events. Panini's karaka categories fit so
well with this point that we can easily account for such
usages as 'the cauldron cooks' (sthali pacati) or 'the sword
severs' (asis chinatti). For, although we know that the
cauldron is not the agent of cooking, as the sword is not
the agent of severing, people do speak in this manner.
Hence, the grammatical category "agency" must be assigned to
such things to account for the role of these words in
certain sentences.
Having briefly outlined the Paninian approach to karaka
categories, I wish to deal now with the comments of the
Nyaya school. The Naiyayikas, to be sure, were artha-
pramanakah. In other words, they were interested in things,
facts, and events, and not particularly interested in how
people speak about them. They were concerned with ontology
and epistemic questions, although they preferred to derive
their insights into such matters through analysis of how
people speak about them. Vatsyayana got involved in the
question of karaka while trying to answer the Madhyamika
criticism of the notion of the pramana-prameya-pramiti-
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pramatr distinction, which forms the basis of their pramana
epistemology. To put it simply, the Madhyamika argued that
the pramana-prameya distinction is arbitrary since the same
item, object, or thing, can be an instrument for knowledge
(pramana) on one occasion and an object of knowledge
(prameya) on another. Vatsyayana, in reply, takes the bull
by the horns and says that designations such as "instrument"
and "object" (of knowledge) follow ultimately the general
pattern of designation by such karaka categories as "instru-
ment," "agent," and "object." I quote (NS 2.1.16):
[All] karaka words apply through the incidence of some
grounds or other. In "The tree stands [erect]," the
tree is the agent because it has independence with
regard to the matter of its own standing erect. In
"[He] sees the tree," the tree is ardently desired
through the action of seeing [by the agent] and hence is
5the object In "He shows the moon by the tree," the
tree is the chief instrument for showing and hence is
the instrument In "[He] sprinkles water for the
tree," the tree is intended to be the beneficiary by the
action of sprinkling, and hence is the dative or the
recipient. In "The leaf falls from the tree," the tree
is the ablative for it is unmoved when separation
through movement is intended [or it is sanctioned by
Panini's rule: the "unmoved" in separation is the abla-
tive, 1.4.24]. In "The crows are in the tree," the tree
is the locative by virtue of its being the locus or
substratum [or, by Panini's rule: the substratum is the
locative, 1.4.45]. In this way, neither the thing
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itself nor the action itself is a karaka. What then?
When a thing is a participant [sadhana] in some action,
or when it is endowed with a special functional acti-
vity, it becomes a karaka. That which is independent in
the performing of an act is the agent; it is neither the
bare thing nor the bare action. That which is most
desired to be obtained [by the agent] is the object; it
is neither the bare thing nor the bare action. In this
way one can explain the notion of the most efficacious
[in defining the instrument], and so on. Thus, the
designation of the karaka categories follows the same
rule. The designation of a karaka applies neither to
the bare thing nor to the [mere] action. What then? It
applies to the thing that participates in action and to
that which is endowed with some special functional acti-
vity.
Vatsyayana's treatment of karaka is rather elementary.
He refers to Paninf s six major rules, which "define" the
six karakas in their initial or primary meanings. He quotes
the three sutras in parts. He ignores the usage of karaka
categories in their secondary senses. But Panini's assign-
ment of the designation of the different karaka categories
to objects is based upon many other considerations. For
example, sometimes the presence of certain prefixes in the
root verb turns a locative into an object (Panini 1.4.46) or
the use of certain roots with specified meanings turns an
object into a dative (1.4.36). Vatsyayana's discussion
ignores such secondary karaka designations. Uddyotakara
comments that Vatsyayana's definition of the object (karma)
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can be so interpreted as to include the tathayuktam
canipsitam rule (1.4.50).
Let us now switch to Navya-nyaya. I shall deal with
Bhavananda's definition of a karaka in particular and the
Navyanyaya discussion of this concept in general. Bhava-
nanda wrote, among other things, an excellent treatise, very
- 7
concise, called Karaka-cakra. I shall discuss only the
general definition of a karaka.
In the Navyanyaya school, the authors usually deal with
two principal ways of answering the question "what is
karaka?" (the "quiddity" of a karaka). Both definitions
were prevalent in the vyakarana tradition. One is derived
partly from the etymology of the word karaka and partly from
the initial remark of Pataiijali in his Vyakarana-Mahabhasya
under the sutra (head rule = adhikara sutra) "karake"
(1.4.23):
karoti kriyam nirvartayati
That which does, performs the action'
Etymologically, karaka means 'a do-er, an actor'. From this
one can say that a karaka is that which performs some action
or that which generates or causes in some way the action in
question. This definition is variously formulated: kriya-
janakam karakam or kriyd-nimittam karakam. We must note
at least two pertinent points. Although I have translated
kriya as 'action', there is a need for subtlety here. Kriya
stands for the meaning of verbal roots or dhdtu. The dhatus
are given in the list called dhatu-patha, which is part and
parcel of the Paninian system of grammar. It just happens
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that certain dhatus in the list do not mean action, but
rather substance. The root gadi means 'part of the face7.
Hence, to assign karakatva, in fact "agency" (=kartrtva), to
the word kapolam Cthe cheek') in the sentence gandati
kapolam (The cheek is identical with the part of the
face'), we have to take kriya in the definition not simply
in the sense of action but as the meaning of the root verb.
The other point is this: if karaka means 'a do-er', then
it will be synonymous with the agent (kartr), and the other
karakas must be excluded. Bhartrhari points out that we can
avoid this difficulty in the following way. All the
karaka-itenis are in some sense doing something, or perform-
ing some function, towards completion of the main action.
When Devadatta is cooking, the logs burn to allow the cook-
ing, the pot holds the rice for cooking, the ricegrains
soften to facilitate cooking, and so on. In this rather
loose sense, they are all behaving as agents. But we call
one the instrument, another the object, and another the
locative when we wish to underline the differences in their
roles and functions toward the completion of the main .
action. Compare:
nispattimatre kartrtvam sarvatraivasti karake
vyaparabhedapeksayam karanatvadisambhavah
(Vakyapadiya IIL7.18)
The second way of defining karaka is to partly emphasize
its syntactic role. A karaka is that which is (syntacti-
cally) connected with an action-verb, or kriya. The word
kriya is ambiguous in Sanskrit; it can be used both as a
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semantic entity and as a syntactic entity, that is, in one
sense it belongs to the ontological category, in another
sense to the grammatical category. The Sanskrit formulation
of the definition is kriyanvayitvam karakatvam.
Both of these definitions have been faulted. As has
already been noted, the causal relationship between a karaka
and the action must be taken in a broader sense so that it
could include both the direct relationship and the indirect
or a chain" relationship. Otherwise, only the agent or the
instrument could be the karaka. That which we call the
dative or the ablative is only very indirectly connected
with the action by causal relationship. Now, if we widen
the notion of causal relationship in this way, we make the
definition too wide or overextensive (ativyapta), for it is
agreed by all parties in Sanskrit grammar that the genitive
is not a karaka. Intuitively it is believed that the so-
called genitive (Parrinf s term for it is sesa 'the remain-
der*) is that which expresses a relation between one thing
(dravya) and another—such as ownership or parenthood,
Caitra's rice or Caitra's son. A karaka underlines the
relation between a thing (dravya) and an action. Of course,
dravya 'thing5 in this context should be taken in a techni-
cal sense; any substantial expression denotes a dravya for
8the grammarian. At the syntactic level, the so-called
genitive combines one nominal or pronominal word (namapada)
with another but a karaka combines a nominal or pronominal
word with a verb.
The overextension of this definition can be shown in the
following way. Consider the example:
271
caitrasya tandulam pacati
'(He) cooks the rice of Caitra'
Here the word caitra is genitive and hence has the sixth
ending (sixth triplet in sutras 4.1.2 and 1.4.104). It is
not a karaka. The sixth triplet applies when relations
other than the karaka relation are to be expressed (this is
the import of rule 2.3.50). But our definition for karaka
will be unduly inclusive of this non-karaka, for here, too,
the indirect and "extended" causal relationship holds
between the action of cooking and Caitra. The person (the
cook) could not have cooked the rice in question if Caitra
had not given his tacit permission (for Caitra owns the
rice). Hence, the definition is faulty.
The second definition also suffers from such a plight,
for we cannot assume that this (syntactic) relation with the
verb must be a direct relation. Why not? Panini has pre-
scribed that under certain circumstances some objects
(karma) or some instruments (karana) will be designated as
sesa, a non-karaka. Specific conditions are mentioned, for
example, in rules 2.3.51 through 2.3.56. Some of these are
sarpiso janite Che acts because of butted) and matuh
smarati Che remembers mother*).
In these cases, the nominal items in boldface are in
direct syntactic connection with their respective verbs but
they cannot be designated as karakas9 according to the
received doctrine, because the fault of overextension
(ativydpti) will again arise. If, in order to avoid this
difficulty, we do not qualify the syntactic relation at all,
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either directly or indirectly, we will run into another form
of overextension. Consider the example:
brahmanasya putram panthanam prcchati
'He asks the son of a brahmana about the way*
Here the nominal item brahmariasya can be said to have
indirect (syntactic) connection with the verb prcchati
through the intermediate item putram. The idea is that, if
a is connected with 6, and 6 is connected with c, then a is
in some way connected with c.
I shall now give Bhavananda's own treatment of the
general definition of a karaka. I shall divide his comments
into six parts and give the translations thereof, adding
explanatory notes and my comments along the way.
Par t It Translation (Karaka-cakra): deliberation on the
notion of a karaka. With regard to the six karakas, we
cannot say that the general definition [of karaka] is: a
karaka is that which becomes a causal factor of an action/
verb.
Note, As already noted, the Sanskrit word kriya is ambi-
guous. The commentator interprets kriya as dhatvartha (=
the meaning of the root-verb) and says that he follows the
grammarians (sabdikas) in this matter. The meaning of a
root is usually an action (vyapara), or the result (phala)
of such an action, or both (phalavyaparayor dhatuh). In
gramam gacchati ('he goes to the village') the result of
going is the final contact (samyoga) between the man and the
village (his reaching there). A causal factor in such
contact is as much the action of going as it is the village
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gone to. We may avoid the problem (of overextending this
tentative definition of kdraka to include the action of
going) if we rightly insist upon the dual nature of the
meaning of a root: action plus the result.
Par t 2s Translation. [Such a definition is not accept-
able,] for it will overextend to Caitra, etc., in such
examples as caitrasya tandulam pacati ['he cooks Caitra's
rice5]. Caitra here is a genitive [a non-karaka]. But he
can be a causal factor of the action of cooking by his func-
tion of supplying the rice to be cooked, just as a dative or
a recipient kdraka [the brdhmana] becomes the causal factor
in the action of giving [in, for example, brdhmandya dhanam
daddti "he gives wealth to the brdhmana'l by permitting the
agent to give.
Note® The counterexample has already been explained in
my introductory comments. The point to note here is that we
have to include both direct and indirect causal factors when
we are defining the kdrakas in this way. This leads to
overextension.
Par t 3: Translation. But [the acceptable definition is:]
a kdraka, both in its principal sense and in its secondary
sense, is that which is "syntactically connected [anvayin]
with the action/verb through the intermediary of the mean-
ings of the case-affixes [= vibhaktis]. A principal kdraka
is both a causal factor of the action and connected syntac-
tically in this way with the action/verb. In order to avoid
overextension to adverbs such as stokam ['seldom'] in stokam
pacati ['he seldom cooks'], we have added the phrase
"through the intermediary of the meanings of the case-
affixes" to the definition.
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Note. Bhavananda evidently recognizes two kinds of
karakas, the principal as well as the secondary ones. An
example of the former is gramam gacchati Cgoes to the
village')? wherein the village is a causal factor of going,
as explained above. An example of the latter is ghatam
janati ('knows the pot'), wherein the pot, in a certain
view, may not be strictly called a causal factor of the
action of knowing. The point is that all secondary karakas
would be at least syntactically connected with the action/
verb through the intermediary of the meanings of case-
affixes, I have taken the liberty of translating vibhakti
as 'case-affix'. These case-affixes are enumerated by
Panini in his rule 4.1.2.
Panini did not formulate any rule to prescribe affixes
for adverbs. In a way they were left dangling. Usually the
singular affix of the second triplet (dvitiya-vibhakti) or
that of the third triplet (trttya-vibhakti) is used to mark
adverbs. Although these endings, or affixes, are not
usually regarded as expressing karakas, the syntactic con-
nection of such adverbs as stokam with the verb is undeni-
able. Hence, overextension to such adverbs is obviously
possible. It is contended that the affixes in these adverbs
do not mean anything, and that they are added to the nominal
stems of adverbial words in order to turn them into usable
words in a Sanskrit sentence, that is, into a pada. The
dictum is that a (nominal) stem has to be Sanskritized by
adding inflections (affixes). Only an affixed or inflected
word is usable in a Sanskrit sentence. Bhavananda obviously
favored this interpretation of the adverbial affix in San-
275
skrit and cited the above as a counterexample to justify his
appendage to the definition.
There is another way of interpreting the adverbial
affix: stipulating that adverbs are to be treated as adjec-
tives or qualifiers of the verbs. In this case, the affixes
that we add to the adjectival stems are said to denote iden-
tity (or abheda). If we say that such meanings as abheda or
prakara belong to that which is denoted by a vibhakti, or an
affix, then obviously the adverbs (as well as the adjec-
tives) will be treated as karakas. This is an acceptable
solution. In fact, one can argue that adverbs are karakas
according to Panini. That is how we can support such formu-
lations as mrdunyau, wherein ya(N) is added to mrdu-nl in
the sense mrdumadhuram yatha syat tathd nayate ('takes very
softly3) by rule 6.4.82. There is a varttika under 6.4.82,
which allows ya(N) after roots that are preceded or prefixed
_ * 9
by a karaka or a gati. Now, if mrdu is not to be treated
as a karaka, we would not expect ya(N). Mrdunyau, however,
is an acceptable form. In sum, adverbs can be treated as
karakas, which implies that Bhavananda's counterexample
(meant to avoid the supposed overextension) is unnecessary,
as is his additional qualification of the definition.
To solve this puzzle, it has been suggested by the
commentator that, without the qualification in the defini-
tion, we will have an "overextension" problem not with
regard to adverbs but with regard to the effort, or krti,
which is the meaning of the verbal suffix in pacati
('cooks').
Par t 4% Translation, In caitrasya pacati ['he cooks
Caitra's (rice understood)'] the relatedness belonging to
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Caitra is not syntactically connected with the cooking [the
action, for such syntactic connection requires syntactic
expectancy, which is selective]. The genitive is [syntacti-
cally] selective of the meaning of a nominal stem and the
verb is selective of the object, etc., and hence between the
verb and the genitive there is no mutually selective expec-
tancy. But, if we supplement the sentence with the word
tandulam Price'], there will arise an awareness in which
the elements will be mutually syntactically connected.
Note. If we say that in caitrasya pacati Che cooks
Caitra's') there is no syntactic connection between
caitrasya and pacati, then we find ourselves in an impos-
sible situation when we try to explain the connected meaning
arising from such expressions. For it is undeniable that an
expression such as caitrasya pacati is well understood as a
complete thought by a Sanskritist, and hence it must be
treated as a complete (natural) sentence.
Par t 5i Translation* Certainly the sixth ending in such
expressions as odanasya bhoktd ['(he is) the eater of rice']
and maitrasya pakah ['this is the cooking of Maitra'] is to
be treated as a karaka-affix, for it signifies either
objecthood [as in the former example] or agency [as in the
latter]. The rule kartrkarmanoh krti [Panini's rule 2.3.65]
prescribes the sixth endings in the sense of an agent or an
object when verbal nouns ending in krt suffixes follow.
Therefore, the grammarians [sabdikah] say that general
[unspecified] connectedness cannot yield a karaka, for there
would be no verb with which to connect it.
Note* We note that not all sixth endings are to be
excluded from the affixes denotative of the karaka relation.
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Special rules have been formulated to show that the sixth
triplet can also be denotative of agency or objecthood.
Par t 6: Translation. If we [syntactically] connect the
meaning of the sixth ending directly with the meaning of the
root, without supplementing the sentence with a nominal word
to mediate between them, as we may do in the example
guru-vipra-tapasvi-durgatanafn pratikurvtta bhisak
svabhesajaih
The physician should cure [the diseases of] the
guru, the brahmana, the ascetic, and the distressed
persons, with his own medicine9
then the correct definition will be this. A kdraka is that
which Is syntactically connected with the action-verb and is
endowed with any one of the six properties: agency, object-
hood, instrumentality, recipienthood [datlvehood], ablative-
hood, and locushood.
Note. The oddity of the translation "we [syntactically]
connect the meaning of the sixth ending/' etc., Is obvious
but It is difficult to translate the rather amorphous term
anvaya in this context. We can certainly talk about the
connection between the meaning of one grammatical element
(an ending) and the meaning of another but, as long as these
are also syntactic elements, and have some syntactic func-
tions to perform, their connection has a syntactic compo-
nent. The use of anvaya seems to underline this fact.
The cited sentence Is an interesting one. Here, if we
do not indulge in supplementation (cf. adhydhdra), we have
to say, as noted above, that the word with sixth ending (or
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the genitive) is directly connected with the verb even with-
out the intermediary of the supplemented word 'the disease'.
In fact, if the meaning of the root verb is simply 'curing
of the diseases of, then undoubtedly the genitive would be
directly connected with the action-verb. Hence, the over-
extension of the given definition to the genitive, a non-
karaka, would be unavoidable in certain cases. The final
definition given above avoids this problem by enumerating
the individual properties of each of the six karakas.
We may also note that certain affixes are upapada-
affixes, which are distinguished from Mrafca-affixes. If
the affixes are assigned under certain special conditions,
that is, in connection with certain words and other items
(and if such words are not directly regarded as causal
factors [sddhana] of the action), they would be called
upapada-sfSxes. An example is:
haraye namah
'Salutations to Harf
The fourth triplet is assigned by rule 2.3.16. There may be
a dual possibility in some cases, viz., the word may take a
karaka-affix and an upapada-affix when conditions for both
are met. In the case of such conflict, the usual dictum is
to let the karaka-affix take priority over the upapada-
affix. This exegetical rule is suggested by Patanjali under
sutra 2.3.4. Hence, we have the following example:
namaskaroti devan
'He makes namas to the devas'
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Here the object-affix, second triplet, takes precedence over
the fourth triplet (caturthi). Now, if we believe in
supplementation, we can even claim that in the previous
example the word haraye could be a karaka, for certainly it
would be syntactically connected with the supplemented verb
through the intermediary of some affix or vibhakti, that is,
caturthi.
In conclusion, we may add that, although the concept of
karaka was presumably clear (at least intuitively) to Panini
and the Paniniyas, it was almost impossible to define it, or
find a laksana or a uniquely distinguishing feature, that
would belong to all and only the six well-known karakas.
Various alternative suggested definitions try to capture
this intuition but fail to do so completely. In any case,
the discussion of these definitions brings us closer to
grasping this intuition. Hence, we can understand what
Panini meant by karaka even though we cannot fully articu-
late it. Bhavananda was well aware of this problem. His
final definition takes the bull by the horns and provides a
practical guide to correct usage (vyavahara) of the word
karaka. Udayana long ago said that the purpose of a defini-
tion (or laksana) is vyavahara-siddhi, guidance to the
correct usage of the term.
Notes
1. Cardona (1978, 233-34).
2. For Bhavananda's date, see Matilal (1977, 109-10).
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7. Published in Haridas Sanskrit Granthamala, No. 154, ed.
Brahmasamkara Sastri, 1942.
8. See Matilal (1971, 110-11).
9. Patanjali under P.6.4.82.
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A GLIMPSE INTO A PEE^PANINIAN VIEW
ABOUT VIKARANAS
G. B8 Palsule
Paninf s description of the Sanskrit language is
regarded as a model one. It was accepted even by the later
schools of Sanskrit grammar. Although they may have intro-
duced minor changes in it, such as replacing old code-
letters (anuhandhas) with new ones, breaking a rule in two,
joining two rules into one, shifting the place of a rule in
the interest of anuvrtti (so as to effect economy), and so
on, the main grammatical theory remained the same. But what
was the position before Panini? About this we know very
little because Paninf s outstanding grammar eclipsed the
older ones, which gradually were lost in the course of time.
Still, one comes across a clue here and a trace there, which
gives us an inkling of the older state of affairs. The
position of the vikaranas is a case in point.
In Sanskrit, a verbal form, say of the present system,
normally contains three elements: the verbal root; thfe
suffix that forms the stem (the vikarana of the Sanskrit
grammarians), sap I syan, etc. / zero in active, yak in
2
passive; and the personal ending (tin of the Paniniya
school). Whereas the verbal root denotes the verbal meaning
in general, everything else is supposed (in the Paninian
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system) to be conveyed by the personal ending. Thus, the
tense, the person and the number of the agent (in the active
voice), or the object (in the passive voice) are believed to
be conveyed by the personal ending. In other words, the
personal ending conveys the voice also.
What is the function of the vikarana in all this?
Apparently nil. In the active there is no uniformity of
vikaranas. It is sometimes sap, sometimes its replacements,
and sometimes its absence (as in the case of the ad- and the
hu- classes). So here the vikarana may not have a role in
the expression of voice. But what about the passive? The
vikarana ya(k) is indispensable in the passive voice (and in
the bhdve construction) in a sdrvadhdtuka construction.
And, it is not found anywhere else. Why is it that the
function of expressing the object, etc. (that is, the voice)
is denied to it? The question seems to be legitimate but
3here Paninfs position is clear. According to P.3.4.69,
the personal endings (substitutes of I) are expressive of
the agent, the object, or the verbal abstract. When it
expresses the agent, sap (or its substitutes or its absence)
is to come in; when it expresses an object or the verbal
5
abstract, the vikarana is to be ya(k). The vikaranas are
what are called "empty morphs" in modern linguistics.
According to ancient Indian terminology, they may at best be
called dyotakas.
But it seems that other grammarians held a different
opinion before Panini. A clue supporting this belief is
found in the Mahdbhdsya of Patanjali, in which there is a
discussion of whether P.2.3.1 (anabhihite) is necessary.
Katyayana first takes the prima facie view that the rule is
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superfluous. Its purpose is already served by the maxim
uktdrthdndm aprayogah. Pataiijali, explaining this view,
gives, among others, the example of the vikarana snam. Now,
although sap is to be set aside by snam, still sap could
also come in side-by-side with snam since they occupy
different places {sap follows a root while snam occurs as an
7infix). Still sap does not come in. Why? Because,
Pataiijali says, its office of expressing the agent is
already fulfilled. Read, for example, snam-bahuj-akaksu
tarhi. snam. bhinatti, chinatti, snamoktatvdt kartrtvasya
kartari sap na bhavati. Patanjali's statement that sap does
not come in because its office of expressing the agent is
fulfilled by snam is somewhat surprising since in the
Paninian system, as we saw above, that office belongs to the
personal ending and not to the vikarana. Here Kaiyata comes
to our aid. He says that Pataiijali's statement is based on
the view held by Paninfs predecessors: bhdva-karma-kartdro
vikaranartha iti purvacarya-darsanam asrityaivam uktam. It
is questionable whether Patanjali can legitimately quote a
view of some predecessors of Panini (which Panini definitely
did not accept) while discussing some other procedure of
Panini. I personally do not think it reasonable. Yet the
fact remains that some grammarians before Panini held the
view that the vikaranas were expressive of voice.
Recently I came across additional evidence, even older,
concerning this view of Paninfs purvdcdryas. Bhartrhari,
commenting in his Dipika on the Mbh on P. 1.1.14 (nipdta ekdj
andn), states that grammarians did not hold identical views.
Among the examples given to substantiate his statement
occurs the case of vikaranas also. He says that, according
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to some, the vikaranas (evidently sap and its substitutes)
first come in to denote the agent. To the root, which is
thus strengthened with the vikarana, is added subsequently
the personal ending, which does not add anything to the
meaning. Read, for example, tatha kesamcid vikaranah prak
kartary utpadyante I vikaranantat svarthe sarvadhdtuka-
Q
pratyayo bhavati. Here Bhartrhari expressly says that the
personal endings are svarthe, that is, they have no meanings
of their own.
An interesting point to note here is the particular
sequence of additions of grammatical elements adopted by
those other grammarians mentioned by Bhartrhari. The
vikarana, according to this view, was to be added first
(prak), the personal ending coming afterwards. This is the
opposite of the procedure followed in Paninf s system where-
in after the verbal root P.3.1.22 (dhatoh) first comes the
personal ending P.3.4.77,78 (lasya, tip-tas-jhi, etc.).
Depending upon whether this personal ending denotes the
agent or the object/verbal abstract, we get the vikaranas
sap I syan I zero or yak, respectively.
I think that this view of Panini's predecessors appears
to be reasonable in a way. Since sap I syan I zero, etc.,
are invariably connected with the present active and yak
with the present passive it is reasonable to regard these
vikaranas as the markers of voice in general. The endings
serve to give further particulars of the agent or the
object/verbal abstract such as the person and the number.
This also agrees with the views of modern grammarians
according to whom the tense- and mood-stem is formed first
(for example, bhava-, ad-, jvhvr, etc., in active, and
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bhuya-, adya-f huya- in passive). The personal ending comes
afterwards.
Panini's procedure, centered around the personal ending,
which is made to come first, results in a major defect: his
system cannot account for modal forms based on nonpresent
systems (that is, based on perfect and aorist stems such as
jagamyat, rurucyah, anahyam; and krdhi5 gahi, badhi, dhdtu,
9
bhutu). Since I have dealt with this subject elsewhere, I
will not go into it here.
NOTES
1. This may sometimes be absent, as in the case of the roots
of the ad-class.
2. There may sometimes be additional elements, such as the
causative sign i (nic) or the desiderative suffix sa(n)





6. P.2.3.1, Var. 1:
7. Var. 2:
8. The Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute's new critical
edition, Ahnika V? pp. 9-10, 11, 12.
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9. Verbal Forms in the Rgveda (Mandala VI), publication of
the Centre of Advanced Study in Sanskrit, class B, no. 4
(Pune: University of Poona, 1978).
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ON THE INTERPRETATION OF
VA PADANTASYA (8.4.57)
K. Kiinjiinni Raja
There is no unanimity among scholars regarding the use
of anusvara and homorganic nasals (parasavarria) in Sanskrit,
Panini's rule prescribing homorganic nasal (antosvarasya yayi
parasavarnah, 8.4.56) is immediately followed by the
optional rule va padantasya (8.4.57). It is clear that
parasavarna is compulsory only within a pada and is optional
at the end of a pada or between padas in a sentence. Para-
savarna is resorted to in the publications of the Bhandarkar
Research Institute, while anusvara is consistently used in
the Adyar Library publications, wherever it is grammatically
possible.
The late Venkatesh Shastri Joshi (1922-1979), a well-
known authority on Sanskrit grammar, stated that this option
in va padantasya should be applied in the case of real words
and not to upasargas (prepositions) and to the first member
of a compound, even though they are called pada technically
by Panini (Venkatesh Shastri Joshi, Problems in Sanskrit
Grammar [Poona: Dastane Ram Chandra, 1980]). He says that
"in the case of compound words as well as between the prepo-
sitions and verbal forms parasavarna sandhi should be
observed necessarily (compulsorily)" (p. 28). He continues
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(p. 128),
In the previous paper "Panini and the Paniniyas on
Samhita" I had pointed out that the external Sandhi
rules should not be observed as compulsory rules in a
sentence. But as an exception to this system of writing
I am going to suggest here in this paper that parasa-
varna sandhi rules should be observed necessarily in the
case of compound words as well as the prepositions and
verbal forms even though each member of the compound
words as well as the prepositions and verbal forms could
be technically treated as different padas in a sentence.
He repeats the same idea in another paper (in the same
volume) written in Sanskrit:
I SlcT:
TFT
The hasty statements of recognized scholars are likely
to mislead the unwary. Thus, probably on the basis of
Pandit V. S. Joshfs theory, a scholar who reviewed Profes-
sor S. D. Joshfs edition of the Mahahhasya (samarthahnika)
in the Journal of the Asiatic Society, Bombay (vol. 43-44,
p. 296) made the following remark: "One cannot help saying,
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however, that a critical edition of a work like the
Vyakarana Mahdhhasya is naturally expected to print the text
with Parasavarna where necessary. pfgqH^IS^T and not
#f^%ts^f (p. 7, 1. 9)."
The option sanctioned by the sntra va padantasya applies
to all padanta® as conceived by Panini? and not merely to
the final of the free words. The aim of the present paper
is to show that Paninf s views on the interpretation of
padantasya are definitely against the view given by Pandit
Joshi
In the sutra Wt JM WJ: w t (P.8.3.25), the form samrdt
is ordained, rejecting the form samrat, which might have
come optionally by the sutra va padantasya,
Kdsikd says WRPT
Nydsa adds ^ t f ^ TMcf":
I W R R ^Rct §^TT: I cfFT ^c# S^R":
Nagesa says in the Sabdendtdekhara
Anusvara can come optionally here only by the sutra
If W[ is not a padaf there is no possibility of
the anusvara by T̂ H^lniW . Whence it shows that padanta
in this sutra is to be taken in the technical sense? which
includes the upasarga sam also. Otherwise there was no need
for the sutra Wt T # ^T: w t (P.8.3.25).
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TIME FOR A LITTLE SOMETHING
J9 A* P. Roodbergen
1. Two rather recent publications of the Centre of
Advanced Study in Sanskrit (VIBHA, Introduction, vi-viii;
and Proceedings, 59-62) have dwelt, in more or less detail,
on the structure (that is, the organization of rules) of the
Astadhyayi. The aim has been twofold: to show that this
structure reflects derivational procedure, and to show that
the Astadhyayi as we know it cannot reasonably be considered
the work of one author, having undergone changes at the
hands of later redactors, like other Vedic and Sanskrit
texts. This discussion is continued, from a different
angle, in the present article, written in honor of Dr. S. D.
Joshi, il maestro di color che sanno in the field of San-
skrit grammar.
2, In the derivation of finite verb forms it is practi-
cally taken for granted that first the finite verb endings
are introduced, then the vikaranas. But, as will be shown,
tradition has hesitated. Panini himself makes a distinc-
2 " - —
tion, or so it is assumed: the ardhadhatuka vikaranas
(except yaK, P.3.1.67) are introduced before the addition of
the finite verb endings but the sarvadhatuka vikaranas and
yaK come after because they are conditioned by the presence
of finite, sarvadhatuka verb endings. Why this distinction;
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what about the interpretation of the Paninisutras involved?
The points raised here do not imply any significant change
regarding the form ultimately derived. But they do have
some implications for a more remote plan, which it seems
worthwhile to explicate, regarding the phrasing of word-
building rules and their application in a particular order.
3. We start from P. 1.3.12. The rule says anndattanita
atmanepadam. It is usually explained as "[the endings
- 8
called] atmanepada [are added] after [a verbal base whose
vowel is marked as] anudatta, or which [verbal base] is
marked with ft!' The word anudattaiiitah is taken as a tech-
nical ablative. Accordingly, the endings mentioned should .
come immediately after the specified bases.
Vt I on this rule (Mbh. 1:274, 1. 18) says atmanepadam
niyamartham, or "[the word] atmanepada [is used here] for
the sake of a restriction/5 The restriction meant is
explained by the KV in the sense that the atmanepada endings
are retained only after verbal bases that have been marked
with anudatta or ft, not after others.
Vt II (Mbh. 1:274, 1. 15) says lavidhandd vihitam "[the
endings called parasmaipada and atmanepada] have been pre-
scribed after the prescription of [the section heading]
lasya," The idea is that the eighteen finite verb endings
have already been prescribed by P.3.4.78. So what is the
point in prescribing atmanepada again in P. 1,3.12? To
render this statement meaningful, it is assumed that
P. 1.3.12 is a restrictive rule, as explained by Vt I. But
Pataiijali's comment points elsewhere. He says (Mbh. 1:274,
1. 16-19):
294
The niyama [endings prescribed by the] restrictive rule
[P. 1.3.12] would have a chance of not applying because '
5the vikaranas intervene. The following is to be
decided here: [whether] the vikaranas should be intro-
duced [first], [or whether the endings prescribed by]
the restrictive rule [should be added first]. What to
do here? [The answer is that] the vikaranas [are intro-
duced first], because [they have been prescribed by] the
(\
later rules. Certainly also, the vikaranas are nitya
7'obligator/. They have a chance of applying whether
[the endings prescribed by] the restrictive rule are
applied or not.
From this Bhasya we conclude that the vikaranas are intro-
duced first, then the finite verb endings.
But there is a different opinion also. Patanjali, in
his comment on the same Vt (Mbh. 1:275, I 11-12) says "The
procedure of the Teacher offers us the clue that [the finite
verb endings prescribed by] the restrictive rule [are]
stronger than the vikaranas because in rules dealing with
o
vikaranas he mentions [the conditions] atmanepada and para-
smaipada.'9 This means that, unless the atmanepada or para-
smaipada endings have been added, we cannot introduce the
vikaranas. From this Bhasya we conclude that the finite
verb endings are added first, then the vikaranas. Tradition
is ambiguous. So much for P. 1.3.12.
4. The rules considered next are P. 1.499-100. The
first rule says lah patasmaipadam* The KV explains that
here the word lah is a genitive requiring (as its correlate)
the word adesa 'substitute'. In other words, lah stands for
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ladesah 'the substitutes of l\ Therefore, the rule is
interpreted to mean that the substitutes of I receive the
designation parasmaipada. The KV then enumerates the first
nine endings stated in P.3.4.78 and adds the participle
morphemes SatR (P.3.2.124) and KvasU (P.3.2.107).10 By way
of vidhi-rule, in which the designation parasmaipada is
used, the KV mentions P.7.2.1.11
The Nyasa on the KV contains some interesting comments.
The first part of the commentary is translated as follows.
Does [the word] lah represent a nominative or a geni-
tive? Of these two, if [we take it that] it represents
a nominative, then [by P. 1.4.99] the designation para-
smaipada would apply to I only, not to its substitutes
UP, etc. Certainly, these would also have [the desig-
nation parasmaipada] by sthdnivadbhdva 'treatment like
12the original'. But [the difficulty in this view is
that the word] lah [continued] in P. 1.4.100 cannot be
connected with [the word] tandnau [in this rule] because
• 13[the endings included in] taN and [the participle
morpheme] ana are not I. Here [we may try to find a
way out by assuming that] tandnau is that I which is
subsequently to become taN and ana [by replacement]. Or
15we have to explain that, since lah is mentioned, [and
since lah stands for ladesah 'the substitutes of V] the
substitutes of I are nothing but taN and ana because of
sdhacarya '[the fact of] occurring together [in one and
16
the same rule]'. But, in that way, if the understand-
ing of a desired meaning is to be established through
~ - 17
vyakhyana 'reasoned explanation', [the result] would
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be gaurava 'complication'. But in the view that [lah
represents] a genitive this difficulty does not arise.
That is why [the author of the KV] says lah iti sasthi
'[the word] lah is a genitive', etc.
Then the author of the Nyasa, after noting that this view is
not without difficulties either, goes on to refer to
Pataiijalfs Bhasya on Vt II on P. 1.4.99.
Kaiyata agrees with the KV. Nagesa, on the same rule
(P. 1.4.99), observes that, if we can take lah as a nomina-
tive, the designation parasmaipada would be applied to the
lakaras (IAT, etc.) only. Consequently, these lakaras could
18not be added after verbal bases marked with anvdatta or N.
Moreover, the nominative word lah, when continued in
P. 1.4.100, cannot be connected with the word tandnau in that
rule. Therefore, Nagesa agrees with Kaiyata.
As regards the earlier tradition, Katyayana and
Patafijali, in their comments on P. 1.4.99, keep silent on the
19interpretation of the word lah.
In conclusion, we may say that, although the question of
whether lah in P. 1.4.99 is a nominative or a genitive was
raised by tradition, the unanimous verdict is that lah here
represents a genitive.
5. But why a genitive? Apart from P. 1.4.99, the
independent word lah appears only in P.3.4.69 (lah karmani
ca. . .), where it undoubtedly represents a nominative.
The genitive form used by Panini is lasya, which also occurs
only once (P.3.4.77).
Suppose that tradition is wrong once again, and that lah
in P. 1.4.99 is a nominative. In that case, as stated by the
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Nyasa commentary, the rule means that I is called parasmai-
pada. Then what about P. 1.4.100? This rule says that the
finite verb endings called taff and the participle morpheme
ana are called atmanepada. Apparently, in the domain
stated, P. 1.4.100 overrules P. 1.4.99. So what is the diffi-
culty?
As correctly viewed by tradition (see section 4), the
difficulty is that the nominative word lahr when continued
in P. 1.4.100, cannot be construed with tananau. The reason
for the discontinuation of the nominative word lah in
P. 1.4.100 may, in fact, be stated as samarthya (or, rather,
20the lack of it). But the reason tradition does not take
lah as a nominative in P. 1.4.100 is that it requires lah as
a genitive in this rule. Here, the traditional argument
begins: since we need lah as a genitive in P. 1.4.100, why
not take it as a genitive in P. 1.4.99 also? But the ques-
tion is really whether lah should be continued in P. 1.4.100
at all, regardless of whether it is thought to be a genitive
or a nominative. Without lah, the rule still makes sense.
6. What would be the consequences if lah in P. 1.4.99 is
taken as a nominative and if this term is not continued in
P. 1.4.100? Let us first see whether and how these supposi-
tions would affect the interpretation and application of
P.l.3.12.
In the new interpretation of lah assumed here, techni-
cally all lakaras will be called parasmaipada. These
lakaras are subsequently replaced by the eighteen finite
verb endings called tiff (and parasmaipada, by sthanivad-
bhava). By way of exception to this designation, parasmai-
pada, the endings included in taJSl are called atmanepada by
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P. 1.4.100. These latter endings also are substitutes of I
(P.3.4.77). One immediate benefit of this new interpreta-
tion is that the problem stated under section 3, namely, the
issue of the immediate sequence of the atmanepada endings
after a verbal base, does not arise. The reason is that the
lakara itself has been introduced immediately after the
verbal base.
Now, P. 1.3.12 tells us after which verbal bases these
atmanepada endings are to be retained, and not the other
endings. They are to be retained only after verbal bases
marked with anudatta or with fj. Here the parasmaipada
endings are disallowed.









The rule concerned is P.3.1.33. It is conditioned by the
term Irlutoh. The rule says that the pratyayas sya and tasl
are added after a verbal base (P.3.1.91, dhdtoh) when the
lakaras IR (that is, IRN and IRT) and IUT follow. Here it
is clear that the ardhadhdtuka suffix sya is added at the
lakara-stsige. At stage (4) we retain the atmanepada ending


































































Here the rule concerned is P.3.1.55. It is conditioned
by the term parasmaipadesu. Does this mean that the aorist
vikarana aft is to be applied after lUft has been replaced by
a finite verb ending? Tradition says yes. But in the new
interpretation of P. 1.4.99 the element aft is already intro-
duced at the ldkara-sts.ge because I is called parasmaipada.
In the traditional interpretation of P. 1.4.99 the derivation
does not give rise to a problem. Kather, the difference
with the derivation proposed above is one of symmetry and
consistency, which is lacking in the traditional method of
derivation. But here another problem arises: are the rules
to be phrased with the help of elements that are already
introduced at the lakara-stage or with the help of elements
that are introduced later on, after the finite verb endings
have been added?
7* Let us now have a look at P.3.4.103, parasmaipade-
sudatto nic ca. The KV explains: parasmaipadavisayasya lino
yasud agarno bhavati sa codatto bhavati nic ca, translated as
"the lift, which is to be subsequently replaced by [the end-
ings called] parasmaipada, takes the augment yasUT, and that
[augment] has the udatta accent, and it is marked with ft"
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The Nyasa commentary clarifies this, stating that the word
parasmaipadesu in the sutgra should be taken as a
21visayasaptaml, not as a parasaptami. That is to say, we
should not assume that the addition of yasUT is conditioned
by the presence of following parasmaipada endings but only
that the augment is added in what is regarded as the domain
in which these endings are added later.
Why this interpretation? The Nyasa says linah parasmai-
padanam asambhavat, "because [lift] is incompatible with [the
endings called] parasmaipada." Why incompatible? Because,
if parasmaipadesu is taken as a parasaptami, then yasUT can
only be inserted after the lakara lift has been replaced by
the parasmaipada endings. But how, then, can yasUT be said
to be an augment of lift?
Kaiyata has not commented on P.3.4.103. Nagesa's
comment does not touch upon the point under discussion. The
earlier tradition, Katyayana and Patafijali, has nothing to
22
say on this point either.
Suppose, however, that I is called parasmaipada. In
that case, we can introduce yasUT earlier, at the stage of
lift, because lift, being a lakara, is called parasmaipada.
As a result, we need not assume that parasmaipadesu in
P.3.4.103 is a visayasaptaml but we can retain the technical
grammatical value of parasaptami. Then, after the intro-
duction of yasUT, the lakara lift is replaced by a finite
verb ending. In this case the difficulty raised by tradi-
tion regarding the interpretation of the word parasmaipadesu








































































































Here the augment yasUT is regarded as a part of lift, and
is replaced by UP. As a result, yasUT becomes a part of
ti. The suffix ti is sarvadhatuka. The addition of SaP is
conditioned by the term sarvadhatuke 'when a sarvadhdtuka
[suffix] follows' (P.3.1.67). Therefore, SaP is added after
the finite verb ending has been introduced and before yasUT
+ UP as a whole.
8, Another, related problem is solved at the same time,
that of the relation between P.3.4.102-3 (siyUT and yasUT)
and P.3.4.107 (sUT). The problem is that sUT, which is only
applicable before finite verb endings of lift beginning with
t/th, is prescribed by a special rule. As such it would set
aside the augments siyUT and yasUT, which are general
augments of lift. The traditional solution is explained in
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the KV on P.3.4.107, wherein it is assumed that between
P.3.4.102-3 and P.3.4.107 no utsarga-apavada relation holds
because sUT is the augment not of IIff (like siyUTIyasUT) but
of t/th. Therefore, the KV says, siyUTI yasUT and sUT have
different domains of application.
But this solution cannot be correct for it does not
apply when both siyUTI yasUT and sUT are introduced after
the finite verb ending has been added. The reason is that
siyUTIyasUT are applicable before all finite verb endings of
lift, whereas sUT becomes applicable only before verb endings
that begin with t/th. So there must be an utsarga-apavada
relation between siyUTIyasUT and sUT.
In the new interpretation of P. 1.4.99 the augments slyUT
and yasUT are introduced earlier, at the lakdra-stage,
because I is called parasmaipada. The augment sUT, on the
other hand, comes after the finite verb endings have been
introduced. Therefore, in this interpretation, siyUTI yasUT
do have domains different from that of sUT. Consequently,
the difficulty raised by tradition does not arise here.
9. Two more examples in which the traditional prakriya
presents difficulties deriving from the prior introduction
of the finite verb endings are babhuva 'he has become' and
bhavita 'he shall become'.
(A) The augment vUK
(1) bhu Dhatupatha 1.1
(2) bhu + UT P.3.2.115
(3) bhu + vUK+ UT P.6.4.88
(4) bhuv + bhuv + UT P.6.1.8
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(5) bhuv + bhuv
(6) bhuv + bhuv
(7) bhu + bhuv
(8) 6/m + bhuv
(9) 6&a + 6/mt;














The augment vUK is regarded as part of bhu by P. 1.1.46
and P.6.4.88. Therefore, at stage (4), bhuv is reduplicated
as a whole.
In babhuva the finite verb ending is anudatta by
sthanivadbhava (UP, P.3.1.4). The verbal base has the
udatta accent by P.6.1.162. In addition, we have P.6.1.195,
which says that before a suffix marked with I the immediate-
ly preceding element takes the udatta accent. Therefore, we
finally derive babhuva.
According to tradition, just as the ardhadhatuka
vikaranas are introduced after the finite verb ending has
been added, the augment is introduced only after a finite
verb ending has been added, although, in fact, the augment
is conditioned by L This gives rise to a problem. The


























At stage (4) two rules become applicable, namely,
P.7.2.115, which prescribes vrddhi for the verbal base
vowel, and P.6.4.88, which prescribes the augment vUK. The
conflict is traditionally solved by assuming that P.6.4.88
23is a nitya rule so that (by pb. 38) the vUK-rule prevails.
But, actually, there should be no conflict because augment
24rules are word-building rules. Since they are conditioned
by I, they are applied before the endings are introduced
which cause morphophonemic changes.
(B) The suffix tdsl
(1) bhu
(2) bhu + IUT P.3.3.15
(3) bhu + tdsl + IUT P.3.1.33
(4) bhu + iT + ids + IUT P.3.4.114;
7.2.35
(5) bhu + i + tds + UP P.3.4.78
(6) bhu + i + tds + Da P.2.4.85
(7) bhu + i + t° + d P.6.4.143
(8) bho + i + t + d P.7.2.84
(9) bhav + i + t + d P.6.1.78
bhavitd
In bhavitd the ending is anudatta by sthanivadbhava (and
by P.6.1.181). The pratyaya tdsl has the uddtta accent by
P.3.1.3 but the accent-bearing vowel is deleted. Then, by
P.6.1.161, the accent is shifted to the ending. The augment
- _ - 25
iT is anudatta by a statement of Katyayana. The verbal
base is accented by P.6.1.162. Here the accent of the
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ending prevails (see note 28). Therefore, the form should
read bhavita, which is not attested as a tense-formation in
26the Veda. This form is to be distinguished grammatically
from the homophonous form bhavita, which is a trC derivation
(P.3.1.133, antodatta by P.6.1.163). One form of bhavita is
a verb, the other is a noun.
In the traditional prakHya the suffix tasi is added
after the introduction of the finite verb ending. But tasi
(like sya) is conditioned by I. Therefore, it should be
introduced at the lakara-stage.
10. The examples cited above are of ardhadhatuka
vikaranas conditioned by a lakara, and they are to be intro-
duced at the lakara-st&ge before a finite verb ending has
been introduced in the prakriya. But, as stated in section
2, Paninfs procedure is different in the case of vikaranas
- _ 27 _ -
conditioned by a sarvadhatuka suffix. Sarvadhatuka
suffixes are always elements added later. They do not
belong to the earlier stages of the prakriya. The question
is, why has Panini adopted a different procedure here?
According to P.3.4.113, finite verb endings and suffixes
marked with S are called sarvadhatuka. As regards the verb
endings, two exceptions are made: those of the perfect {UT)
and those of the precative (asirlin) are called ardhadhatuka
(P.3.4.115-16). The suffixes marked with S are mainly those
mentioned in the section dealing with vikaranas (P. 3.1.68-
81). The point to be kept in mind here is that these
vikaranas are not conditioned by I but by a following
sarvadhatuka suffix.
Two examples may suffice.
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Both UP and SaP are sarvadhatuka suffixes. They are
also both anudatta by P.3.1.4. The verbal base takes the
udatta accent by P.6.1.162. Thus the finished form reads
bhavati.








YaK is an ardhadhatuka suffix. Ta is a sarvadhatuka
suffix. The verb ending is anudatta by P.6.1.186 (ad-























28the vikarana yaK, being sati sista, prevails over that of
the verbal base. Thus the finished form reads bhuyate.
11. Why this difference in treatment between vikaranas
conditioned by I and vikaranas conditioned by a sarvadhatuka
suffix? Could Panini not have phrased a rule like lot-lot-
lan-lin-ksu sap 6SaP [is added to a verbal base, dhatoh,
P.3.1.91] when [the lakaras] lATy etc., follow
5?29 Why not
introduce all vikaranas at the lakara-stage and establish a
common pattern?
The answer is that the sarvadhatuka vikaranas, apart
from playing a role in the derivation of verb forms, also
serve to derive nominal forms. They are also applicable
before krt-suffixes that are sarvadhatuka (Sit). Therefore,
obviously, Panini could not condition their introduction in
the prakriya uniformly by a lakara by phrasing a rule like
the one mentioned above.
Consider some examples based on the sequence P.3.1.137-
39. These rules prescribe the suffix Sa, which is
sarvadhatuka, and also a fcri-suffix. It is added, in the




















































































































































Examples (A) and (B) can technically be derived without
the addition of a vikarana because the substitute pib and
the augment nUM are conditioned by the krt-su&ix Sa only.
In (C) the vikarana SaP is needed to have guna of the
immediately preceding vowel. Since the suffix Sa is 2Vt£ by
P.l.2.4, it will prohibit guna by P.l.1.5. But SaP is Pit.
Therefore, it allows guna. In (D) SaP is required for the
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application of P.2.4.75 and the subsequent reduplication.
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Here SaP is needed to have guna of the immediately preceding
vowel. Like Sa, KHaS is iSlit. See the argument above with
regard to example (C).
If Panini had prescribed Sa and KHaS as substitutes of
I, these elements would technically be vikaranas conveying
the senses of tense and mood also. As this is clearly not
desirable, a distinction is required: some sarvadhdtuka
vikaranas are dependent on lakaras, others are not. Now the
other question arises, namely, why are traditionally the
Za&ara-dependent sarvadhatuka vikaranas introduced after the
lakaras have been replaced by wordform-elements? A possible
answer is: in order to ensure some semblance of uniform
treatment for all sarvadhatuka vikaranas. Just as in the
krdanta derivations SaP comes after a wordform-element
o
[Sa/KHaS] has been introduced, so also in the tinanta deri-
vations, where UP, etc., function as the wordform-elements.
12, So far, the process of establishing a reason for
Panini's different treatment of ardhadhatuka and sarvadha-
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tuka vikaranas in the derivation of finite verbs has pro-
ceeded on the basis of the assumption that sarvadhdtuke in
P.3.1.67 represents a parasaptaml. As stated in note 2, a
parasaptami requires the presence of a following grammatical
element in a particular stage of the derivation.
But what if sarvadhdtuke in P.3.1.67 is taken as a
visayasaptami? In that case, the formal presence of a
finite verb ending is no longer required for introducing the
sdrvadhdtuka vikaranas. We could add them at the lakdra-
stage.
Can we muster philological support from the Astadhyayi
for this hypothesis? There the term drdhadhdtuke is used
- 30twice in the sense of a visayasaptami. The only possible
use of sarvadhdtuke in the same sense is precisely
31P. 1.3.67. Thus we can only say that the use of a
visayasaptami in a closely related term is known here.
But there is at least one argument in favor of the hypo-
thesis. In the case of the drdhadhdtuka vikaranas the sati
32sista accent principle works very well because these
vikaranas are introduced in one of the early stages of the
prakriyd. It does not work as well in the case of Sit
vikaranas because, on the traditional assumption just
mentioned, these vikaranas are added in the finite verb
derivation after the endings have been formally introduced.
But, if these vikaranas are also introduced at an early
stage in the prakriyd, the sati sista principle will work
very well and we can justify the uddtta accent of finite
verb endings when required.
13, The occurrences of the visayasaptami are restricted
to the second and third adhydyas. To be more precise, we
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may say that they occur before P.3.1.91 (dhatoh). Here the
treatment of morphology begins: first that of morphemes
added to a verbal base (krt and tiff), then that of morphemes
added to a nominal stem (suP and taddhita). Thus P.3.1.91
marks the boundary between base/stem-forming rules and rules
dealing with suffixation.
This division in the Astadhyayl corresponds with the
order of the word-building process. We proceed from the
left to the right-from the base, to the vikaranas, to the
endings. The augments occupy a position between any two of
these three. On this basis the order of application of
rules may be stated as follows.
1. Base/stem-forming rules. These include rules dealing
with verbal base substitutes (P.2.4.36ff.) and vikaranas
(and their deletion). They also include rules dealing
with compound formation.
2. Suffixation rules (krt, tiN, suP, taddhita).
3. Morphologically and phonologically conditioned rules.
The corresponding divisions of the Astadhyayl, according to
the rule categories, are as follows.
1. Category 1: up to P.3.1.91.
2. Category 2: from P.3.1.91 to the end of the fifth
adhyaya.
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3. Category 3: the adhyayas 6-8.
Here the rule categories 1 and 2 represent the word-building
rules. They provide the analytical wordform-elements out of
which a usable word (pada) is forged by applying the rules
belonging to category 3.
14. From what has been stated above one conclusion may
finally be drawn regarding the order of the word-building
process and the structure of the Astadhyayi. The word-
building process proceeds in what is visually a left-to-
right direction. This direction corresponds to what (in the
order of application of rules) is a time sequence, earlier-
later. This correspondence lies at the base of the sati
sista accent principle. But, stripped of its accent conno-
tation, it can be said to be the governing principle of both
the word-building process and of the organization of the
Astadhyayi. That is to say, Panini's derivational procedure
as reflected in the organization of the Astadhyayi is depen-
dent on one principle, namely, that of the left-to-right
processing order. Rules dealing with left-side elements are
introduced earlier than rules dealing with right-side ele-
ments.
This ordering principle has nothing to do with a feeding
relation between rules in which the application of one rule
is made dependent on the effect of the application of
another rule. It has nothing to do, either, with the ques-
tion of conflict of rules. To solve a conflict, other prin-
ciples apply: paratva, siddhalasiddha, and utsarga-apavada.
It is this left-to-right processing order that is
violated by the position of the taddhita and samasa sections
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in the present edition of the Astadhyayi, The structural
reason is that the rules belonging to these sections
presuppose the existence of a fully derived pada. There-
fore, in order to make the Astadhyayi a more perfect proces-
sing machine, a word-processor in the literary sense of the
word, these sections should be lifted from their present
position and placed after the asiddha section.
Notes
1. Vikarana literally means 'a change-producer'. Panini
does not recognize a separate class of suffixes called
vikarana. The term is used once in a Varttika (Vt. VIII
on P.6.1.186) and a number of times in the Mhh. In
Paninf s grammar vikaranas correspond to wordform-
elements that occur between the verbal base and the
finite verb ending or a fcr£-suffix.
As regards the derivation of finite verbs, vikaranas
may be divided into three groups: conjugation markers,
tense/mood markers such as cli (P.3.1.43) and yasUT
(P.3.4.103), and the passive voice marker yaK
(P.3.1.67). For a detailed enumeration, see V. S. Apte,
The Practical Sanskrit-English Dictionary, rev. ed.
(Poona, 1957). The list occurs in vol. 3, appendix F,
"Grammatical Concordance" (by S. D. Joshi), 104-5, s.v.
2. The assumption is that sarvadhdtuke in P.3.1.67 repre-
sents a parasaptami not a visayasaptaml. This assump-
tion is traditional. The difference between a para-
saptami and a visayasaptaml is that the first requires
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the presence of the element named by the term in the
locative, whereas the second does not. See also KA,
note 1.
3. P.3.1.91 (dhatoh).
4. In P.3.4.77. hah (that is, V) is the common element in
the symbols I AT, etc., for tense, mood, and voice
(P.3.4. 69) in the Astadhyayi. For the role of I in the
derivation of finite verbs, see VIBHA, "Introduction,"
sect. 3. The formal substitutes of I are enumerated in
P.3.4.78.
5. The result is that the endings can no longer be added
immediately after the verbal base.
6. After P. 1.3.12, namely, in P.3.1.33-86.
7. Reference is to pb. 38, for which see PN9 185.
8. Asrayati.
9. Reference is to P.3.1.54-55, wherein the locative terms
atmanepadesu and parasmaipadesu serve as a condition for
the operations prescribed.
10. Although P.3.4.78 mentions eighteen finite verb endings,
the KV mentions the first nine only because elsewhere
the designation atmanepada prevails, by P. 1.4.100, which
is an apavada 'exception' to P. 1.4.99.
11. The rule says that before the aorist marker sIC,
followed by parasmaipada endings, the final vowel i, u,
or r of the verbal base takes vrddhi.
12. Reference is to P. 1.1.56. Thus the real designee of the
designation parasmaipada is L The endings UP, etc.,
are called parasmaipada by sthanivadbhava only.
13. This pratyahara includes the second series of nine
finite verb endings mentioned in P.3.4.78.
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14. Mentioned in P.3.2.124 as a substitute of I AT.
15. By way of anuvrtti in P. 1.4.100.
16. Sahacarydd va . . . ttt vydkhyeyam is to be read as one
sentence.
17. Reference is to pb. 1, for which see PN, 2.
18. Nagesa is wrong. He should say that after verbal bases
marked with anvddtta or N the symbol I will always be
called parasmaipada. But this is not a difficulty
because at a later stage in the prakriya this symbol
will be replaced by talSf or ana, and these are called .
atmanepada.
19. We have three Varttikas on this rule, all dealing with
the question of how to achieve coapplication of the
designation parasmaipada (or atmanepada) with the
pim^sa-designations prescribed by P. 1.4.101. In the
ekasamjnd section, in which P. 1.4.99 has been put, only
one designation can be applied at a time, namely, the
one prescribed by the later rule. Therefore, how to
ensure that the designation parasmaipada (or atmanepada)
is not set aside by the other designations? This
problem is solved by Katyayana by means of the
jnapaka-procedure (Vt. Ill on P. 1.4.99). The rule that
offers the desired clue is P.7.2.1 (see note 11). If
the jmmsa-designations had set aside the designations
parasmaipada and atmanepada, then P.7.2.1, which pre-
scribes the vikarana sIC before parasmaipada endings,
becomes meaningless. The reason is that the finite verb
endings cannot be called parasmaipada but only
prathama- , madhyama-, or uttamapv/rusa.
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The clue may be had from P. 1.4.99-100, also, because
we must give scope (avakasa) to the designations men-
tioned here in order to prevent their being stalemated.
Then why does Katyayana refer to P.7.2.1? His reason
must be that the designation parasmaipada has scope,
namely, with reference to the participle ending SatR.
Therefore, he refers to a rule that deals with finite
verb endings, namely, P.7.2.1.
20. See S. D. Joshi and Saroja Bhate, The Fundamentals of
Anuvrtti, Publications of the Centre of Advanced Study
in Sanskrit, class B, no. 9 (Pune: University of Poona,
1984), 45-47. The examples given in this book are all
of the discontinuation of items on the grounds of (lack
of) syntactic compatibility. One more possibility may
be considered here, namely, that the nominative word lah
is continued as a genitive word in P. 1.4.100 by vibhak-
tiviparinarria. But one of the findings of Joshi and
Bhate's anuvrtti book (see also p. 241) is that this
goes against Paninian procedure. If a genitive word is
needed, it must be expressly stated. See, for example,
the sequence P. 1.2.45-48 (wherein the genitive prati-
padikasya is expressly mentioned) and the sequence
P.3.1.43-44 (wherein the genitive cleh is expressly
stated).
21. See note 2.
22. The three Varttikas on P.3.4.103 are concerned only with
the questions of why yasUT should be Nit and why it
should be described as having the udatta accent.
23. See Bhattoji Diksita, Siddhanta-kaumudi (Bombay: Nirnaya
Sagara Press, 1915), No. 2174 on P.6.4.88.
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24. That is, rules providing the elements that together
constitute the raw material of the wordform.
25. Varttika VI on P.3.1.3. Patanjali explains the relevant
part of the Varttika as agama anudattd bhavantiti
vaksydmi 'I [Katyayana] am going to state that augments
are accentless'.
26. W.. D. Whitney, Sanskrit Grammar, 2d ed. (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1889), § 946, "the tense-use
begins, but rather sparingly, in the Brahmanas. . . ."
J. L. Brockington, in Righteous Rama: The Evolution of
an Epic (London: Oxford University Press 1984), notes
that in the core books of the Ramayana, with the excep-
tion of the first twenty-seven sargas of the
Ayodhyakanda, the use of the periphrastic future is
extremely rare (p. 19). It seems doubtful that the
rules dealing with the periphrastic future formed part
of the original Astadhyayl, The following points may be
noted.
1. The suffix Da is introduced at the end of the second
adhydya (P.2.4.85) as a loose appendix, and the rule
concerned shows no connection with the preceding
rules. The substitutes of verb-ending suffixes are
not introduced in the Astadhyayl until the beginning
of the third adhyaya.
2. P.3.3.15, which prescribes this future, is a kind of
replica of P.3.2.111 (anadyatane Ian). It has no
intrinsic connection with either the preceding or
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the following rule. If it is dropped, the conti-
nuity of rules does not suffer.
3. Finite verbs are usually unaccented in the utterance
(by P.8,1.28). But P.8.1.29 makes an exception for
the periphrastic future. The reason these forms are
excluded from the usual verb treatment must be that
they were not originally verb forms (Whitney,
Sanskrit Grammar, § 942b).
If it is assumed that the rules dealing with these
future forms are a later addition to the Astadhyayi, we
have another clue for Panini's rather early date,
presumably that of the early Brahmana period.
27. On the assumption that sarvadhatuke in P.3.1.67 (contin-
ued to P.3.1.86) represents a parasaptaml (see note 2).
28. Vt IX on P.6.1.158. The idea is that a pada can have
only one (udatta) accent. But, while deriving the pada,
we may have to introduce elements that have an vdatta
accent of their own. So how to retain one accent and
eliminate the rest? The answer to this question is
provided by the sati sista accent principle, which
states that the accent that is taught, when another
accent-bearing element has already been introduced,
prevails. That is to say, the accent of the element
added last in the prakriya prevails, at least if it has
an vdatta accent of its own.
29. Here UT, IRT, IRft, IUT, lUff, and asirlin are excluded
because in connection with these lakaras the suffix SaP
has not been prescribed.
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30. In P.2.4.35 and P.3.1.31. This is admitted by tradi-
tion; see the KV on these rules. Elsewhere the term
ardhadhatuke occurs in rules dealing with morphological
and phonological operations, where it has the sense of a
parasaptamt (P. 1.1.4, 6.4.4, 7.3.84, 7.4.49).
31. The other occurrences are in P.6.4.87, 6.4.110, 7.2.76,
7.3.84, 7.3.95, and 7.4.21. Here sarvadhatuke repre-
sents a parasaptaml.
32. See note 28.
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